

B. C. P. L. No. 7

BIR CHANDRA PUBLIC LIBRARY



Class No.....37.0:1.....

Book No....J-92.....

Accn. No...12507.....

Date.....

TAPA--31-1-62--10,000

The Function of Teaching

also edited by A. V. Judges

*

LOOKING FORWARD IN EDUCATION
PIONEERS OF ENGLISH EDUCATION

THE FUNCTION OF TEACHING

*Seven Approaches to Purpose,
Tradition and Environment*

Edited by
A. V. JUDGES



FABER AND FABER

24 Russell Square

London

*First published in mcmlx
by Faber and Faber Limited
24 Russell Square London W.C.1
Second impression mcmlxi
Printed in Great Britain by
Latimer Trend & Co Ltd Plymouth
1915*

Contents

INTRODUCTION	<i>page</i> 9
by the Editor	
1. T. S. ELIOT	23
by the Rt. Hon. Lord James of Rusholme, M.A., High Master of Manchester Grammar School	
2. KARL MANNHEIM	40
by Jean Floud, B.Sc., Reader in the Sociology of Education, University of London Institute of Education	
3. JACQUES MARITAIN	67
by A. C. F. Beales, M.A., Reader in Education, University of London King's College	
4. MARTIN BUBE	89
by A. V. Judges, D.Sc., B.A., Professor of the History of Education, University of London King's College	
5. SIGMUND FREUD	109
by Ben Morris, B.Sc., Ed.B., Director, Univer- sity of Bristol Institute of Education	
6. WILLIAM JAMES	135
by Margaret Knight, M.A., Lecturer in Psy- chology, University of Aberdeen	
7. WILLIAM TEMPLE	155
by the Rt. Rev. and Rt. Hon. J. C. W. Wand, K.C.V.O., M.A., D.D., formerly Bishop of London	

Editor's Introduction

The task accepted by the writers of the chapters which follow has been to isolate the notions concerning education and the teacher's role advanced by a handful of people who were selected by no means at random. In the first place the subjects were dealt with in a series of lectures given to the public in the large theatre of King's College, London, in the early months of 1858. The endeavour in each case was to present something of what was described in the notices as the 'educational message' of certain men whose influence on the thought of the present generation is known to be powerful. The attempts made to separate the contributions to educational thought from the main body of the authors' public utterances were I think the more interesting just because they were bound to be interpretative and incomplete. The choice had deliberately avoided those whose claims to consideration might have rested upon some conscious attempt to advance educational philosophy, though for M. Maritain perhaps some such claim might incautiously be made. We would most of us hold that the vital impulses now sustaining discussion about the role of education spring up in places quite remote from the usual debating grounds of the professional educators. The significant thoughts have often to be picked up on wave-lengths by no means in tune with an educator's way of thinking, and often need recoding in the language of the craft.

INTRODUCTION

The divination of such messages in the present volume cannot of course be completely worked out. Some of the contributors have found it sufficiently exacting to climb with the reader up to the shrine and to coax or provoke the oracle into a display of his powers. My colleague, Mr. A. C. F. Beales, seems to assert in Chapter III that the resulting manifestations could be mutually incompatible. But when we examine some of the more novel or illuminating appraisals of education's ways and purposes issuing from these philosophers, critics, seers and physicians of the soul, it does appear that some common ranges of interest are presented. This is the justification for bringing them together.

Thus the desire of Professor Ben Morris to show, admittedly in Freudian terms, that 'the fundamental problems in teaching are problems of attitude and feeling', that we must look for their clarification in the motives of the teacher as well as of the pupil, finds numerous echoes elsewhere in these chapters. Further, a concern for a restatement of ideas about the religious bearing of the teacher's work, even when that is not in strict terms presented as 'religious instruction', seems to show itself again and again, sometimes unexpectedly.

Another common element of interest declares itself quite plainly. For this generation the cultivation of the individual in isolation is moribund—dead or dying because the individual personality has ceased to be recognized as self-sufficient. Some people get satisfaction from viewing the individual learner as a focal point in a whole field of influences; and all those who nowadays have anything to do with what is called learning theory must study fields of influence. None of the preachers and publicists whose ideas are here considered will be seen to have anything to do with ivory-tower learning or Robinson-Crusoe learning. Education is admitted to be in large part a social exercise, and, even though the world of professional sociology has been slow to develop a place for it, it has a right to be treated as one of the most important social institutions.

INTRODUCTION

Accordingly, for those whose influence we are studying, some of the most worth-while questions spring out of the dynamic properties of human relations. Not the least significant preoccupation is with what it is that really happens between persons brought together in an educational situation. How much of all that does happen is deliberate or consciously accepted? What virtues, if any, are to be ascribed to the elements of individual give-and-take? In the passage of the torch—that symbol of knowledge which for long advised drivers on British roads of the proximity of a school—is it the actual handling of the torch by the parties concerned that claims significance; or is it the illumination *per se*? Or should we be influenced by the consideration that it has to be a standard torch of reputable descent in a long line of torches? Professor Buber would emphasize the act of handling at the moment of contact between teacher and pupil, and so would Freud. M. Maritain would be concerned with the purity of illumination. Mr. Eliot would have us look closely at the provenance of the torch: it would need to be a rather particular torch. William James would draw attention to the behaviour of the recipient as he went through the motions of accepting the torch. James has his place in our volume because he is the teacher who made plain the need to study the physiological mechanism of conscious learning in genuine life situations in which people have been brought together.

Such questions arise within the social framework. Their implications can be pushed well beyond the operations of the classroom, and they receive special emphasis in the field of morals and standards. In the field of youthful learning in which nature and nurture forge their partnership, responses are made both to the call in the blood and to the demands arising from social norms. Upon how broad a basis of inherited primary behaviour-patterns does the personality structure of the learner develop? There is no certain answer. But where if not in the ancestral inheritance should the teacher first look for the springs of moral judgment in the

INTRODUCTION

child? And how far can he assume that these are anything but generally shared dispositions—in the racial bloodstream, so to speak? Our basic drives are commonly thought of as self-centred, and bestial into the bargain, even to the point (with the Freudians) of self-destruction. But the classification of these impulses seems still to be loaded with gloomy and outdated prejudice about the state of the natural man, and to push his Fall back irredeemably into the abysses of biological time in a fashion which few theologians would tolerate.

At the present time, as Professor Morris seems to hint in Chapter V, the depth psychologists are becoming increasingly perceptive of the significance of religious mythologies that appear in settings far removed from the Aeschylean tragedy cycles with which they have been on borrowing terms so long. It is a commonplace of observation that discussion of religious and moral teaching is no longer able to neglect the thought systems of Freud or Jung. Current educational thinking is influenced by the stress given by some schools of psycho-analysis to the concept of wholeness in the personality of the maturing individual. No more is the *psyche* displayed as a mere battleground, offering a shadowy arena for the net-and-trident performances of the gladiators of the unconscious. We see, too, in the deepening concern of these therapists with the problems of education some reflection of the important work of psychiatric workers who study the home environments of young 'normal' children.

Admittedly these changes in emphasis and the defter treatment now given to the projections of the hidden part of the personality have not disposed of all the old objections to this whole way of thought. In the laboratories of the physiologist and the biochemist, the physical and behavioural functions of the growing child are complacently analysed without invoking the ghosts of Oedipus and Orestes. These functions can be explained as having their primal origins in the tissues of ancestors; although admittedly present-day thinking has

INTRODUCTION

more and more to allow for environmental factors in growth, such as adequate nourishment and the stimulus of friendly surroundings, as indeed also for the new specific aids which are brought in to remedy the accidental defects of the body's chemistry. For 'a few grains, perhaps even less than one grain a day, of desiccated ox thyroid given by mouth will turn an ugly, hairless, coarse-featured, apathetic, slovenly being into a pleasant-looking, lively and charming personality'.¹ Mr. Aldous Huxley has been writing in a manner alternately menacing and persuasive of the imminent introduction of mind-changing procedures which will exploit discoveries in drug therapy. We are asked to consider not only the correction of pathological symptoms in the diseased, but also the direction of personality changes in the healthy—'the procedure to which one might give such names as Pharmacological Education, Pill Morality, Synthetic Stoicism, Chemical Christianity'. These topics may yet be tabled for discussion at headmasters' conferences. 'Within a few years it may be that we shall be treating our encysted fossils, our dull or stubborn non-learners, not with homilies or lectures, but with something out of a bottle. This train of thought concerning the physiological roots of mental and spiritual manifestations is, of course, not as new as it looks. In this volume we are content to trace it back as far as James's *Principles of Psychology* (1880) and his *Varieties of Religious Experience* (1890).

William James was one of the first of the modern school of psychologists to confess his inability to draw an absolute distinction between mental activity and its physiological concomitants, as Mrs. Knight demonstrates in Chapter VI; and nowadays much academic philosophy is willing to go a long way with Ryle in the famous demonstration that the ghost and its physical machine are inseparable aspects of a single process. The old-fashioned logical dilemmas concerning mental wishes and somatic dispositions seem to me to give

INTRODUCTION

less anxiety to theologians than might be expected. M. Maritain, indeed, in the role of theologian, says somewhere that if self-love is recognized as one of the primary impulses, then love of the source of our being declares itself as yet more primitive. For him, as for his interpreter in Chapter III, respect for divine necessities is built into the human frame as a bit of natural endowment, waiting to come to life as the intellect is trained and begins to glimpse the real meaning of freedom.

To some of us this is a more agreeable picture of the roots of the personality than that of Freud, whose primary impulses, springing up through the unspeakable trapdoors of the *id*, seem to be unduly conservative in their functioning and too far opposed to the needs of personality development. Still, it is startling to discover the closeness of the parallels, in spite of differences in terms, in the various approaches to the growth and maturation of the personality. The characteristic and necessary features of the dynamic expressions of the individual self, according to Freud's teaching—namely *source*, *aim*, *object* and *impetus*—have a more than superficial resemblance to the four-fold Aristotelian grading of 'causes', in respect of development, adopted by M. Maritain and Mr. Beales from its special usage in the thought of St. Thomas.

Turning from nature to nurture, that is to the environmental continuum, on to which Mannheim and Mr. Eliot are disposed to throw far more responsibility in their education of values, we come to a question which is as old as the portentous debates of the Sophists, whether morality and the teaching which helps to keep it alive are more than the result of fluctuating group pressure; of influences on the dispositions of the young learner that have nothing to sanction or explain them save the ease with which they accommodate themselves to changes in the economic structure or the whims of the bosses. It is impossible to read Mannheim without appreciating the service he has performed in studying the kinds of stresses which established norms have had to undergo

INTRODUCTION

in times of rapid transition. He hated moral chaos, but his 'dynamic logic' left no room at all for universal truths, and so the norms he approved were not unchangeable: they were to be contrived patterns of conduct which would come to men as the reward of social study and democratic experiment. This attitude to change, as Mrs. Floud shows, led Mannheim on to propose the replanning of the social content of teaching as the essential ingredient of the scheme of rational adjustment which he saw as the right alternative to violent revolution. Mrs. Floud notes that the school will be required not only to be ahead of the masses in its social thinking—a not unreasonable expectation—but to take over functions neglected by other social institutions.

The position thus assumed by Mannheim does not explicitly abandon the widely held belief that teacher and pupil should explore together an area of common fundamental duties and decencies. Still, it is by no means in harmony with a religious approach to education, if by that we understand that conscience offers a channel of access to a fund of supernatural inspiration by which valuations can be tested. Buber, Temple and Maritain all acknowledge this reality of conscience. Faced with the phenomenon of the moral autodidact, the child enamoured of the inner light and stumbling perhaps into heresy, all three in their several degrees would admit the need for check-points in the form of inherited tradition; and this would be a sanctified tradition handed forward from the past by the techniques of oral and written communication. Temple's interest as a teacher was in the wider adoption of what Bishop Wand in Chapter VII calls 'an attitude to life', founded on a corporate moral tradition; at the same time no one who knew the late Archbishop of Canterbury can question his *sympathy* for the moral autodidact. And in Professor Buber, again, we find a stronger belief in the truth of myth—which is open only to the imaginative understanding of the learner—than in 'revelation by proposition', in other words the crystallized teaching

INTRODUCTION

of a religious group. Professor Buber, like Temple, has a weakness for heretics.

Mannheim's indebtedness to Freud is sufficiently marked to yield opportunities for interesting parallels. Freud allowed a role, if only a secondary role, to environmental forces: relativity of moral judgment was no more than a consequence of differences in individual attitudes. Mannheim did not dispute the latter's contention that the child moulds his super-ego, and eventually his whole character pattern, on his picture of what is admirable in his parents. Mannheim then proceeded to ask with characteristic ingenuity how the parents themselves acquired their moral personalities. Where but in a further borrowing from ancestral models and thus from past community patterns at large? Readers of Professor Ben Morris's treatment in Chapter V of the relation between Freud's ego-ideal and the civilized conscience will wish that he had had space to develop farther his thoughts on personality training; but they will be grateful none the less for his lucid account of the way in which the 'central self' of the child can in certain environments emancipate itself from primitive impulses that are foreign to the environmental ethos. It is interesting to hear from a believer in depth psychology that 'we cannot escape the fact that religion and its opposite, irreligion, are fundamentally social matters'; that a rejection of religion 'is tantamount to a denial of our debt to our parents'; and that it seems right to assert that 'the bonds' in the religious group 'are by no means those of love alone'. When the argument reaches the position that a rejection of spiritual allegiance, even if that has taken no traditional form, is to be viewed as 'a denial of that mutuality which is the basis of our existence as persons', we hear echoes of Maritain and Buber, and find ourselves asking where the religious sense and the trained sense of duty come together, and how far the teacher can treat them as separate elements.

To assemble some of these ideas in a comprehensive statement: there seems to be something like a common message

INTRODUCTION

that whatever creates the moral *persona* in a human environment is one of the necessary objects of inquiry. As to how this environment exercises its influence will depend on the viewpoint of our authority. We may consider the *persona* with Freud in the family group, with its divergently disposed siblings, with its inevitable tensions between parents and children, and with the enormous consequences of apparently trivial external human actions within the inner life of the immature and impressionable young person. Or we may consider it in Mr. Eliot's prescriptive group, committed by something like class loyalties to the sacerdotal preservation of an accredited touchstone; or with Mannheim in the historically conditioned social groups, powerful even in transition and disarray, or in a very different atmosphere of discussion, in Professor Buber's spontaneous grouping of persons, held together at a special level of tension by mutual understanding. Or again we may look for it in the family and its surrogates as elements of a spiritual hierarchy in the Thomism M. Maritain has reconditioned for twentieth-century needs; or once again in the *ecclesia* of Temple, with its sacramental bonds and its earthy preoccupations, its uplifting educative concern with man's activity in every sphere of life. Only William James, curious, enthusiastic, disrespectful, irreverently synthetic in his survey of the multiple ranges of the human spirit, fails to direct his students to a particular nodal centre of social conditioning. Yet we must remember that he is the inventor of the 'social self' and the precursor of the progressive school of Dewey. Mrs. Knight certainly feels it proper to draw attention to the extremes to which his behaviourist inclinations would take him when she remarks in Chapter VI, 'he draws no sharp distinction between moral and intellectual training, since both, in his view, consist, in the last analysis, in producing the right sort of modification in the nervous system'. She states the case for regarding as James's great service to educational psychology 'the idea that it is possible to apply scientific method to the study of

INTRODUCTION

human behaviour'. This is a fair comment. It would equally be fair to refer to Mannheim's belief that this was also *his* contribution to educational thinking, though he meant something quite different.

Our current concerns with the social implications of education are beginning to show themselves clearly in British party politics and in newspaper debates. As Lord James puts it, there is a dominating idea 'that the educational process should be related to the attainment of a particular kind of society'. Most academic theorists concerned with education will talk for hours about liberty, but they are shy about the use of words like equality and social leadership. I am glad to say that the underlying realities of our present disputes are frankly discussed in several chapters of this book; and it will be clear to the reader that there are marked divergencies among our 'subjects', if not among their interpreters. Professor Buber's views on social organization and social objectives, although they have a critical bearing on schools and their functions and have had wide circulation in Zionist circles, could not readily be worked into the treatment of his ideas in Chapter IV. His antipathy for large-scale collectivization and his admiration for the successfully integrated village community are as well known as his belief in egalitarian schooling. M. Maritain's extreme egalitarianism has a more sophisticated, a more urban look about it, and it may produce no surprise in the minds of students of modern trends in Roman Catholic social thought that he comes out for a well-developed liberal schooling for all boys and girls, less for reasons of social equality (upon which some left-wing theorists would hold him to be unsound) than for reasons of good pedagogical practice, and to emphasize his concern for a kind of spiritual democracy, if I may venture so to put it. Clearly M. Maritain is opposed to the idea of an intellectual *élite* set apart by custom and kept apart by differentiation in schooling.

It is the clash of ideas about the justification of an *élite*

INTRODUCTION

that brings into rather special prominence Mr. Eliot's striking and influential contribution to the discussion about the aims and functions of education. He has put us in his debt by clarifying the issues. Much has been written in a loose and imprecise way about the purpose of education; and it has been left to Mr. Eliot, as part of his effort to get the relationship between Education and Culture more neatly defined, to examine the insecure foundations of a number of well-known authorities who have ventured upon accounts of the subject during recent years. The High Master of Manchester Grammar School, in Chapter I, thinks that a more discriminating selection of targets for criticism might reasonably have been made. The examination of less incautious approaches would not of course have served Mr. Eliot's purpose so well. No one who is familiar with the particularly damaging criticism to be found in Chapter VI of *Notes towards the Definition of Culture* will now lightly expose himself in this field unprepared to be challenged on his definitions. No one will put his trust again in such assumptions as that a particular culture can be indefinitely extended without dilution or damage; though some will share Lord James's doubts as to whether Mr. Eliot has not carried his dislike of loose talk about educational equality to extremes. 'The mute-inglorious-Milton dogma' has taken an exceptionally severe beating. It is not within the capacity of every liberal educationist to find a reasoned reply to such statements as that 'the disintegration of class has induced the expansion of envy, which provides ample fuel for the flame of equal opportunity'.

Our own generation has been schooled to weigh Mr. Eliot's words with considerable care. We have learned to cherish his *obiter dicta* as a criticism of life. But it would be difficult even in the independent schools to find a responsible school teacher who would accept the totality of Mr. Eliot's argument for a restricted form of 'higher' education reflecting or interpreting a form of cultural tradition linked with class. Nearly all of those who are the guardians of the A-stream

INTRODUCTION

would sympathize with Lord James in his feeling that, if an *élite* is necessary in order to preserve 'a whole way of life', we can surely find better ways of cultivating the virtues of this privileged intellectual group and of adding judiciously to its members than by using the selective machinery of an economic-class system largely brought into being in the anarchic struggle for survival of the early age of industrial liberalism. On the other hand Mr. Eliot's anxieties about the threatening standards of what Lord James himself is preparing to call a 'candy-floss culture' are shared by many convinced democrats, who are yet too weak in spirit to voice their true opinions. Like others who decide to come out with a thoroughly unpopular minority view, Mr. Eliot seems to have concluded that he would do well to go the whole way in expressing his contempt for the educational ladder, and so draw the fire of critics among his friends as well as his certain adversaries.

That a certain reciprocity of understanding in the handling of ideas about the dynamics of the class-and-culture process existed between Mr. Eliot and Karl Mannheim has been evident to earnest students of both. If we consider further the inculcation of established values, can we rate Mannheim as the friend or adversary of the position just examined? In the analysis of his work carried out in Chapter II the fundamental disagreement becomes manifest. Mrs. Floud brings an incisive vigour, slightly tempered by the piety of a former pupil and colleague, to the examination of this remarkable sociologist, who settled in Britain as a refugee from Nazi oppression and bewitched the minds of many students in the University of London. We know that he had a system of ideas designed, as it were, to equip educationists to view their subject as part of the science of sociology; indeed the University may be presumed to have appointed him to a chair in Education with the merits of this claim in mind. But there have been relatively few who could pretend to give a clear account of what precisely the contribution was. And I believe



INTRODUCTION

that Mrs. Floud's present analysis is the first attempt in the language of the social sciences to meet our guest on his own terms and discuss the whole impact of his thought on the mind of his professional colleagues.

As to Mannheim's ideas about the structure of the *élites* (for we must use the plural here), it will be seen that he thought of the society in which he lived as something in the grip of the forces of far-reaching change. That he was able to penetrate so deeply into this situation is part of his importance for us. His Marxian training (in the intellectual sense) gave him a taste for the explanation of educational institutions in dynamic terms. And, although his earlier views underwent change, he retained, though without optimism, something of a millennial outlook. During the protracted birth pangs of the new community life which he looked towards and longed for, he spoke of the intellectual groups (in whose fortunes his particular interest as a sociologist were centred) as being subject to change, subject indeed to demoralization, demotion, disintegration, and again revival in new forms and new roles.

As Mrs. Floud explains, Mannheim wishes his followers to plan for a new society, making all possible use of the specialist knowledge and instruments of the social scientist. In order to be flexible in this endeavour, they must be able to conceive and work to the pattern of a new personality-type, which would fit the requirements of the coming democratic order, itself to be rigorously conditioned by legislation for the enjoyment of freedom. For the educational agencies that would emerge from this planning, he would reserve the responsible task of seeing that the members of the 'primary groups', and of course of the intelligentsia however grouped, would be able to fulfil their functions with assurance. Mannheim thus brings to our attention the most far-reaching conception of the demands to be laid on the teaching profession. Far from accepting the role of safeguarding culture as a specialized product of Mr. Eliot's *established* society, where there is to be

INTRODUCTION

no damn nonsense about meritocracy, we see Mannheim's teacher carrying out his social task in an age of planning. In that age the schools and universities are to act as nurseries for a more fruitful organization of values.

I

T. S. Eliot

By LORD JAMES OF RUSHOLME

In being asked to talk about the effect which Mr. T. S. Eliot has had upon educational ideas, I have been given a task which is, I think, peculiarly difficult. The series of studies of which this is one, is concerned, apart from Eliot, with four philosophers, a theologian, and a genius who was both scientist and philosopher. Those others have dealt primarily with ideas, and in so far as they have had an influence on educational thought it is natural that it should be a fairly direct and obvious one. It is natural, too, that with them the criterion of judgment is simply the truth or falsity of the beliefs they hold. But with Eliot this is not the whole story. He is primarily a poet. And though his poetry expresses a philosophy of life, his actual pronouncements on education are obviously to be found in his prose writings. But in criticizing those pronouncements we must not forget that the major part of his influence is not exerted through them; it is an indirect one that follows from his stature as a poet. It is his poetry that provides a significant element in the environment of experience in which the ablest of our young men and women grow up, and which has had an influence, often a profound influence, on those who teach them. These are the fundamental effects which he, in common with any other great creative writer, has upon education, and they would

T. S. ELIOT

still exist, real if almost incapable of analysis, if he had never written directly about education at all. I feel that I must labour this point the more because I do not believe that many of his explicit educational ideas are true in some important aspects. But I am anxious that no one shall think from any criticisms that I make of Eliot the social and educational philosopher that I am therefore silly enough to have any doubts as to the place of Eliot the poet.

Having cleared the ground a little, then, let us turn first to the quite explicit statements that Eliot has made from time to time on education and related questions. And here to understand his significance and his contribution, it is necessary to remind ourselves of some of the ideas that dominate the educational thought of our time. The first of these is the belief that we should strive towards an equality of opportunity for all children. The second is that the educational process should be related to the attainment of a particular kind of society. However much we may differ over means, whether in the administration or organization of schools, or in the curriculum which we teach in them, most of us would say that we wished to give to every child a chance to develop his talents to the full whatever his social background, and that we are opposed to a system under which some children enjoy undeserved educational privileges simply through the good fortune of their birth. Many of us would go on to say that one of the primary purposes of education, even for very many its most important purpose, is to make children develop into better citizens of a democratic community. They would say that education has a duty to serve the needs of society not only in producing, say, more technologists, but in inculcating certain social attitudes. We may differ on many points. You may favour comprehensive schools and I highly selective ones. But we shall not in general be differing about the ends to be achieved. I should not, for example, seek to justify my belief in selective schools by saying that it is good to give some children special privileges. I should,

T. S. ELIOT

indeed, be at great pains to show that my methods promote objects such as equality of opportunity and social mobility more effectively than the schools proposed by my opponents, who desire the same ends.

The importance and interest of Mr. Eliot as a writer on education is that he rejects ideals such as these altogether. He questions not the means, about which he probably knows and cares little, but the ends. In his *Notes towards a Definition of Culture*, for example, he selects some of the current educational dogmas, of which I have mentioned two of the most important, and examines them, not merely critically but destructively, and the fact that he makes his task easier by dealing with educational writings which are a good deal below the first rank is of little importance, for the dogmas in question are ones to which most of us subscribe.

The free extension of education, which to many of us seems a self-evident good that everyone both needs and desires, is met by Eliot with pessimism and doubt: 'It is possible', he writes, 'that the desire for education is greater where there are difficulties in the way of obtaining it—difficulties not insuperable but only to be surmounted at the cost of some sacrifice and privation. If this is so, we may conjecture that facility of education will lead to indifference to it; and that the universal imposition of education up to the years of maturity will lead to hostility towards it. A high average of general education is perhaps less necessary for a civil society than is a respect for learning.' The belief that we should organize education in such a way as to provide the maximum degree of equality of opportunity, Eliot describes as 'Jacobinism in education' and, somewhat unfairly perhaps, quotes a splendid passage of Burke attacking the Jacobins. He agrees that education should help to select the *élite*, but it should also, he maintains, help to preserve the class. I shall say something more about his use of these terms. For the moment let me quote an important passage which illustrates it. 'But the ideal of an educational system which

T. S. ELIOT

would automatically sort out everyone according to his native capacities is unattainable in practice; and if we made it our chief aim, would disorganize society and debase education. It would disorganize society, by substituting for classes, *élites* of brains, or perhaps only of sharp wits. Any educational system aiming at a complete adjustment between education and society will tend both to restrict education to what will lead to success in the world, and to restrict success in the world to those persons who have been good pupils of the system. The prospect of a society ruled and directed only by those who have passed certain examinations or satisfied tests devised by psychologists is not reassuring: while it may give scope to talents hitherto obscured, it would probably obscure others, and reduce to impotence some who should have rendered high service. Furthermore, the ideal of a uniform system such that no one capable of receiving higher education could fail to get it, leads imperceptibly to the education of too many people, and consequently to the lowering of standards to whatever this swollen number of candidates is able to reach.' It is not equality of opportunity that he seeks but some happy combination of privilege and opportunity that he favours, to which no Education Act can ever find the secret. The mute inglorious Milton he dismisses as a myth, and were he real, he doubts whether it is, as he puts it, worthwhile to turn education topsy-turvy so that we shall not miss him.

These attitudes, that so obviously run in a direction diametrically opposed to most of the educational thinking of our day, arise naturally from a particular view of the nature of society and of culture that underlies more or less explicitly all his work. Culture, the proper development of a society, is for him dependent on the existence of social classes, and these in turn rest upon the continuity of families. For Eliot the family is the most educative of all influences, the most stable element in a healthy society and the means by which culture in its highest sense is preserved and transmitted. The first

T. S. ELIOT

condition for culture is, he says, an 'organic (not merely planned, but growing) structure, such as will foster the hereditary transmission of culture within a culture; and this requires the persistence of social classes'. And again he says: 'If we agree that the primary vehicle for the transmission of culture is the family, and if we agree that in a more highly civilized society there must be different levels of culture, then it follows that to ensure the transmission of the culture of these different levels there must be groups of families persisting from generation to generation, each in the same way of life.'

It is this continuity that in Eliot's mind distinguishes classes from *élites*. The career open to the talents, the expansion of opportunity so that the most talented child of any social background may rise in the social and economic scale will furnish an *élite*. But an *élite* compared with a class suffers from certain disadvantages. Its members will be united by nothing except a common professional interest and expertise, because their background and tradition will be so different. More important still, the composition of an *élite* would be fluid and changing from generation to generation, so that there would be no continuity of tradition and hence of culture. He quotes with approval a passage from Mannheim which runs: 'We have no clear idea how the selection of *élites* would work in an open mass society in which only the principle of achievement mattered. It is possible that in such a society, the succession of the *élites* would take place much too rapidly and social continuity which is essentially due to the slow and gradual broadening of the dominant groups would be lacking in it.'

From these pronouncements of Eliot that are explicitly concerned with education the broad outlines of his thought begin to emerge. For him education is not a thing to be diffused as widely as possible. It is to be restricted not even to the able, but to a group selected as it has been in the past to a considerable extent on the basis of social class. And that

T. S. ELIOT

education must be of a kind, presumably in content and in method, to emphasize tradition rather than change. It is to some extent a view that springs from Eliot's American background. He is, if you like, the Bostonian surveying the crowded high schools and the ever-expanding universities with their classes in driver-training or air-hostess-ship, who feels that the belief that education is a good in itself has produced its own nemesis; that in the desire to educate everybody we are educating nobody. And behind this view lies a more fundamental attitude which rejects the kind of world which progress and social reform, science and education, between them are creating. 'The rise of the democracy to power in America and Europe is not, as has been hoped, to be a safeguard of peace and civilization. It is the rise of the uncivilized, who no school education can suffice to provide with intelligence and reason. It looks as if the world were entering upon a new stage of experience, unlike anything heretofore, in which there must be a new discipline of suffering to fit men for the new conditions.' Those are not the words of Eliot himself. But he quotes them from a letter of Charles Eliot Norton as a chapter heading in *The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism*, and they admirably summarize much of his own thought. He believes, as we have seen, in order, in authority, in tradition, and he simplifies and symbolizes those beliefs in a respect for class. He sees a society in which these concepts are not only in decay but are no longer even the objects of a nominal respect. It is not that we are trying for what he regards as the right ends and failing to achieve them; it is rather that we are turned towards wrong objectives. Ours is a society without coherence—whether it be in standards, culture or belief. As Miss Helen Gardner says: 'He is writing of religious experience. . . . But he is doing this in an age which has no universally or even widely-held conscious formulation of belief. . . . Until about a hundred years ago the public for whom a poet wrote was, if not so compact and unified culturally as is sometimes suggested, at

T. S. ELIOT

least in rough agreement as to what an educated man should be presumed to know. . . . The modern poet is in a very different position. The reading public is far larger, the output of printed matter incomparably greater, and the extent of education has expanded so enormously that there is now no general cultural tradition to which the poet can refer or be referred. The divisions do not only run between those who are trained in the sciences and the humanities but between science and science and between one branch of the humanities and another.' 'This lack of a common basis, which is one of the most frequently lamented characteristics of contemporary culture, has obvious educational roots and educational consequences. It is easy to ascribe it to the decline in classical studies and to look back nostalgically to the state of affairs so eloquently described by the Hammonds. 'Chatham, like Cicero,' they wrote, 'saw the stolen treasure of the East corrupting the politics of his day; Fox and Burke, denouncing the misgovernment of India, spoke as pupils of Thucydides and the Greek tragedians, as men for whom history had rehearsed the scenes that moved before them, and inspired minds had interpreted their meaning. At the climax of the greatest of the speeches by which he charmed the senses of the House of Commons, the younger Pitt turned to the stately music of Virgil's hexameters as naturally as Bright would have turned to the solemn cadences of the Psalms. For it was from the classics that men of liberal temper derived their public spirit, their sense of tolerance, their dread of arbitrary authority, the power to think of their nation in great emergencies as answering nobly or basely to some tremendous summons.' It would be idle to maintain that contemporary education provides a basis as universal as this; it would be equally idle to deny that in some ways we are the poorer for its absence. And it is true that the creation in a world increasingly dominated by science of a common ground between educated men is one of the most urgent tasks of our education. But though we may recognize this, it

T. S. ELIOT

is true, also, that the disintegration of which Eliot is so acutely aware has often been exaggerated. By insisting too much on the existence of barriers of incomprehension between different kinds of specialist we do much to assist in their creation. A high degree of specialization is in any case inevitable in a society in which culture is anything but static. The love of learning itself produces an inevitable nemesis in the growth of knowledge to unmanageable proportions. It is of this danger, which he himself, ironically enough, exemplifies in his more obscure poetry, that Eliot is rightly and anxiously aware. Throughout his work is the sense that we have irremediably lost touch with tradition.

*And what there is to conquer
By strength and submission, has already been discovered
Once or twice, or several times, by men whom one cannot hope
To emulate—but there is no competition—
There is only the fight to recover what has been lost
And found and lost again and again: and now under conditions
That seem unpropitious.*

We have even lost touch with Nature itself, except as something to be despoiled and exploited. *The Dry Salvages* begins thus:

*I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river
Is a strong brown god—sullen, untamed, and intractable,
Patient to some degree, at first recognized as a frontier;
Useful, untrustworthy, as a conveyor of commerce;
Then only a problem confronting the builder of bridges.
The problem once solved, the brown god is almost forgotten
By the dwellers in cities—ever, however, implacable,
Keeping his seasons and rages, destroyer, reminder
Of what men choose to forget.*

This whole dominant aspect of Eliot's thought, his rejection of the 'modern', the 'progressive', the ultimately rootless, is summed up in that great poem *Gerontion*. It is the picture

T. S. ELIOT

of a civilization so sick that it is probably doomed. Certainly nothing can save it, say the later poems and the plays, but a recovery of personal religion and with it a sense of sin. If Eliot's growing Christianity has increased the pity, it has scarcely increased the hope.

The implications of all this for the educator are not encouraging. It is true that in one of its interpretations education is still a means for preserving traditions of every kind, and many of us are conscious that it should retain this element. But the modern teacher has a much larger and as he might say 'forward-looking' view of his function. We have inherited the optimistic view of the nineteenth century and, indeed, of a much older humanist tradition. In the *Republic*, for example, we find the passage: 'Moreover when a community has once made a good start, its growth proceeds in a sort of cycle. If a sound system of nurture and education is maintained, it produces men of a good disposition, and these in their turn, taking advantage of such education, develop into better men than their forebears, and their breeding qualities improve among the rest, as may be seen in animals.' We may be naïve in doing so, but most of us share this belief that education can and does make individuals and societies better. That is why we go on attempting to educate. There are few of us here today, I suppose, who do not think that this country has progressed in some real sense through successive Education Acts. There can be very few people here who would not welcome the raising of the school-leaving age to sixteen or the creation of county colleges. Why? Because we believe that such extensions of education will make people better. As we walk into our classrooms and our lecture rooms most of us are concerned not only with the transmission of culture; we believe that we are creating a new world. Many of us take pride in stimulating the very processes of social mobility that Eliot condemns. And what does he say of our optimistic visions? He is explicit. 'We can assert with some confidence that our own period is one of decline; that the

T. S. ELIOT

standards of culture are lower than they were fifty years ago; and that the evidences of this decline are visible in every department of human activity.' 'And we know, that whether education can foster and improve culture or not, it can surely adulterate and degrade it. For there is no doubt that in our headlong rush to educate everybody, we are lowering our standards, and more and more abandoning the study of those subjects by which the essentials of our culture—of that part of it which is transmissible by education—are transmitted, destroying our ancient edifices to make ready the ground upon which the barbarian nomads of the future will encamp in their mechanized caravans.'

I have said that I reject Mr. Eliot's assumptions and his conclusions. And it is, indeed, easy to do so, and easy to discover what seem to me weaknesses in his structure of argument. Let me pause to indicate very briefly one or two. He considers society, I think, in far too abstract a way without attempting to assess what is likely to occur in practice. For equality of opportunity can only be very approximately attained, and hence its incidence even upon a society which strives towards it does not involve the complete and discontinuous creation of a new *élite* with each generation. Not only are the influences of heredity profound, but the favourable environment enjoyed by the children of an *élite* will always ensure that more of them will be recruited into the *élite* of the next generation than statistics would suggest. Thus even if *élites* were recruited on a purely competitive basis, and if nepotism were completely eliminated, there would still be a considerable element of continuity; a generation of philosopher-kings in the Platonic state that Mr. Eliot is attacking will draw a large number of its members from the children of the previous generation. It is an error to imagine that equality of opportunity, in any sense in which we are likely to realize it, thus involves a complete break with tradition, or to believe that movements opposed to privilege involve a complete negation of family influence.

T. S. ELIOT

This is, as it were; to meet Eliot on the ground of his own assumptions. But more important than this, there is an air of unicality about his analysis. At first one suspects that it is a result of his remoteness from the actual world of education, his failure to envisage his ideas in terms of concrete programmes. But it really springs from something deeper than this. His thinking violates certain moral assumptions that are now almost universally recognized if not followed. The interpretation of religion that most people now hold is more equalitarian than the case which Eliot is defending. Yet for him religion and culture are so intimately related that at times they are indistinguishable. His weakness is that though claiming to be a traditionalist, he is really not in the tradition. The views he expounds—his hatred of equality, his unmoved contemplation of much human frustration and suffering that greater knowledge and wider education would remove, violate what has now become the great tradition of religious thought. He is a prophet whose message we reject not because it is too moral for us but because it does not seem moral enough.

But in practical terms the most serious objection to Mr. Eliot's position that can be brought, at any rate by those of us who believe that it is the function of education to create *élites* rather than to preserve classes, is simply this: that the wastage of talent involved in avoidable inequalities cannot be reconciled with the intellectual needs of our kind of society. I will not labour this point for there are other aspects of Mr. Eliot's thought that I want to discuss. But it is increasingly clear that we cannot meet the demands forced upon us, not by a search for a higher standard of living in any purely materialist sense, but in the inescapable obligation to meet the needs of expanding populations, of widespread misery and avoidable suffering, without a mobilization of intellectual resources on a scale that Mr. Eliot's class society could never provide. To some extent Mr. Eliot recognizes this when he talks of needing both *élites and* classes, and of

T. S. ELIOT

desiring that 'all positions in society should be occupied by those who are best fitted to exercise the function of the positions'.

But here he is almost giving his case away. And having said that, having rejected his position as it is coherently expressed in his prose writings on grounds of logic, of expediency and even of morality, one is conscious of the fact that one has not finished with him. I have called him a prophet, and prophets are not disposed of by argument. They are most persuasive, not in their clearer moments, but in their more obscure and poetic utterances. And though Eliot as a writer on education may be assailed both by those who believe in equality and by those who, like myself, believe in *élites* but not in classes, he, nevertheless, leaves in our minds not so much by specific utterances as by his whole attitude, a series of uncomfortable questions that it is right for us to face. It is of the greatest value that the optimism and the often hubristic self-confidence of the educator should have to submit to the challenge of his ideas. In what follows I have attempted not so much to examine critically and in detail Eliot's educational beliefs, as to give an account of some of the reflections which they raise in the mind of one teacher.

There is first the question as to whether we do not habitually overestimate the contribution that education in any formal sense can make to the development of the individual. Eliot says for example: 'For the schools can transmit only a part [of culture], and they can only transmit this part effectively if the outside influences, not only of family and environment, but of work and play, of newsprint and spectacles and entertainment and sport, are in harmony with them.' It is probable that if we overestimate he is underestimating what a school can do; he is forgetting that great army who by the stimulus of good teachers and the great books that are put into their hands are enabled to transcend the backgrounds from which they spring, and whom it is one of the greatest triumphs of our schools to make members of

T. S. ELIOT

the commonwealth of learning. But it is no less certain that the professional educator has tended to forget the influences outside the classroom. Very often we hear effects ascribed to some particular form of education, to the boarding school, for example, which really arise from powerful social and personal influences quite outside the school that have been at work upon the children concerned. And through this awareness of the much wider meanings that the word education may have than those we often give to it, Eliot leads us on to a further consideration of another of his most important points, the meaning of equality of opportunity. It is an ideal, that, as we have seen, he distrusts because of the instability that he feels that it brings into society. But though I reject his view for reasons that I have given, I am forced to think afresh about my ideal and to recognize its difficulties. For if we press it too far there is the danger that we may adopt policies which will ultimately be fatal to other ideals, such as liberty. We can see our problem clearly if we consider one small example, the independent schools. It is to many people a manifest denial of equality of opportunity that some children should be enabled to go to schools with better amenities and better staffing ratios than the state provides. But are we, therefore, to forbid parents to spend money on their children's education, while permitting them to spend it on television sets or motor cars? And since the cultural influences of the home, through books or pictures or conversation, are ultimately often more important than those of the school, how far are we, in the search for equality of opportunity, to intrude and to control? When Plato was searching for true equality of opportunity for his Guardians, the logic of his argument forced him to destroy the whole structure of the family in the most fantastic part of his great creation. We may believe deeply in making opportunity more equal than it is today. We must face more frankly than we often do the responsibility that rests on our schools and colleges and universities to supply influences that the homes of many of our

T. S. ELIOT

pupils do not provide. But we must try to think more clearly about these problems, and realize that changes in the educational system are inadequate in themselves to produce deep and complex social changes. We must recognize, too, the strains that the social mobility that education produces can cause for the individual. As Eliot says: ' . . . to be educated above the level of those whose social habits and tastes one has inherited, may cause a division within a man which interferes with happiness.' ' . . . Too much education, like too little education, can produce unhappiness.' It may well be, too, that we have been so reluctant to admit that our educational efforts produce *élites* that we fail to inculcate into these new *élites* anything corresponding to the sense of social responsibility that membership of a class has usually implied. Above all, it is important to acknowledge that as we advance along the road to equality of opportunity there will come a point beyond which we cannot go without encroaching on vital liberties, endangering the family and treating human beings not as ends but as units in a piece of social engineering.

The phrase 'social engineering' leads us to consider the fundamental objects of contemporary education in a way to which much of Eliot's thought is relevant. To the question, 'What is the purpose of education?' we know that there can be no simple answer, for there are many purposes. But there is no doubt as to the growing emphasis on the purely social function of education. We can see this most clearly in America, where at the school level all other purposes of education are subjugated to the tasks of social adjustment. It is a means by which a certain kind of society is created and sustained, by which the individual is conditioned to take his place smoothly and efficiently in a particular pattern of social organization. To some extent, of course, all education has always had some such process as one of its goals. But in much contemporary educational thought one is aware that this purpose has become so dominant that it constitutes a danger to the individual personality and to the pursuit of

T. S. ELIOT

wisdom. This fear is behind some of the quotations that I have already given from Eliot and is present when he says: 'What we remark especially about the educational thought of the last few years is the enthusiasm with which education has been taken up as an instrument for the realization of social ideals. It would be a pity if we overlooked the possibilities of education as a means of acquiring *wisdom*: if we belittled the acquisition of knowledge for the satisfaction of curiosity, without any further motive than the desire to know; and if we lost our respect for *learning*.'

We may resent his assumption that we should restrict the number of people whom we should try to educate; we may criticize his use of abstractions like 'wisdom', 'knowledge' and 'learning' and ask what meaning they can have in a social vacuum. But in spite of these objections, it is salutary that he should remind us of the dangers of using education as a means of producing conformist and unoriginal personalities, as well adjusted to their environment as a colony of ants or bees. In an age when all the resources of advertisement and all the influences of communication are at work to produce acquiescence, under the threat of the 'organization man', it is good that we should be led to ask 'Where are we going?'

Where are we going? Both from explicit statements and from the general feeling of his work it is clear, as I have said, that Eliot not only rejects the idea of automatic progress but rather is convinced of a clear decline in standards. His is the attitude that Hoggart has recently elaborated from a rather different point of view in *The Uses of Literacy*. About the question whether we are better or worse than our forefathers, it is possible to argue long and profitlessly. But it is also possible both to believe in the reality of progress, to think that most people are kinder, more moral and even more rational, as well as being healthier and better housed and fed, than they were fifty or five hundred years ago and still welcome such an attitude as Eliot's as important. The dangers are real enough, of a candy-floss culture, of an acquiescent material-

T. S. ELIOT

ism, of a society corrupted by the belief that one view is as good as another and everyone has a right to an opinion. It is these dangers that alarm Eliot, and he is right to be alarmed. For education in itself is of no value; it must be the right education, an education, that is to say, that teaches people not simply to live but to live well. The extension of culture to wider groups is useless if the culture we transmit is debased in the process of making it more accessible. Eliot has led us here to what is one of the most interesting questions of our time: How far is it possible to extend education and culture without destroying them? It may be that the strip-cartoon and the holiday-camp, the telly and the university course in air-hostess-ship are inevitable results of a belief in an equalitarian democracy. It may be, on the other hand, that they are for many people merely the transitory results of the first impact of mass-instruction, and that the remedy of further and fuller education will, as the generations pass, create a greater regard for the highest achievements of mind and spirit even among those who cannot fully share them; that in time a respect for the standards held by the few will be transmitted to the many without themselves being corrupted. Between these two opposed views, the first that of Eliot, the second, almost inevitably, that of the teacher, it is impossible finally to decide. Both are worthy of respect. What in the eyes of both is not worthy is to maintain that there are no standards higher than what the public wants and to ensure that its demands are satisfied where they exist, and created where they do not. The ultimate degradation of a society occurs when those who should by reason of ability and perception be leaders of their society, become instead, their own standards corrupted through laziness, or for money, or for popularity, the panders of the herd. For finally, behind our ideas of progress, our material triumphs, our conquest of nature, stand the realities of man's spiritual life, love, death, wisdom, integrity, suffering, those great words that poets and prophets

T. S. ELIOT

are not afraid to use. However we may dislike his explicit ideas, however loudly we may shout 'reactionary', Eliot does this service for us. He takes us beyond the neon lights to the edge of the shore where we can hear only

*Through the dark cold and the empty desolation,
The wave cry, the wind cry, the vast waters of the petrel
and the porpoise.*

And once there he invites or rather compels us to consider what we are doing and what we hope to achieve. My answers are different from his. But it is none the less right that teachers of all men should be taken to that dark shore and made to ask those questions.

II

Karl Mannheim



By JEAN FLOUD

It would not do to take too limited a view of the objective of this essay. A tidy summary of Karl Mannheim's views, based on the abundant references to education in his books and essays, and specially in those written after his arrival in this country, would do less than justice to the message of a thinker on the grand scale. What Mannheim had to say about education must be set in the context of his general sociological preoccupations, despite the formidable problems of compression and exposition raised by this more ambitious undertaking.

Perhaps I may begin with a comparison which I find illuminating between Mannheim's work and that of the famous French sociologist Emile Durkheim. Durkheim, who died in 1817, was the last of a line of French social philosophers and sociologists who since the eighteen-thirties had turned to education in their quest for the magic synthesis of social progress and order, freedom and organization. It is a curious fact that, although he occasionally refers to Durkheim's two most famous treatises, *The Division of Labour in Society* and *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Mannheim gives no indication whatever that he realized the existence of Durkheim's writings on education¹, the formulations of which,

KARL MANNHEIM

despite differences in terminology, are strikingly similar in many respects to his own. Both men occupied chairs of sociology and education: both came to concern themselves with education in the context of a wider interest in the modern crisis of Western society and the particular problem of social order and consensus. Both, in fact, were in the mainstream of the classical French and German discussion of the problem of reconciling revolutionary thought and romantic reaction. And both *believed* in sociology as the source of a scientific ethics, a scientific, as distinct from a utopian politics, and a scientific pedagogy.

The principal difference between them seems to lie in the dynamic cast of Mannheim's thought, which reflects the important Marxist strain in his intellectual pedigree. However, I think one can make too much of this difference.

Durkheim, preoccupied as he was with a static analysis of society in structural and functional terms, saw education as the means by which society secures in its children the essential conditions of its own existence. It is for him one social institution among others, a totality of practices, of ways of doing things, of customs, with the primarily adaptive function of socializing the younger generation. The scientific understanding of society yielded by sociology is the proper source of the ends of education; that is to say, it provides the basis for a rational pedagogy. And psychology, especially social psychology, is the proper source of its means; that is to say, it provides the basis for a science of education.

But for Mannheim education is sociology achieving itself in action. It is, significantly, a social *technique*. 'It is only by remaking man himself that the reconstruction of society is possible,'¹ and much of his writing is devoted to explaining why society needs reconstructing.

However, this emphasis on social change is perhaps deceptive. It seems to me that Mannheim was as much concerned as Durkheim was with social order, consensus and integra-

¹ *Freedom*, p. 6.

KARL MANNHEIM

tion. He was no revolutionary. His radicalism, so it would seem, was born of a deep conservatism. What he yearned for was stability. Reconstruction was, as it were, forced on him as the only means of achieving equilibrium in the appalling 'age of transformation'. He yearned and longingly for personal freedom, both in the narrow political sense and in the broader sense of freedom from irrational psychological and social pressures. But freedom is impossible in a disordered society. Change, social reconstruction, is, therefore, unavoidable. But one never feels that Mannheim welcomes change, in the manner of the true revolutionary, for its own sake. His obsession was the synthesis of past and present; he sought to take charge of change, to forestall it, and guide it. The spirit of exaltation that infuses so much of his writing about reconstruction derives not from any historicist sense of marching as the standard-bearer of the future with History on his side, but from his joyful conviction that Sociology, the science of social action, can banish or mitigate the horrors of social change. Change threatens stability because it is uneven in its impact, producing disharmony, revealing inconsistencies and contradictions in society; and society should function as an integrated structure. Since, however, one cannot do away with change, it must be controlled, even encouraged where necessary, to maintain a dynamic social equilibrium.

It is in keeping with this mixed attitude towards change—great aversion compounded with a compensating overmasterfulness—that, despite his preoccupation with it, Mannheim should have developed no theory of social change. In his early years, of course, he was a Marxist, and although he soon abandoned Marx's insistence on the primacy of the technological and economic factor in social change, he did no more than assert the untenability of any monocausal theory. He was thus insisting on the interconnectedness of everything, whilst nevertheless reserving a distinctive emphasis on economic factors as playing an exceptionally important and sustained role in social change. His account

KARL MANNHEIM

of the 'age of transformation' has no theoretical orientation'. He works with no typology of social change, constructed in terms of differences, say, in the levels at which it takes place, or the area of origin or source of initiative. He considers change, in fact, in only one manifestation, at the global level of total social structure. And he concentrates his attention almost exclusively on the mechanics of this kind of overall social change and possibilities of planned intervention. At the heart of things he looks not at flux but at balance.

Thus, although a study of such signposts as his chapter headings conveys an impression of concentration on social dynamics, one realizes that Mannheim's real preoccupation was with the classical problems of social statics—the relations of the individual to society; social order and consensus; the reconciliation of freedom and organization. Although it took the sophisticated form of a planned dynamic equilibrium, his heart was in stability.

Mannheim was haunted by a sense of social disorder and crisis. The sociologist must—and, he thought, alone can—play the part of the good physician, supplying a correct diagnosis and prescribing remedies. Durkheim, who sought to show that God is a social function, another name for society, was notorious for his so-called 'sociologism'. You will see that Mannheim's sociological 'imperialism' was at least as all-embracing. But I want now to turn to his social diagnosis, scientific basis of his 'educational message'.

The fullest and most stimulating exposition of Mannheim's distinctive contribution to the 'diagnosis of our time' is to be found, not in the book of that name, but in two of the *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*,¹ and in the essay 'Rational and Irrational Elements in Modern Society',² all written in the early thirties of this century.

¹ 'The Problem of the Intelligentsia. An Enquiry into its Past and Present Role', and 'The Democratization of Culture'.

² *Man and Society*, Part I.

KARL MANNHEIM

The analysis of the social crisis is focused on the process of *democratization*, the process by which, with the advance of industrialism, larger and larger numbers of people participate in political, intellectual and cultural life. The trend is inescapable, bound up with the general momentum of industrialism; it is, Mannheim says, 'our predestined fate' and it is 'our supreme duty' to explore its implications and potentialities. Dictatorship is not the simple antithesis of democracy, but 'one possible way in which a democracy seeks to solve its problems'. We must, therefore seek to understand the democratizing process in order to influence it in a desirable manner and avoid any pathological outcome.

Democratization has two principal corollaries, and on these Mannheim concentrates his attention. First, the elements which he terms the 'governing *élites*' and, in particular, the intelligentsia, lose their homogeneity and social authority as their ranks are opened to recruits from all social strata. What was once a caste-like group with a virtual monopoly of public interpretation—a traditional prerogative of formulating authoritative answers to the questions of the time—gives place to an open stratum, incapable, by its very nature, of formulating a unitary view of the world or a core of commonly acceptable values such as would lend spiritual consistency to a social system. The democratization of the intelligentsia is, perhaps, the major element in the disintegration of social consensus. What appears as an unhealthy scepticism, or a declining faith, or a fragmentation of the contemporary outlook (what Mannheim himself later termed the 'crisis in valuation') has its social roots in this transformation of the intelligentsia.

Secondly, 'as groups not yet familiar with political reality suddenly become charged with a political function', irrationality—always present in society, but under other social conditions either dormant or suitably canalized—forces its way into the arena of public life. Instead of a rationally

KARL MANNHEIM

informed conflict we get the uninhibited expression of momentary emotional eruptions among the masses. Instead of the adjustment of rival social interests we have democracy of impulse (*Stimmungsdemokratie*), no longer one of reason (*Vernunftsdemokratie*).¹

The masses have always been ignorant and irrational. Mannheim discusses what he calls the 'social disproportion in the distribution of rational and moral capacities among groups and classes in society', and he illustrates the manner in which social systems vary in this respect.² But industrialism atrophies the older institutions of social control and uproots the masses from the close-knit primary groups of an earlier social order, mobilizing them in great urban centres, so that their intellectual and, more particularly, their political shortcomings, become matters of such general concern that it seems dangerous to allow them to remain in their former state of ignorance.

The democratization of the intelligentsia, the upsurge of the masses, and the consequent threat to the delicately balanced distribution of rational and irrational social forces, these are the staples of Mannheim's diagnosis of the social crisis, and it has always seemed to me that his formulations have a slightly nineteenth-, even eighteenth-century flavour about them. This, I think, is the permanent mark made on Mannheim by his earliest experiences as a young man in Hungary during and after the first world war. He was twenty-one when the war broke out. Between October 1918 and August 1919, Hungary went through the three convulsions of a Radical and a Bolshevik revolution and a White counter-revolution. We in this country, who have only hearsay knowledge of these events, are handicapped in trying to understand the impression they made on those who lived through them. It is remarkably illuminating, I think, to read Mannheim's diagnosis in the light of Oscar Jászi's first-hand ac-

¹ Op. cit., pp. 44, 45.

² Op. cit., pp. 42-3.

KARL MANNHEIM

count of *Revolution and Counter-revolution in Hungary*.¹ Jászai says, at one point:

'In these fevered October days I realized as never before the irresistible force of mass movements towards social change, the impotence in the face of them of all who seek deliberately to guide and control them. . . . At such times even the primitive, subconscious promptings of ingrained tradition lose their power, while all normal means of influencing public opinion prove equally ineffectual. Argument and persuasion, the careful weighing of data, the logical design and strict execution of plans, the considered distribution of functions and other rational accompaniments of political action in normal times, stop short as though under an enchanter's wand; in their place there form in society mysterious magnetic fields, attracting the masses to themselves with merciless violence and subjecting to their influence the vast bulk of so-called independent opinion. . . . Events prove incapable of proceeding through the normal path of discussion and compromise . . . the bridge of reason collapses, and the fresh indispensable equilibrium is attainable only through the wild, animal collision of opposing wills, the clash of the extremes. . . . Since August, every discerning spirit among my acquaintances had been impressed by the irresistible growth of the influence of these "magnetic fields" over the masses in Budapest. I may fairly say that we felt as a physical, biological fact the more and more intolerable pressure of approaching events. We got through our day's work feverishly, distractedly. . . . Whither would this awful avalanche carry us, this avalanche . . . with an ominous roar that we could hear continuously in the silence of our studies?'

The Hungarian democracy had had no schooling; the poverty and the lack of education were enormous. On the other hand, the intelligentsia—predominantly Jewish and with an almost extra-territorial relationship with the rest of

KARL MANNHEIM

Hungarian society—adopted what Jászi describes as ‘an altogether unique mixture of materialism and idealism. . . . On the one side they fed from Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin, on the other from Fichte, and Hegel, the mild Rickert and Windelband, Kierkegaard, Husserl and even the medieval mystics!’ As he expressed it, ‘the old order had been caught between the millstones of the animal appetite of the mob and the transcendental enthusiasms of the young man’.¹

Mannheim was one of the young men. He was associated with the influential Sociological Society and its offshoot, the Galileo Club, and he assisted the distinguished Marxist theoretician George Lukács in his free-lance venture, the Free School of Social Science, in which he taught philosophy. His diagnosis, his ideal of a democratic society embodying ‘the sovereignty of the industrious masses of peasants and town workers in the State, under the guidance of the genuinely creative intelligentsia’—not to mention his bibliographical footnotes, his characteristic turn of mind and his literary style—all become intelligible in the light of Jászi’s account.

Within the framework of his general analysis, Mannheim had interesting things to say about the intellectual and spiritual aspects of modern life. I much regret that I have no space for them here. For these were the aspects that most interested him. On settling in Germany he devoted himself to their systematic study and produced a succession of scholarly papers on the sociology of knowledge, of which the high-points were the essay on *German Conservative Thought*² and the book, *Ideology and Utopia*, first published in 1929.

By the early thirties, under the influence of Max Weber and Emil Lederer, Mannheim had moved some distance from his early Marxism. However, its philosophical imprint is still marked in *Ideology and Utopia*, which is an attempt, in reaction from German idealism, to work out a Marxian-inspired theory of the relationship between thought and its

¹ Op. cit., p. 75.

² *Social Psychology*, pp. 77–119.

KARL MANNHEIM

social milieu. As Ernest Manheim has pointed out,¹ there is in *Ideology and Utopia* a 'realist undercurrent'—a noticeable tendency to treat groups and collective situations, rather than individuals, as the seats of ultimate reality. But in the first of the *Essays of the Sociology of Culture*, written in the early thirties, we find a significant shift away from this earlier tradition towards an explicit though qualified nominalism. 'The individual is the seat of reality and the reality of groups is derivative.' Yet, 'to recognize that the individual is the focus of reality is not the same as to construe the self as an isolated entity; to understand his behaviour, one has to know the constellations in which he acts'. This essay, under its unpromising title 'Towards a Sociology of the Mind: an Introduction', contains the best exposition of Mannheim's approach to sociology, his notion of its nature and scope, and his idea of social structure and the mechanism of social change. The natural development of his ideas has not yet been, as I think it was later to be, distorted, even arrested, by his haunting sense of social crisis and by his obsessional belief in sociology as the source of a scientific politics. It must, of course, be stressed that he is always as clear as any thorough-going positivist that the only justification for sociology is its contribution to human betterment. Its primary objective he says is 'the rational mastery of human relations', and the questions which give it its focus are 'basically extensions of the social problems of the epoch'.² But his taste for action in the role of social physician was not to get the upper hand until after 1933. In the few years between the publication of *Ideology and Utopia* and his emigration from Germany he was thinking his way beyond the relatively restricted problems of a sociology of knowledge to the more general problems of a sociology of culture. With the development of this sociology of the mind, as he calls it, we can see him laying some of the theoretical foundations for

¹ In his Introduction to *Culture*, p. 5.

² *Culture*, pp. 53, 15-88, 18, 19

KARL MANNHEIM

his later preoccupations with education or 'the problem of transforming man'.

Mannheim added little or nothing of his own to the diagnosis of the crisis after 1833.¹ In England, during and after the war, he chose to elaborate the symptoms in more conventional and superficial terms, painting the commonplace sociologist's picture of society in the era of 'bureaucratic monopolistic capitalism', emphasizing the disruption of the so-called primary groups of family and neighbourhood in the transition to the Great Society with its dynamic technology and rationalizing tendencies, its mobilization of the masses in huge urban agglomerations and its mounting civil and political conflict.

But his interest had shifted. We can see that he had turned from the fine points of the diagnosis to the active political problem of controlling the descent into disaster. His experience of life in this country, which made such a profound impression on him, did not affect his diagnosis of the crisis; what it gave him was a new hope that a solution might be found and he turned his attention to developing the idea of social planning and to making explicit his educational message.² The new, or at least freshly developed, elements in his thought were *social psychology*, which he conceived of in very broad terms as the study of the psychology of social consensus or integration, and what he termed *social education*, namely, the planned use of a wide range of social forces and institutions to create the democratic personality type necessary to guarantee social integration in a reconstructed society.

Mannheim was very fond of quoting Aristotle's dictum that political stability depends on adapting education consciously to the form of government. In the past, he claims, this adaptation has come about blindly through 'custom' and 'tradition'. All social institutions have their educational

¹ *Freedom* is an urgent and systematic restatement of earlier analyses and pronouncements.

² *Diagnosis, passim.*

KARL MANNHEIM

aspect. But the weakening of the basic influence of attitude-forming institutions such as the family, neighbourhood and Church leaves a void into which social science must step, planning and co-ordinating where formerly had been unconscious adjustment.

Industrialism involves democratization, with its concomitants in the cultural and political fields; it also, just as surely, involves social planning. Planning is not merely something which is necessary or desirable in the situation in which we find ourselves, but it is an integral feature of contemporary social development, bound up with the momentum of industrialism.

This idea of planning was first expounded in the German edition of Mannheim's book *Man and Society* which appeared in Holland in 1936. The notion of planning is distinguished on the one hand from a utopian attempt to found a new society—which Mannheim terms 'establishment'—and on the other, from the administration of a satisfactorily planned society as a going concern. 'Planning' is not utopian; it accepts the historically determined present state of society as its datum. 'The crowding together of men and things in society is the foundation of planning.' We acknowledge the fact that there is no unlimited power of free disposition and look merely at the strategy of working with or against existing social currents from the most favourable points of control that can be discovered. It is 'predictive strategy'—an intervention in the social process by manipulation from key points. It is, therefore, a rarefied version, in fact, of Marx's social midwifery.

Dictatorship as such is not planning, although a certain measure of planning may involve dictatorial powers. 'Dictatorship grows out of the negative working of the forces of mass democracy and is nothing more than a violent attempt to stabilize a stage in the development of liberal society which was by its nature transitory, and to reinforce and extend that stage with all its defects in favour of the one-sided interest of

KARL MANNHEIM

a certain group.' Under conditions of industrialism and democratization dictatorship cannot but be totalitarian planning. Mannheim's planning, however, is intended in principle to be a restrained or limited activity; it takes effect at key points only. But it turns out that this ascetic policy signifies economy of means rather than modest aims. 'A finer mastery of the social keyboard, a more accurate knowledge of social techniques, will make excessive interference unnecessary.' The planning, though not totalitarian, will be total. Freedom in a planned society, Mannheim explains, is not to be achieved by limiting the powers of the planner, but by guaranteeing the existence of essential forms of freedom through the plan itself.¹ It is not so much that there will be areas into which the long arm of the new law will not reach, as that oases of relief from its dispensation will be planned as a measure of social hygiene.

Mannheim's faith in the possibilities of applied sociology and psychology as the basis of planning was prodigious—one might, without disrespect, say it was obsessional. As A. D. Lindsay, who got to know him very well, once remarked: 'Mannheim always resisted very strongly the suggestion that there was any limit to sociological knowledge, any suggestion that legislation, like moral action, was partly a leap in the dark. One always felt that he had a sociological faith that all these blanks of ignorance about society could be overcome.'²

This *furor sociologicus* shows itself on the most general level, as when he envisages the possibility of an age of a 'ministra-

¹ *Man and Society*, pp. 107, 192, 267, 378. See also the statement in a footnote to p. 109 in which Mannheim describes the social order which he envisages as 'a sort of authoritarian democracy making use of planning and creating a stable system from the present conflict of principles'.

² In an illuminating review (published posthumously) of *Freedom in The British Journal of Sociology*, III (1), March 1952. In the course of the same review Lindsay remarks, 'I don't think that planning of the kind Mannheim wanted could be called democratic planning, though it might be called planning for democracy.'

KARL MANNHEIM

tion emerging after an age of planning during which 'all or most of the historical forces which have arisen in the struggle have been brought under control through strategy'; or as when he simply states the possibility that 'at a later stage all that we now call history, the unforeseeable, fateful dominance of uncontrolled social forces will come to an end'. On a more particular level, the same *furor* assails us when we are told that a planned society will 'adapt the level of expectation' in the different social classes 'to wishes which it is possible to fulfil', or still more drastically, that it will be possible 'to mould personal intercourse in a more realistic way'.¹

It is the purpose of this essay to consider Mannheim's educational message. When it comes to the point one wonders what exactly an educational message is. Is it something more, or less, than an educational policy? There seems to be a distinction here—between the message and the policy—but there is no doubt that it was blurred in Mannheim's own mind. Thus, we find him advocating 'the planned guidance of people's lives on a sociological basis with the aid of psychology', and adding, with a touch of that staggering *naïveté* which was at once his most infuriating and endearing characteristic, 'in this way we are keeping in the foreground both the highest good of society and the peace of mind of the individual'. This is a message disguised as a statement of policy, which is actually—one may think, fortunately—in all probability both a logical and a practical impossibility. In fact, Mannheim's message took the hybrid form of an analysis of the crisis of liberalism with a built-in policy for salvaging a liberal society by *planning* for freedom.

His message, or policy, begins and ends with a concern for the intellectual or spiritual transformation of modern man. The question of possible natural limits to this undertaking Mannheim declares to be 'not a theme for abstract philosophical discussion but for realistic approach through educa-

¹ *Man and Society*, pp. 193, 202, 281-2.

KARL MANNHEIM

tion and sociological research'.¹ Doubtless there is a line beyond which innate hereditary traits and certain principles of social organization hold sway, but it is not determinable in advance. The aims of the transformation and the spirit in which we set about it cannot be abstractly determined. We do not regard education solely as a means of realizing abstract ideals of culture. 'Education can only be understood when we know for what society and for what social position the pupils are being educated' and 'there is no doubt that Democracy has lost the clear conception of the type of citizen it wants to create'.² Confusion is not allayed by the tendency to exaggerate the influence of formal educational agencies. Sociology, however, can save us from errors of this nature and will deliver us at the same time from uncertainty and unclarity about our educational aims. 'We are mostly unaware of the wealth of forms in which the conscious and unconscious influencing of the mind takes place and how the points of attack of the environment upon the mind are dispersed'.³ Sociology teaches us how to find out; it teaches us not to take these influences for granted, but to regard the social environment as a set of patterns to be explored for their educational significance. We may then exploit them for our educational purposes. It is a discipline that enables us, in other words, to take stock systematically of the educational impact of existing social dispositions, and then to modify the social forms themselves to serve our educational ends. These ends, in turn, will not be utopian ends, because we are in a position to formulate them in the spirit of 'planning', with a proper regard for the scientifically ascertained possibilities of the social situation. This series of operations and its conscious direction is what Mannheim calls 'social education'.⁴

The prime need of contemporary society is for consensus.

¹ Op. cit., p. 222

² *Freedom*, p. 199.

³ *Social Psychology*, p. 276.

⁴ *Freedom*, p. 198.

KARL MANNHEIM

To achieve this is the first task of social education. We may ask what impediments will interfere with the task thus proclaimed. The intelligentsia is disrupted and socially demoted and offers no authoritative unitary world-view. The masses are uprooted and are no longer subject to the pervading influence of tradition working subtly through the primary attitude-forming groups of family, neighbourhood and Church. The conflict or confusion of values stems from the social disorganization brought about by industrialism; at the same time it represents the personal disorientation of individuals. Suicide, crime and violence, are the social indices of widespread personal disorganization, and the personal indices of profound social disorganization.

Durkheim coined a term for this condition which has now passed into the jargon—*anomie*, normlessness, a state of affairs in which society is no longer a 'moral community', no longer provides the individual with norms relevant to his social condition in such a fashion that he can introject them and make them his own. Durkheim had his own cure for *anomie*, which was moral re-education. Individuals could make themselves respond to a changed social environment by absorbing new and appropriate norms, thereby re-establishing social consensus on a new level. Durkheim, in fact, devoted much time to discussing in a very practical way the contribution which schools and teachers could make to this process—he was particularly interested in classroom relations, for instance, and in the teaching of science. Mannheim, however, with his broader concept of 'social education' and a very much more highly developed psychology at his disposal, was able to consider the problem in greater depth than Durkheim, who resorted to crude notions of discipline and collective morality which Mannheim with his planned 'attack on the Self' leaves far behind.

How then shall we apply this knowledge? We must begin, he says, by attending to the masses. 'As soon as industrial society reaches the highest stage of individualism and slashes

KARL MANNHEIM

the bonds of custom and tradition through over-competition, urbanization and other processes, it leaves the individual without shelter . . . without any motive in primary groups, without a feeling of belonging. . . .¹ Another name for uprootedness is, of course, emancipation. The difficulty is to capitalize the emancipation and to resist the tendency to massification (*Vermassung*), the flight from the responsibilities of spiritual freedom and personal autonomy. In the last resort, large-scale industrial societies cannot function successfully on the basis of mass conformism; successful Division of Labour needs the individualization it makes possible. On the other hand, the ravages of liberalism must be healed by an initial education for a degree of conformity.

‘The liberal age could give its whole attention to the propagation of the idea of freedom, for it could build on the foundations of the traditional conformity it had inherited from the old community culture of the Middle Ages. We shall have to waste a great deal of energy in the next few years replacing the old pattern of traditional conformity which is now disintegrating by a new one. We shall discover new values which were lost to us in the age of unlimited competition; identification with the other members of the society, collective responsibility, and the necessity for possessing a common background for our attitudes and behaviour. But once the new community has acquired the necessary unity of outlook . . . there is no reason why provision should not be made, both in the educational system and in the very structure of society itself for “gradual modifications, culminating in individual personality”.’²

We must make a conscious attack on the problems of ‘rootedness and ego-security’, and on the basis of sound fundamental social relationships, we may turn to producing the type of democratic personality suited to the new society. We must ‘rediscover the educational effects of primary

¹ Op. cit., p. 243.

² *Man and Society*, p. 264.

KARL MANNHEIM

groups' and 'create such groups where they are lacking' and 'stress their continuity and purposefulness'. And we must make up our minds about ultimate issues, producing a sound statement of belief which will take the place of the old dogma, and inform our whole educational effort. Everything possible must be done to destroy the psychological anarchy of liberal capitalism. We must, for instance, diminish the exaggerated appetite for competition; and modify the emphasis on monetary rewards, re-evaluate work and leisure,¹ and recapture the spirit of allegiance to responsible leadership.²

To achieve some of these aims we should need to mobilize all the resources of social psychology in a great campaign for re-educating the public. If, for example, we diminish the scope of monetary rewards as incentives by means of a drastically equalizing fiscal policy, we must provide alternative gratifications. 'Thus, psychological substitutes for vanishing gratifications will have to be foreseen by the decision-making groups of society and controlled, in the same way as purely material changes.' 'This requires, first of all, social-psychological studies and a comprehensive information service on the spontaneous reactions and attitudes of the people.' It is something of an anti-climax to be referred in a footnote at this point to a Mass Observation Report on *Britain and her Birth-rate*. 'No institutional change is complete without appropriate psychological and educational changes to make the new system work. Social education should penetrate into ever deeper levels of the Self.'³ A footnote shows that he is thinking here of some work by Anna Freud on 'toys inducing the desire for various gratifications'.

We can now ask a question about educational agencies. The schools have an important but subordinate part to play in all this. 'The school performs its special task by intensifying and systematizing social experience. This it can only do if it

¹ *Freedom*, pp. 244, 266 ff., 297.

² *Man and Society*, p. 356.

³ *Freedom*, pp. 188, 190.

KARL MANNHEIM

is no longer regarded (merely) as an institution in which we spend our early years but as servicing in one way or another the whole social system and adult life.' We shall do our best to revivify or replace the primary groups of family, neighbourhood, workshop and Church. But the school must yield some of its older purely scholastic character and face the possibility—the virtual certainty—that it will have to take over functions neglected by other social institutions. As the family, workshop and community shed their educational functions, the school will have to become more like a workshop, more like the community and more like a family.¹ At this point one is inclined to sympathize with Sir Fred Clarke, whose annotated copy of *Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning* is in the library of the London Institute of Education, when he asks in the margin here: 'Why should they?' and 'Can it be done?'

As will be already obvious, Mannheim was no egalitarian, despite his profound faith in the perfectibility of man. He was deeply concerned with the selection of leaders, especially intellectual leaders, and does not voice any scruples about segregating them during the period of their schooling. He is mainly concerned that the competition shall be formally equal in the sense that opportunity shall equal ability regardless of social origins. Unlike R. H. Tawney, he is concerned with the open road rather than with the equal start.²

Aside from this primary consideration, he is anxious that the whole body of the educated *élite* shall not be drained off into exclusively vocational channels. He wants a free-lance intelligentsia preserved.³ 'It is quite wrong to think that the fate of thought exclusively hinges on the opportunity of education' and that the intelligentsia is a social extravagance. On the contrary, it is an indispensable antidote to the

¹ Op. cit., pp. 247, 248-9.

² Op. cit., pp. 102 ff., and *Diagnosis*, pp. 71-2.

³ *Freedom*, pp. 264-5.

KARL MANNHEIM

bureaucratization of society: it guarantees 'scope for free experimentation with the essential objectives of life'.¹

Education itself is one of the major areas in which the spirit of inquiry is admittedly on the decline.² The bureaucratic trend in education is inevitable. The increasing scale of industry, commerce, medical and public services (and, one might add, planning itself) necessitate the rational recruitment of skilled personnel and this means consistent training and selection through a mass education service. The difficulty is to resist the accompanying tendency to specialize and standardize instruction, jeopardizing the impulse to question and inquire.

Now, somehow we must keep this impulse alive. Mannheim advocates education for spontaneity at the school level—the reorganization of curricula and methods of work and discipline along lines with which we are familiar under the label 'progressive'. But it is not clear whether he recognizes this as an immediate need or sees it as something that follows the preliminary drive for basic conformity. In any case he has two suggestions to offer for a later stage. The nature and function of adult education should be drastically revised.³ It should cease to be a substitute for higher education for labourers and white-collar workers. It should play the same part in relation to these people's lives as do the universities in relation to the learned professions. 'We envisage man as for ever learning': adult education should provide post-education and re-education to enable people to keep abreast, whatever their walk in life, with swiftly moving social and technical change. Above all, it should encourage self-education, and this should no longer be merely intellectual but also religious and artistic. Mannheim found support and nourishment for his ideas on this point from Herbert Read and he even envisaged 'settlements and colonies where

¹ *Social Psychology*, p. 283.

² *Culture*, p. 167.

³ *Freedom*, pp. 212 ff., 253 ff.

KARL MANNHEIM

artists and labourers mix, from which new forms of self-expression and new valuations of work and leisure will emerge'.¹

Within the universities, which of course must be greatly expanded, he advocates the encouragement of free-lance activities by stipends which 'should be allotted by a mixed jury including a reasonable percentage of jurors who do not represent the views of official institutions, but do justice to changes in intellectual life which escape these large and self-contained bodies'. 'Only those who have worked their way alone unsheltered by institutions and have thus developed a sense of the new needs and currents in social life are able to develop the new approach which is needed and to produce the really creative incentives.'²

Finally, one of the elementary prerequisites of social creativeness is that the masses should not be able to criticize a social idea before it has been elaborated into workable form. 'It is very probable that a planned society will provide certain forms of closed social groups similar to our clubs, advisory councils or even sects, in which absolutely free discussion may take place without fear of premature broadcasting of views expressed.'³ It goes without saying that admission to these secret societies or orders will be on a democratic basis; members will have to maintain close and living contact with the masses; and institutionalized channels must be provided through which the fruits of this sheltered liberal experimentation can, in the interest of flexibility of the plan, reach the planners.

I have by no means exhausted the points on which Mannheim had concrete suggestions to offer concerning educational reorganization and the transformation of man. Indeed, it is arguable that in trying to do more in this essay than present

¹ *Man and Society*, p. 354.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 353.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 111.

KARL MANNHEIM

a summary of his views, and in submitting to the need to call attention to his general sociological preoccupations and views, I am doing him less than justice in the matters before us. An adequate handling of these would demand some treatment of Mannheim's notion of the democratic personality-type which it is the aim of social education to produce. Again, one would wish to refer to his particular interest in the educational possibilities of group psycho-analysis. The most serious omission is the failure to deal in these remarks with his interest in religion as the source of the common values which should integrate the democratic society. There are hints that just before his death he was considering, in a manner reminiscent of Comte, the possibility that sociology should provide the theology of the new social religion of democracy.¹ But if I may be forgiven the limitations imposed by the too grandiose plan of the essay, perhaps it will be agreed that enough has been said to illustrate the curious mixture Mannheim offered of the commonplace and the visionary. So far as education goes, set out point by point, the strictly policy element in his hybrid message reads like the 1943 Green Book of the Ministry. It can be argued that he was, understandably, not well enough informed about English educational conditions to make a distinctive contribution to the study of our national problems. It is true that he was not well-informed, but I doubt that this is the whole story, or even the important part of it.

It seems to me to be nearer the mark to point out that changes in more or less specialized educational agencies are the least part of the social education which his message is about. Educational reconstruction as it has been discussed in this country since the war, for instance, is far from being central to it. What is important is his notion of a total social plan (of which I have tried to convey some impression) in

¹ *Freedom*, pp. 285 ff., 'Thought, Philosophy, Religion, and the Integration of the Social Order': *Diagnosis*, pp. 100 ff., 'Towards a New Social Philosophy. A Challenge to Christian Thinkers by a Sociologist'.

KARL MANNHEIM

the realization of which education, in the radical sense intended by his notion of 'social education', would play a vital part. His educational message was a social message, based on a set of assumptions or theories which derive, as I have tried to show, partly from a considerable tradition of social speculation and inquiry, and partly from Mannheim's personal experience of a society in upheaval which was closer in its characteristic features to the East—to Russia—than to the West at any time in the last two hundred years.

So far as the assumptions and theories are concerned, I have suggested that, intellectually speaking, Mannheim succumbed to terrible first-hand experiences of wars and of revolutions. He stopped trying to understand specific situations better, and concentrated instead on preaching at large the gospel of salvation through sociology. So long as he did not plan, he applied his remarkably agile and fertile mind to understanding, and although the process is involute, the results are frequently very suggestive and sometimes highly illuminating. A good example is his discussion of humanism in the early essay on 'The Democratization of Culture'.¹ Here he is directly in his own field, and his touch is sure. He talks—in fact, he 'sociologizes' in a most perceptive way—about humanism as a cultural and educational ideal, and broaches a critical exposition of an alternative democratic ideal which he sees emerging. A decade or so later, this illuminating discussion bears what I am conservative enough to regard as rather poor fruit in the suggestion that 'instead of a new interpretation of the classics, social science instruction may well become the core of a curriculum destined to integrate a new ruling *élite*'.² Evidently, Sir Fred Clarke's cogent paper 'History Teaching and Sociology' delivered in 1843 at a conference (which Mannheim also addressed) on Sociology and Education did not strike home.³

¹ *Culture*, pp. 229 ff.

² *Freedom*, pp. 104–5.

³ *Sociology and Education* (Le Play House Press, Malvern.

KARL MANNHEIM

Had Mannheim continued to try to understand and diagnose, rather than to plan and legislate, he might have done a number of things. He might, for instance, have applied his expertise in the sociology of knowledge to the modern man of science. There can be little doubt that, had he done so, he would have had to make considerable modifications in his notion of the intelligentsia and in his analysis of their characteristic qualities and, in particular, of their present and future social role; it is also certain that his democratic cultural or educational ideal (*Bildungsideal*) would have been the richer for an added dimension.

It is possible, furthermore, that he might have arrived at a more critical view of the whole question of the relation between the so-called primary groups and the Great Society, and of the part to be played in it by a set of common values as the basis of social consensus; and this would have had profound consequences for his educational message. The suggestion that the remedy for the *anomie* of modern society lies in the cultivation and propagation of primary groups, which supposedly act as the nurseries, so to speak, of the higher norms of abstract morality which must govern conduct in the larger society, has gone virtually unchallenged since its prototype was first formulated in Germany in the eighties. Durkheim, admittedly, did not subscribe to it. He accepted the social demise, under modern conditions, of the primary groups and did not seek, as did the German school, to resuscitate them. He argued that since occupational differentiation is the dominant characteristic of modern society, it is logical to take the occupational group as the basic social unit and endow it, on the analogy of the guilds, with an ethical or moral authority over its members. This suggestion is usually dismissed as mere syndicalism, and I do not want to consider it here. His position was more logical, however, and his thought more rigorous than Mannheim's. There are, in any case, welcome signs that quite apart from his contribution, sociologists are about to bring the classical theory

KARL MANNHEIM

of primary groups under closer and more critical scrutiny.¹

It is moreover, a matter of common observation that large-scale social organization can maintain a high degree of integration without widespread or intense attachment to an overriding value system. In applying ethical norms to the problems of political organization, the formulation of common ultimate ends is possibly less important—in the sense that it is less difficult—than the discovery of principles with the aid of which they can be linked with the detail of life.² In other words, it is not usually general moral principles that become the subjects of doubt and controversy; it is the application of these principles to specific cases. Our understanding of the bonds which hold large-scale societies together is still rudimentary. Mannheim took a great deal of the theorizing of his predecessors and colleagues on faith.

Having prepared this essay, I realize that I have nowhere managed to say anything which would convey the peculiar qualities of Mannheim's personality which made it possible for him to be the success he was over here. On the face of it, he suffered every possible handicap in obtaining a response from English audiences. Refugee status, moral fervour in a suspicious cause, a highly-coloured and turgid style of exposition, poor spoken English and, in teaching and other personal contacts, an embarrassing determination 'to break through' (as it is expressed by his editor Paul Kecskemeti) 'to the inmost layer in man which hid the naked impulse.'³ Yet he obtained a phenomenal response. Of course, one must allow to some extent for the climate of the time. One must allow for the guilt-laden revulsion from totalitarianism, the solace of a man not afraid to discuss social issues in technical and

¹ Shils, Edward, 'Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties', *The British Journal of Sociology*, VIII (2)

² Ginsberg, Morris, *On the Diversity of Morals (Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, Vol. I), Heinemann, London,

³ In his Introduction to *Social Psychology*, p. 3.

KARL MANNHEIM

functional language, arguing as he did on two fronts at once—against liberalism and against totalitarianism. One must allow for the attractions of a hygienic and prophylactic, rather than ecstatic, view of planning, when all were agreed that there was no way back to an unplanned society.

But more than *Zeitgeist* was at work. Mannheim personified the characteristic positive qualities he himself attributed to the modern intellectual—a natural anti-scholasticism, a capacity to sensitize himself to facts which would not confirm his convictions. Sometimes a visionary, he was never a dogmatist. These qualities embraced the capacity for empathy—the urge to penetrate the unfamiliar and baffling points of view of others—issuing in ‘insight to the point of periodic self-suspension’, and I may add, also in an inconceivable slipperiness in discussion; for he invariably realized the limits of his own position and anticipated and utilized the arguments of his opponents. Ambivalent feelings are, of course, ambivalent. But setting off the misgivings roused in us by this over-subtlety in argument against the charm of his understanding, it is fair to say that the attraction of his mind and personality had us all in his power. As a Professor of Education his success was astonishing, and his death in 1744, at the age of 54, only twelve months after his appointment in 1746, deprived London of a formidable teacher at the height of his powers.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Mannheim's writings in the following editions have been freely drawn upon in preparing this essay. The abbreviations indicated in each case are used in the footnotes; the list is presented in approximate order of first publication.

Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. Paul Kecskemeti (cited as *Sociology of Knowledge*) containing six essays written and published in German scientific journals between

KARL MANNHEIM

1823 and 1829, of which that 'On the Nature of Economic Ambition and its Significance for the Social Education of Man' represents an early formulation of Mannheim's views on education.

Essays in the Sociology of Culture, ed. Ernest Mannheim in co-operation with Paul Kecskemeti, 1856 (cited as *Culture*), containing three essays written in the early 1830s.

Ideology and Utopia, London, 1836, translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils from the German, *Ideologie und Utopie*, Bonn, 1829, and enlarged by the author (cited as *Ideology*).

Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, 1840, translated by Edward Shils from the German *Mensch und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Umbaus*, Leyden, 1835, revised and enlarged by the author (cited as *Man and Society*).

Essays in Sociology and Social Psychology, 1853 (cited as *Social Psychology*), containing a number of essays and short papers, including the important early essay on 'German Conservative Thought', which is a revised version of Mannheim's doctoral dissertation. Among the shorter papers, the four which together make up Part IV of the book 'Planned Society and the Problem of Human Personality', written and delivered in English at Oxford in 1838, are of particular interest to students of Mannheim's approach to education.

Diagnosis of Our Time. Wartime Essays of a Sociologist, 1843 (cited as *Diagnosis*).

Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, 1850 (cited as *Freedom*). The posthumous publication of a systematic treatise on which Mannheim was working before his death. Compiled from unpublished manuscripts and edited by Hans Gerth and E. K. Branstedt.

Mannheim's approach to education has been examined by Professor W. A. C. Stewart in his very useful essay 'Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Education', *British Journal of Educational Studies*, Vol. I (2), May 1853, pp. 99-113. A quantity of unpublished notes and manuscripts relating to

KARL MANNHEIM

education have been made available to Professor Stewart by Mannheim's widow, and he is preparing a further publication which will no doubt throw still further light on the development of Mannheim's thought.

III

Jacques Maritain



By A. C. F. BEALES

I

Speaking (as Maritain would say) as a Thomist but not as a Thomist as such, I am disposed to venerate my master, and through him his own master, Aquinas. But that does not dispense me from the obligation to present his contribution to modern education as objectively as may be. For one can say of Neo-Thomism, as Henry Osborne Taylor said of the original medieval synthesis, that it is not only 'credited by faith and empowered by piety', but 'constructed by reason'. Maritain, Gilson, Christopher Dawson and Copleston today are in the open market, alongside militant Marxists, latter-day liberals, logical positivists, scientific humanists, in a debate that will no doubt go on prompting symposia of incompatible Public Lectures to the very end of time. The market for educational philosophy, though increasingly dull, is certainly steady.

In this market Maritain is the ideal kind of broker. Nobody would call his thought less than exact; nobody would call his prose feverish; nobody would say his work is coloured by irrelevant persuasiveness. But, like all brokers, he has to have jobbers to effect the sale. For, while I have heard it maintained that St. Thomas Aquinas could have edited a simple parish magazine most satisfactorily, I have never yet heard

JACQUES MARITAIN

it maintained that Professor Maritain could interpret himself, direct, to anything below a most exceptional sophomore.

His own academic training he had from the universities of Paris, Heidelberg and Rome. His own verdict on that period is that it gave him one supreme benefit—he met his wife, Raissa. Otherwise, the phenomenalist philosophy of his teachers at the Sorbonne ‘at last made me despair of reason’,¹ till Raissa herself, and their joint study of Bergson and Péguy and Leon Bloy, brought them to Rome and to the feet of Aquinas, since when he has taught Thomistic philosophy all over the Western world, save for five years before his coming to Princeton in 1848, when he was French ambassador to the Vatican. London University heard him not long before the war. With the fall of France, preceded by his quiet, agonizing broadcast in French to England, he went in voluntary exile to the United States. His first (and only) book on education as such² was written at the age of sixty, during those years in the wilderness. It is Thomism pure and far from simple.

Thomism at large is that particular philosophy of the entire cosmos elaborated in thirteenth-century Paris by the Italian Dominican Thomas Aquinas. In the Neo-Thomism of today, what is *neo* is that, whereas Aquinas was mediating its principles to a Christendom reared on Aristotelian science, feudal economics and dynastic politics, the Thomist nowadays has to mediate these same ultimate principles to a post-Christendom dominated by nuclear fission, the Welfare State and the culture of the very common man. Maritain has spent his academic life doing precisely that. ‘There is,’ he has said, ‘a Thomist philosophy; there is no neo-Thomist philosophy. We make no claim to include anything of the past in the present, but to maintain in the present the “actuality” of the eternal.’ Thomism is ‘the only philosophy which, while rising to the knowledge of the supra-sensible,

JACQUES MARITAIN

first requires, from experience, an unqualified adhesion to sensible reality'. It is 'the only philosophy whose peculiar characteristic is that it is peculiar to nobody, strictly impersonal, absolutely universal'.¹

Its application changes, but the principles remain eternally the same. Where Aquinas fought the old scholastics by defending the value of reason in its own right, Maritain fights the subjective naturalists of today. Where the master fought the Averroists by defending the value of faith, the disciple fights the pragmatists. Where the one fought nominalists, the other does so still. The supreme need, then and again now, in philosophy, has been (in Maritain's words) the need 'not for something supra-dogmatic but something supra-subjective': above all in education.²

Thomist education I shall be coming to. But it stems from Thomist *man*: a being dependent on God yet endowed with a 'relative stability', dependent yet autonomous, resembling God most in his intellect; intelligent and responsible, rational and free—a *person*; each with a responsibility unique to himself and (as such) 'incommunicable' to others. It is this idea that Maritain develops in his phrase 'interiority to self'.³

That is the heart of what Maritain has to say on man and education. But it is the very opposite of subjectivism. For this idea, in its original flowering during the Middle Ages, produced a 'predominant desire to see things, and contemplate being, and take the measure of the world', and so 'kept the eyes of medieval man away from himself'. All the things of this world 'took on the spiritual colouring of the next'. And in the ultimate dissolution of these 'consecrated forms'

JACQUES MARITAIN

there came to birth, at the Renaissance and Reformation, a civilization that increasingly has secularized itself.¹

The consecrated humanism so dear to the scholastic philosophers has been lost. Today the task for educators is not to restore it, but to reassess and adapt it to modern conditions, as Erasmus at the very time of its evaporation was about to do with classicism. The effects of the loss have been double and opposite: a Protestantism which, in extreme forms, is a 'theology of grace without freedom', and 'annihilates man before God', and an anthropocentric humanism which, in extreme forms, is a 'theology of freedom without grace', and deifies man. The one began with Calvin and ends with Kierkegaard and Barth; the other began with Machiavelli and ends with Rousseau and Russell. And, says Maritain, 'we are now witnessing a dispersion, a decomposition, which is final'. For, as religion dwindled, the man-centred humanism which took its place (the liberalism of the nineteenth century) mistakenly visualized democratic society as a 'neutral arena' in which men bandied their ideas and nostrums: neutral even as to freedom; unmindful of the fact that the very notion 'man' is really 'man-in-society'. Wherefore, 'against this materialized spirituality the active materialism of atheism and paganism (today) has the game in its hands'.² The Western world is bankrupt of a faith, and Marxism has come to fill the vacuum.

What is most significant in the Marxist challenge is not its communism. The early Church was communist; so was Thomas More. What is significant is that 'Marxism presupposes a whole universe of faith, and of religious values in which that faith is set up'. For Marxism has deified matter; it took hold of material causality, which is certainly an in-

JACQUES MARITAIN

tegral part of any true explanation of change, and made it primary and all-inclusive. It 'demands that something resembling liberty and a soul be attributed to matter'. On that basis, the individual's joy may well lie, logically, in serving all—but at the cost of 'de-individualizing him'.¹

In place of this disintegration of personality, Neo-Thomism substitutes a reintegration. The symptoms of today's disease are agnosticism, naturalism and individualism. Indeed the road from the one to the others is inevitable. Modern man 'knows truths without the truth; he trusted in peace and fraternity without Christ (for he did not need a Redeemer); he enjoyed human life without knowing the gift of oneself; he had a life in common without common good or common work; he believed in liberty without moral responsibility; he hoped in machines and techniques, without wisdom to dominate them in the name of human good; and he looked for happiness without any final end to aim at'.² Happiness became 'the movement itself towards happiness'.

The remedy, the reintegration, is implicit in that diagnosis. It has become explicit, in ever-developing detail, in everything that Maritain has written since the basic *Humanisme Intégral* of 1836: namely, a 'rediscovery of the true image of man', such as will 'save the humanist truths which have been disfigured by four centuries of anthropocentric humanism . . . under the terms of a fundamentally different synthesis'. Actually the best description of this revitalized humanism is to be found in *The Range of Reason*. 'The image of man involved in integral humanism is that of a being made of matter and spirit, whose body may have emerged from the historical evolution of animal forms, but whose immortal soul directly proceeds from divine creation. He is made for truth; capable of knowing God, as the cause of being, by his reason; and of knowing God in His intimate

JACQUES MARITAIN

life, by the gift of faith.' Or, as he had said in his book on *Aquinas*, 'a humanism is possible, but only on condition that its ultimate end is union with God through the humanity of the Mediator'.¹

That philosophy of humanism, which (I repeat) he establishes on grounds of reason and independently of theology, issues in a political and social theory concerning rights and duties, authority and freedom. Of this, in turn, the Neo-Thomist educational theory is a part. We have to consider both.

2

Maritain's conception of society and of education is personalist and pluralist. It rests squarely on the Natural Law. 'I take it for granted', he says (in a uniquely lucid passage):

'I take it for granted we agree that there is a human nature . . . the same in all men; that man is a being gifted with intelligence, who acts with the power to determine for himself the ends which he pursues.

'On the other hand, man possesses ends which necessarily correspond to his essential constitution, and which are the same for all.

'But since man is endowed with intelligence and determines his own ends, it is up to him to put himself in tune with the ends necessarily demanded by his nature, an order or disposition which human reason can discover, and according to which the human will must act so as to attune itself to the essential and necessary ends of the human being. The Natural Law is nothing more than that.'²

The natural law, that is to say, says 'should'. A razor should not be used for cutting carpets, nor a carpet-knife for

JACQUES MARITAIN

shaving. The human intellect, which is passive *and* active, should not be trained in the same way as the animal intellect, which is merely passive. And this 'should' becomes a *moral* law 'when we cross the threshold of the world of free agents'. The natural law of human nature is therefore a moral law, duly issuing in the law of nations and later in positive law, and involving rights and duties which are fundamental and call for education.

Man himself is caught between two poles, individuality and personality, the ego and the self. 'Our whole being is an individual by reason of that in us which derives from matter, and a person by reason of that in us which derives from spirit. Similarly the whole of a painting is a physico-chemical mixture by reason of the colouring stuff of which it is made, and the whole of it is a work of beauty by reason of the painter's art.'¹

But persons do not exist *in vacuo*. They live in society—indeed, in a whole concentric series of societies intermediate between man and the State. This is the pluralism; and because it is natural to man it is to be encouraged.

Society itself 'tends to the common good'. The condition of its existence—without which it is perverted—is justice. Its life-force is friendship. Its organic life is shown in its pluralism. The State is but 'that part of the body politic especially concerned with the maintenance of law'; a specialized part, an agency, inferior to the body politic and existing *for* man.²

This common good, which is the criterion of all social life, is a moral end, incompatible with any intrinsically evil means. It must therefore know how to apply the principle of the lesser evil, and 'tolerate evils whose interdiction would bring greater evils' still. For political and social life belongs to 'the world of existence and contingency, not to that of pure essences'.

JACQUES MARITAIN

And the emerging life of a society, along these lines, is what we call culture or civilization. For Maritain these two terms are virtually synonymous. Both relate to 'a work of our spirit and our freedom acting in co-operation with nature'. The end of culture, though subordinate to an eternal life, is an earthly end; the two orders are quite distinct.¹ Ignore the distinction, and the result must logically be Leviathan, either an extreme theocracy or an extreme totalitarianism.

Hence the threads of the argument draw together in the age-old problem of the-person-and-society, man-versus-the-State, which educators will have had (somehow) to answer before their practice can claim to be coherent. The Thomist answer is fivefold: to the questions What is authority? What are human rights? What is freedom? What is equality? What is education-for-all-these?

Authority is 'the right to direct and command. Authority requests power. But the power without the authority is tyranny'. True authority claims to be freely obeyed by force of conscience. For, though it derives from the people, it has its primary source in the Author of nature. Democratic authority is indeed the best, because it recognizes that 'authority in the rulers derives from the right to rule themselves inherent in the people and permanent in them'² The ruler is 'the vicar of the multitude'.

This last phrase, of Aquinas, is illuminating because it spins the medal, so to speak, and shows us the other side—*human rights*. The person is 'a whole, who is master of himself and his acts'. He is bound morally to fulfil his destiny, as he sees that destiny. *Vis-à-vis* society, then, he has the right to

¹ Cf. *Religion et culture* pp. 11-14, 67-75; *True Humanism*, pp. 88 ff., 101; and the note running through all Christopher Dawson's writings on the interplay of religion and culture, arising from the fundamental nature of the human person as free and responsible.

² Cf. *Man and the State*, pp. 126-39.

JACQUES MARITAIN

do this; and he has a right to the means to do it.¹ And in this all men are equal.

To the Thomist, *equality* is positive but proportional. It is not the equality of the empiricist (nominalist); for he makes the *inequalities* in men fill the whole of his vision; he ignores their common nature and essence; and his negative conception of equality leads logically to the enslavement of man by man. Nor is it the equality of the idealist, which takes the opposite line: not denying equality of human nature, but deifying it, and refusing to take into account the inequalities, thereby leading logically to a 'sovereign domination of the mass', and stifling the creative inequalities. In place of nominalist or idealist enslavement, Thomism proclaims a fundamental unity of human nature which is both 'ontological and concrete'. All men are creatures; all are fallen; all are redeemed. They have 'a community of origin and an equality of rational nature'. It is within this conception that the hierarchy of concrete inequalities not only exists but has to be insisted upon. There cannot be differentiation without inequalities. Yet that fact does not injure true human dignity, for the true equality is primordial. The inequalities, albeit real and spectacular, are secondary. It is base to treat a man's inferiority as an inferiority of his essence. But, at the same time, justice does mean that 'innate or acquired superiority, because it renders more services to the whole, should receive more in return'. Social equality includes, and rightly includes, differences; and it favours the development of natural inequalities.² Anything that Maritain may say in the future on (for example) the comprehensive school, can be anticipated in terms of that analysis.

In the light of all this, then, on authority and rights and equality, can we formulate the relationship between person and common good? Maritain has done it for us several times, but nowhere better than in *Education at the Crossroads*:

¹ Cf. *Les droits de l'homme*, pp. 84 ff.

² Cf. 'Human Equality', in *Redeeming the Time*

JACQUES MARITAIN

'Social life emancipates man from the bondage of material nature. It subordinates the individual to the common good, but always in order that the common good flow back upon the person, and that he enjoys that freedom of expression or independence which is ensured by the economic guarantee of labour and ownership, political rights, civil virtues, and the cultivation of the mind. . . .

'The man and the group are intermingled with each other, and they surpass each other in different respects. Man finds himself by subordinating himself to the group; and the group attains its goal only by serving man and by realizing that man has secrets which escape the group and a vocation which is not included in the group.'¹

Developed in detail in his various books, that is Maritain's Neo-Thomist rendering of 'Render unto Caesar. . . .' The educated person—citizen of both the earthly and the heavenly city—is supposed to have assimilated it. We turn, then, to his formal education.

Let it be said that Maritain on education is exasperating to a degree. Time and again, in *Education at the Crossroads*, one feels that, while the voice is the voice of Jacob, the hand that put in the cross-heads (in the most bizarre places) is the hand of a journalist.

The terms of reference are Thomistic. Education, like all change, is a process: evolutionary and developmental. It is,

JACQUES MARITAIN

for each of us, a passing from being potentially something to being actually that something: as Socrates taught us. Potency—actuality; capacity—for perfection. The educability is there at the start, just as the egg is (already) potentially caterpillar and chrysalis and butterfly. And that Being which is *pure* actuality, perfection in every respect, is God.

Next, everything that comes into existence has at the heart of it some determining principle by which we recognize it, whereby we call it table or headache or symphony. The matter may be the same, yet the determining principle, or form, different (as between a marble statue, a marble column, a marble tombstone).

And thirdly, no change, no development, is satisfactorily explained unless we attend to Aristotle's well-known four factors: the out-of-what (the marble) or material cause, the into-what (the statue) or formal cause, the how (the sculptor's work) or efficient cause, and the why (the sculptor's intention) or final cause.

Those three terms—that all created being has matter and form, that all development is a passing from potentiality to actuality, and that the process involves such fourfold causation—are fundamental. That being so, and education being a developmental process, no description of education will be coherent that does not take into account all three terms.

Aquinas himself did not formulate a definition of education. Nor does Maritain. But between the lines of the *De Magistro*, and on some of Maritain's lines, one emerges. Education is, as to its matter, the human potentiality the infant starts with; as to its form, it is the integrated character which we hope he will end with; as to its efficient cause, the pupil's own intellectual self-activity; and as to its final cause (*finis*, end, purpose), some ideal or other. Education is 'the self-development of human plasticity into an integrated character under the influence of an ideal'.

Now, what is central to that description of education is the vital self-development of the pupil, which rests on the basic

JACQUES MARITAIN

difference between the animal intelligence, which is passive, which can be led and trained, and the human intellect, which has, as well, an active power, to lead and train itself. There is no mention of a teacher in the definition I have just given. And that is why. The teacher no more does the work in education (fundamentally) than the doctor does the work in health. What heals is the patient's own physical nature, helped by the external ministrations of the doctor; what educates is the active intellect of the pupil, helped by the external ministrations of the teacher. Doctor and teacher are alike 'extrinsic proximate agents'.¹

It may be impressive enough to find this developmental teaching on education in a thirteenth-century treatise (the *De Magistro* of Aquinas): especially because it is also startlingly existentialist (though I fancy Aquinas would have winced at so barbarous a word). Matter and form are not static essences; they are the components of something that is: that exists. The intellect does not merely 'know' concepts, as the senses merely 'receive' impressions, but 'conceives the universal and affirms its actual existence in the particular'.²

What is still more impressive is how this Thomist analysis can be brought to the defence of the moderns. When Pestalozzi says 'Let the child be the agent in his own education'

¹ The *De Magistro* of Aquinas is in the *Quaestiones Disputatae*, Leonine edition, 1883, iii, 412-32. The text in English is to be found in M. H. Mayer, *The Philosophy of Teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Milwaukee, Bruce, 1929), which has a valuable commentary by the author and a masterly introduction by E. A. Fitzpatrick. Apart from this little book, long out of print, the literature on the *De Magistro* in English is meagre. But cf. T. Corbishley, S.J., 'St. Thomas and Educational Theory', in *Dublin Review*, No. 424, Jan. 1843; G. J. Shannon, C.M., 'Aquinas on the Teacher's Art', in *Clergy Review*, vol. xxxi, June 1849; and the London University thesis on the subject, 1854, by Sister Mary St. Thomas, H.C.J.

² The important implications of this short paragraph are dealt with illuminatingly in E. L. Mascall, *Existence and Analogy* (London, 1849), esp. pp. 54 ff.; and D. J. B. Hawkins, *Crucial Problems of Modern Philosophy* (London, 1857).

JACQUES MARITAIN

and 'let the teacher follow the child and not lead him'; or when, again, Herbert Spencer talks of a development from 'an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity' to 'a definite, coherent heterogeneity'; or again, when Dewey crusades for activity-methods (meaning thereby the activity of the whole personality, and not merely doing things), the Thomist pedagogy of Aquinas and Maritain is the philosophical basis on which these modern pioneers can be completely vindicated if challenged.

The entire educational methodology, then, that has been elaborated from the philosophy of the active intellect and of self-development, can well be common ground, among practitioners as diverse in philosophical allegiance as Pestalozzi, Spencer, Dewey and Maritain. Indeed it *is* common ground. Poles asunder as are their ultimate ideals, as between the humanism of Maritain and the pragmatic naturalism of Dewey, they both proclaim the activity school and are colleagues.

But on the other plane, the educational philosophy behind the pedagogy, the plane of ultimate ideals and final causes, what do we find? If education is to be philosophically worth the name, there must *be* an ideal, a final cause, at work in it: as every philosopher from Aristotle onwards had always insisted. But today, while the Thomist proclaims one—the freedom of integral humanism—and while the Marxist proclaims another, which is the total negation of this freedom, far too many people in the free world seem still undecided whether a clearly-conceived purpose in education, of any kind, is indeed important. And though that warning is far from being Maritain's only contribution, as a professional philosopher, to modern education, it is certainly one of his profoundest.

He inherits, then, and passes on, the correlatives matter-and-form, potency-and-act, the fullness of contingent causality and the *intellectus agens*. He also passes on, and this time direct from Newman, the idea of knowledge-its-own-end,

JACQUES MARITAIN

and the idea of a liberal education that follows therefrom.

The liberal education of Newman's famous discourse in *The Idea of a University*, that 'enlargement of the mind', which 'stands on its own feet', and is 'a good' in itself', is still rooted in the *delehonos paidaea* of the ancient Classics; for Newman believed in a social and mental hierarchy.¹ Maritain at first follows Newman. Knowledge, he says, is an end in itself and a value in itself, and 'truth consists in the conformity of the intellect with reality'. Or again, 'Education directed towards wisdom, centred on the humanities, aiming to develop in people the capacity to think correctly and to enjoy truth and beauty, is education for freedom, or liberal education.'² But latterly (as we shall see in a minute or two) he has developed this thought to fit the future world of secondary-education-for-all, in a technological age.

Such are the criteria of education, then: the self-education, and the liberal education, of the integral person. The whole conception looks beyond this natural life here below, to a life beyond nature—supernaturalist. Where the idealist and the materialist can so easily subordinate the individual to the common good, and prescribe a 'civic' education accordingly; and where the anthropocentric humanist and naturalist subordinates the common good to the individual, and is apt to prescribe a training *miscalled* progressive, the supernaturalist sees individual and society as interpenetrating each other, as Maritain has been at such pains to make clear, and takes his view of the whole educational process in that perspective. The aim of education—is the service of God here and hereafter; the means—a training of the character towards a self-disciplined asceticism; the control of the pro-

¹ Cf. the *Politics*, Everyman ed., p. 239; and Terence Kelly, as in note on p. 76 above.

² See 'Thomist Views on Education', in Nelson Henry (Ed.), *Modern Philosophies and Education*, Yearbook 54 of the National Society for the Study of Education (Chicago U.P., 1955), pp. 59, 77. And cf. the four articles by T. S. Eliot in *Measure* (Chicago), vol. ii (1950-1).

JACQUES MARITAIN

cess—not by the State, not indeed a ‘control’ by anybody, but a true partnership of all the agencies responsible to the child: parents, teachers, State, Church.

So important is all this, that *Education at the Crossroads*, and the two essays in which Maritain has since followed out one particular theme in that book, are concerned far more with aims and values than with curriculum and methods. We are well served on curriculum and method, anyhow; for these things are ‘neutral’ to philosophy, and, as techniques, can be common to all. Jacques Maritain conceives his duty to be, as Newman had conceived his, a century ago, to recall men to aims and ends. ‘As long,’ he says, ‘as chaotic information is cultivated in the place of integrated knowledge and spiritual unity, the very soil . . . will remain rough and barren.’¹

His most pertinent reminders for us today, to which I now pass, are accordingly the very ones we ought to hope for: as to the function of the school, the function of society towards the school, and the nature, in this Space Age, of a liberal education.

The function of the school is specialized, in so far as it depends on his teachers fulfilling that part of the child’s needs which his other educators—family and church and society—cannot fulfil. All the partners are of course responsible to the child at all levels of his development, towards that self-liberation which is his goal, which Maritain calls ‘the conquest of internal and spiritual freedom by the individual person, his liberation through knowledge and wisdom, good will and love’. The teacher in particular is there ‘to prepare a human mind to think for itself. The one who does not know must believe a master, but only in order to know, and maybe to reject . . . and he believes him provisionally, only because of the truth the teacher is supposed to convey’.² The main task of the school is a skilled task, which no other agency can fulfil: ‘not primarily to shape the

¹ ‘Thomist Views . . .’, p. 88.

² *Education at the Crossroads*, p. 26.

JACQUES MARITAIN

will and directly to develop moral virtues in the youth, but to enlighten and strengthen reason'. These wider questions are certainly the main object of education; but 'direct action' towards them depends chiefly on spheres outside the school, just as the child's health in general depends chiefly on spheres beyond the doctor.

And it is as commentary upon this central issue, of the function of the school, that Maritain indicts all those misconceptions about education which have led to the aimlessness of today: the culpable disregard of ends, the false ideas as to the end, the crude intellectualism and voluntarism. Certainly the teacher has a moral authority over the child, for the teacher is *in loco parentis*; but his moral authority is at best 'the duty of the adult to the freedom of the youth'. 'It is neither for conservative nor for revolutionary purposes but for the general purpose of teaching how to think, that they have to foster in the pupils the principles of the democratic charter.'¹

It is thus, and thus alone, that Maritain sees coming to fruition those 'fundamental dispositions' the school exists to foster: love of truth, love of justice, the disposition to be a person who 'exists gladly', the disposition to have 'the sense of a job well done', and the disposition to co-operate with others.

And likewise, the function of society itself in education—through administration and the structure of the school system—must be for ever a liberating function. His gloss on Hocking and Sir Fred Clarke, in this context, is famous. Sir Fred had endorsed Hocking's dictum that the purpose of education is 'to produce the type', with a proviso that there be provision for 'growth beyond the type'. But even this, says Maritain, still sounds 'terribly biological'. The type may be a wrong type. Going where a principle leads, Maritain takes his stand on what he had said about the interpenetration of the person and the common good, that man 'has secrets

¹ 'Thomist Views . . .', p. 69.

JACQUES MARITAIN

which escape the group, and a vocation which is not included in the group', and seriously limits the legitimate area of State supervision.¹

For the aim of education is to make an integral person, free to do (or not do) what he believes he ought to do: which is true liberty. All the rest—education for leisure, education for citizenship, education for individuality, is but secondary, and subordinate to that, and an idolatry without it.

'Liberal education', then, is still the touchstone. And here we come to that major development in Maritain's thought, during the last few years, of which I spoke. Liberal education to the Greeks was the privilege of the free man as against the slave. Even to Newman it was still aristocratic. Maritain is now trying to democratize it.

And one can easily see why. The welfare State, mass education, the shortage of scientists and technologists, the enigma of differentiation at eleven-plus, complaints at too early specialization in schools—these are all of them pulling our contemporary education in potentially antagonistic ways. The first-year course at the University College of North Staffordshire, Mr. Peterson's mixed Arts and Science courses, Sir Charles Morris's plea, following Professor L. Arnaud Reid, for a 'philosophical approach to science' by non-scientists—these are all of them at once warnings of the danger and attempts to face it. What is at stake is the very idea itself of liberal education. Nobody will be surprised to find that Maritain desires most ardently to save it by boldly universalizing it.

What he is saying today stems, paradoxically enough, from his reflections on play. His general line on play, as formulated in *Education at the Crossroads* fifteen years ago, recurs in 1955. But he proceeds to a new synthesis. He wishes, first, to 'recast the very concept of the humanities and the liberal arts', enlarging it, to include physics and the natural

¹ Cf. *Education at the Crossroads*, pp. 98-101.

JACQUES MARITAIN

sciences, the history of science, anthropology and the other human sciences, with the history of culture and civilizations, even technology', all taught 'from a philosophical point of view'. He wishes, secondly, having broadened the matter, to restrict the burden on the pupil and student. 'The guiding principle is less factual information and more intellectual enjoyment'. Basic liberal education of this kind 'should cover both high school and college'. He would 'have the colleges divided into a number of schools of oriented humanities, all of which would be dedicated to basic liberal education, but each of which would be concerned with preparatory study in a particular field of activity. Thus the essential hierarchy of values inherent in liberal education would be preserved, with the main emphasis, as to the disciplines, on philosophy; and the main emphasis, as to the ways and methods, on the reading of great books. But the practical arrangement of the curriculum . . . would be attuned . . . to what will be later on, in actual fact, the principal activity of the person who is now a student.' In short—basic liberal education adapted to real, individual, needs.¹

Most recently of all, he has answered the 'realistic' objection to this, that 'for too many boys and girls intellectual life, liberal arts and the humanities are only a bore'. Here he reverts to the magic of play—the Christian principle of the dignity of manual activity'. The argument is extended, but it comes to this. Having recapitulated that intellectual service is in itself of more worth than manual service, but that the two are nevertheless equally worthy of public esteem, and should therefore be on a footing of complete equality in the educational system, he goes on: 'Training in matters which are of most worth . . . may (i.e. can) take place through the instrumentality of the activities of play as well as of the activities of learning; and . . . the relationship between activities of learning and activities of play would be reversed, or opposite', in those compartments of your liberal curri-

¹ 'Thomist Views . . .', pp. 61, 81.

JACQUES MARITAIN

culum which were, or were not, for you, 'special' subjects.¹ In short, the curriculum would be broad and fully representative as a curriculum; that part of it which, for a particular student, bore most on his future livelihood, he would study from the 'intellectual service' angle; those parts that did not, he would study from the 'manual service' angle. It is the traditional, unipolar conception of liberal education, rebuilt on bipolar lines. It is, at last, a philosophical norm by which to re-examine Hadow and Spens, tripartism in secondary education, mixed arts and science degrees, and the comprehensive school: a norm for pedagogues not necessarily to agree with, but to come to grips with. For it is coherent.

4

But the message does not end there (though I must). We have reached only the beginning. For though philosophy is still the handmaid of theology, the world of today looks to its philosophers for something more than armchair dilettantism. The integral person, when he has had his liberal education, has a job to do, to salvage that full humanism that has been lost, as Maritain has spent forty years telling him. How is he to proceed?

Maritain's two contributions here, in the practical arena of conduct and apologetics, may well turn out to be his two most enduring. They are: his view of the 'planes of action' on which the Christian, as educated citizen, may and must act; and his view of the concerted action, with others, that may and must be taken to save the world from chaos.

The famous appendix on the planes of action, at the end of

JACQUES MARITAIN

True Humanism, needs no elaboration. We act, on the spiritual plane, as-Christians-as-such. We act, on the temporal plane, as Christian citizens. The two planes, of God and of Caesar, are distinct. On the one we do, on the other we do not, commit the whole Church. But the two planes are not separate: unless I can cut myself into two halves and still live. The one plane is subordinate to the other, as the temporal common good is to eternal common good. There is therefore a third, intermediate plane of action, lying between them: the plane of matters in which 'the spiritual touches the temporal', matters in which temporal truths connect with revealed truths, matters where spiritual truths must influence thought and action on temporal questions. Action on this third, intermediate plane draws its rules from the spiritual plane, above, in order to safeguard values on the temporal plane, below.

Action on this third plane is, therefore, action as-a-Christian-as-such, in which the citizen is obliged to make his contribution (for he may not go against the light that is within him), but (obviously) cannot count on a solidarity from those who do not share his fundamentals. How, then, is the integral humanist to succeed in saving this temporal world, if on the one hand he is (in Moberly's phrase) a 'committed person', but on the other hand is manifestly a minority in contemporary society? Here Maritain's final contribution, on the basis of true, practical, human co-operation, is crucial.

He sees the problem not negatively, in terms of 'tolerance', but positively, in terms of 'fellowship', as a co-operation in which each remains loyal to the truth as he sees it. Our fundamental notions, on God, the Church, the person, freedom, differ. The bond cannot therefore be common doctrine. But it can, and must, be universal *caritas*. 'Charity presupposes faith, and has its roots in faith.' A man of good faith accepts implicitly (but not explicitly) the totality of divine truth. The spiritual basis of co-operation lies, then, 'in the heart and in

JACQUES MARITAIN

love'. 'Charity alone can open the heart to the love of all men.' 'It remains within faith, while reaching out to those who are not of the faith.' It is 'not supradogmatic, but suprasubjective'.

And the temporal basis of the co-operation will be common activities, jointly 'sealed'. Nor is this really common action without common principles, as it may appear superficially to be. For 'we are all bound together by a more primitive and fundamental unity than the unity of thought and doctrine; we all have the same human nature'. There is no identity of principles, but there is veritably a community of principles. There is, as he phrases it in *The Range of Reason*, paraphrasing the exquisite analysis in *Redeeming the Time*, 'there is an analogical similitude in practical principles', a likeness in which he, and Karl Barth, can co-operate wholeheartedly. Its implications are common: the absolute value of God, the eminent value of goodwill, and the dignity (and therefore the rights) of the human person. The answer to the Gospel question 'Who is my neighbour?' is for all creeds the same: him to whom *I* show mercy.¹

It was on this basis that Maritain spoke of world education and world co-operation, to the Unesco World Conference in 1947.² And nowhere is it better summed up than in what he told his American audience in *Education at the Crossroads* during the war.³ He has since brought the matter right into the classroom, as regards 'teaching the democratic charter'.⁴

It is supremely this very life-blood of *caritas* which must find its carry-over from the family into the school. No error would be more tragic than to suppose that, because Maritain's educational theory comes from the *intellectus agens* of Aquinas, and because he insists that the primary task of the school (as Newman had said of the University) is intellectual,

¹ *Redeeming the Time*, pp. 101-22.

² Later published in *The Range of Reason*.

³ p. 7.

⁴ See 'Thomistic Views . . .', pp. 72-4.

JACQUES MARITAIN

his message is merely intellectualist. The passages—albeit difficult and even obscure—in which he deals with the fine arts, and with aesthetics, are one proof to the contrary. But his treatment of the mainsprings of personality, pervading all he has written, like cochineal thrown into water, colours the whole. Education is a person-to-person relationship; not only I-Thou but I-They. And its bond, if it is to endure, will be less the *Eros* of human love and more the *Agape* of divine love: even in the classroom.

‘Eros recognizes value in its object and therefore loves the object. Agape loves, and thereby creates value in its object.’¹

The whole of his message for education, in sum, is personalist in that sense. Personalist and pluralist—rooted in the natural law—insisting on the distinction between individual and person—insisting on inequalities, but within the framework of a more profound equality—with self-development as the means in education, and an ideal as the end—all issuing in a liberal formation for all, whose touchstone must be *caritas*, though its focus must never be Man.

But let Maritain himself have the last word, from that same *Confession of Faith* with which I began: ‘In my view, God educates us through our deceptions and mistakes, in order to make us understand at last that we ought to believe only in him, and not in men—which really brings one to marvel at all the good which is in men despite everything, and at all the good they do in spite of themselves.’²

IV

Martin Buber

—*—

By A. V. JUDGES

To prepare an exposition of Professor Martin Buber's teaching is like plundering a well-established orchard. There are so many fruits worth gathering. Some are plainly recognizable by any visitor as well worth while; some are decidedly curious to the taste and hard to classify; some, which are like no other fruits, first puzzle and finally ravish the understanding.

He who ventures into this field of discovery will have to learn the logic of the place and of its cryptic resources from Buber himself, using not a little patience and understanding. But after a while it becomes a rewarding visit. The glades open up, and one may even get glimpses of objects commonly thought to be inaccessible. The tree of life itself—Buber seems alternately to reveal it and to remove it from view; for he is by means on distant terms with the first creator of a garden. As for the other forbidden tree of fatal attraction, you can descry its outline plainly enough beyond the dazzle of the flaming sword and the cherubim.

I find myself moving into Buber's own world of symbolism. One of his most interesting longer essays deals with the Garden of Eden and early middle-eastern man's notions about the genesis of that which is wrong behaviour and Buber's own notions on the subject. In its English translation

MARTIN BUBER

this little book is called *Images of Good and Evil*, a title which has a lot of relevance to his work as a whole.

Sin is the imagining of possibilities of action which are out of tune with life's true direction. It is a misdirection of one's powers; but it is not a destruction of them or a negative. Thus the use and abuse of freedom of choice are for Buber at the heart of the matters on which I am going to speak. One may perhaps be forgiven for thinking that Adam and Eve were sharply treated for a kind of behaviour which was no more than a mixture of scientific curiosity and self-assertion, following an impulse which had only a short time before been planted in them by their maker—a creator who knew the limitations of His creatures. What would Buber's answer be to this rather flippant observation on the myth of the forbidden fruit? He sees the action of our first parents as misdirected passion. These two people in their inexperience were acting below the level of performance of the magnificent conative equipment with which man, as distinct from the other mammals, had been endowed. Having erred, they ran away and hid themselves. Buber's attitude is implacable in one sense, for sin is held to stand for inattention to the law of our being. Yet, in other senses, his disapproval is less grave than that to be observed in most Christian thought. Sin is rather the absence of righteousness than its opposite or its defiance. Moreover it is redeemable by man. Here is an attitude which is rooted in the life and dogma of Buber's own race. Hardly an orthodox Jew, he might be regarded by some Jews as an amiable and harmless heretic, by others as a true member of the Jewish resistance movement, the underground of revolt, ever chafing against the inflexibility and uncreative strictness of the orthodox Rabbism. In this capacity, we can see that he took to the *maquis* when, having been brought already under the powerful intellectual stimulus of Kant, he began as a young student to undertake research into the doctrines of the east European Jewish sect, or movement, of the Chassidim. Most unfortunately the

MARTIN BUBER

ways of thought and action of this wonderfully attractive spiritual movement, at its height in the eighteenth century, have to be omitted from this discussion; and to that extent my subject is impoverished.

The point has to be made that on these unusual foundations, and in the presence of all the antinomies which Kantian and neo-Kantian thought discovers but cannot dispose of, Buber beat out his own intellectual route into the presence of God; for only in divine terms could he explain the termination of his quest, a point at which being fully himself means a man's being alive to opportunity, with power to back his own judgment.

Now I think I am right to emphasize the place which the teachings of the Torah, and even the Kabbala, and all the great documentary affirmations of the faith of Israel, to say nothing of the yearnings of modern Zionism, demand in any consideration of Buber's teaching. More skilled in New-Testament exegesis than many Christian scholars, and one of the strongest influences in present-day Christian thought, especially among the theological deviationists of Central European Protestantism, Buber does not himself respond to what most people would hold to be the central Christian message. Moved by the narration of the synoptic Gospels, none the less he rejects the atonement. His refusal is not, to be sure, of the living Jesus who preaches the new man, but of the whole concept of a planned and organized redemption; and he vehemently dissociates himself from the Pauline position on faith in a mediator drawn from Heaven.

The field open for redemption by preternatural effort remains none the less world-wide in its magnitude. This work is for man himself, who (as Chassidism preaches) has to move in and play his spiritual role in the cosmic process. The problem of tracking evil back to its home ground has occupied the attention of other powerful thinkers, often more to their intellectual satisfaction than to our profit. What we must note is Buber's ingenuity in avoiding the liveliest

MARTIN BUBER

temptation which a consideration of evil offers to the investigator, namely the desire to recognize in it an absolute reality. That way lie gnosticism and Manicheism, to which the thinking of Jewry has always been opposed. It is plain that Hitler and the cold wickedness of Auschwitz and Belsen and Dora did very nearly shake Buber off the knife-edge into dualism. He confessed that only in a formal sense could he recognize a common humanity with those who planned this sustained and horrifying pogrom. But we can still take it from him that man, whatever his falling from grace may signify, retains the capacity for his own redemption. Here the enlightened teacher's role plainly calls for consideration.

Sin then is the name given for the experience of a divided life, where the sense of direction is unstable, where a kind of incompetence rules, a dithering as it were of an unfocused personality, the result of a bungled birthright.

I seem to have been longer engaged with this subject, which is the reverse of the medal I shall display, than that taciturn New Englander Calvin Coolidge, who, when asked by his stay-at-home family to tell them what was the Sunday-morning preacher's subject, said laconically, 'Sin'. 'Well, what about Sin?' they asked. 'He was against it.' So is Buber constantly against it, though, as I say, he makes it look cosier and much less a part of our gene-inheritance than many a Sunday-school pedant would have it. The feature of it which stands out starkly in his writing is its loneliness. It constitutes a marooning of the self, a self once created and nurtured in community. John Donne the poet said, 'No man is an island.' And this in short is what Buber is all the time telling us. His preaching is all about one thing, which is the recognition of a kind of heightened consciousness and indeed a different mode of living which occurs when personalities are directly in contact. This goes with the acknowledgment of the presence of a living God. What he is essaying is the transfiguration of the dull workaday milieu of the objective world into the setting of a spiritual drama, a drama which is set in

MARTIN BUBER

motion when in the deepest experience of life with one's fellows one is aware of the flash and glow that light up as signals of understanding pass without reserve between two individuals. Its tokens at both poles are a kind of unconditioned respect and a spontaneous sincerity, not least an affirmation of tolerance for the right of the other to be himself and not some ideal or imagined person.

It is as if, Buber says, one called silently to the other and was silently answered. The meaning of the casual words which pass between may have little importance. There may even be no talk, no sound; only a glance of inquiry, the crooking of a finger, the hint of a smile perhaps, or a slight pause in the regularity of breathing. Something declares its presence, some sense of common understanding, even though the parties are met in dispute, even though the contact be the most unexpected and unplanned coming together of strangers. Still each gives the other the sudden confidence of his understanding and places himself equally unreservedly at the other's mercy. Watch a loving mother playing silently with her sixth-month-old child, and the relationship is manifest, although intellectual cognition is entirely wanting.

It is in this way that Buber introduces us to what he conceives to be the most intense reality of human expression and action. In one sense it may be described as being engaged in a state of relationship. In another sense it is the consciousness of being carried forward by life in the only conceivably true direction. A third aspect is the heightening, not the submersion, of personal awareness.

Proceeding from this intuitive recognition of a mutual situation, Buber seems to have asked himself what then happens in circumstances in which no signal is given or received—a contact made with the shutters closed. Here it is as if the participants were regarding one another, not as living souls, but as things under observation; treating one another as utility objects in a world where percipient awareness lights up on the screen of our environment merely

MARTIN BUBER

according to the use one has for things—a world of pragmatic observation. After all, to pledge one's loyalty or to imperil a day of one's convenience in an act of address and recognition to an inanimate object—that is something rather absurd to contemplate. So with animate beings. In such a setting they can be no more than environmental events, and worth no more. We are all aware that a pledge of loyalty or an offer of service can seem no more than an institutional performance; and, as a 'matter of fact, as Buber sees it, a great range of contacts may be seen to occur in a quite impersonal way: we might as well be things. A traveller can purchase a ticket from a bus conductor in the same state of mind as when he secures one from an automatic machine; and, whatever the state of being an automatic machine may experience, such we may believe to be the ontological condition of the conductor in question. Yet on another day, on another bus, a single word and a glance will induct both persons into an entirely different relationship, producing such a spark of mutual acknowledgment that it will sustain each through any crisis which the next moment may bring forward to call upon all their powers of decision. Similarly a complete lesson may be given in a classroom by a seemingly automatic instructor to a group of indifferent pupils; and all concerned may file out at the end with fuller notebooks but no quickening of the sense of human contact, and moreover no growth of experience.

Thus the reality of the mutual contact lies less in what is said than in how it is said. Professor Morris speaks in his lecture on Freud of one's pathological tendency to project an imagined figure of one's own construction to serve instead of the real creature one has to do with. Admitting the truth of this, I think we can say that only when the fiction is set aside, and an easy and almost cynical acceptance of the real individual takes its place, does mutual interchange become possible. The critical gesture may be only the lift of an eyebrow. 'For what', in the words of Mr. Arthur Cohen, the

MARTIN BUBER

latest writer on Buber, 'binds men together is not programmatic agreement, but the transference from one to another of a vital portion of his nature.'¹ It is the same experience, if I can contrive to put Buber's thought into a brief few words, as that which a person has when he addresses his God, and in the same act modestly receives God's recognition of himself. At all events it is of the same order of reality.

Precisely what communication takes place in either form of address is and remains a mystery. Buber finds it impossible to describe the transaction. Its characteristics are spontaneity and trust; nor is love absent. No intellectual affirmation at all can be found. Faith need have no knowledge content. It is an attitude of trust; and God Himself, as soon as we think of Him in the third person singular rather than the second, becomes an abstraction and eludes us. Thus reality can only be experienced in the present: it cannot be re-created from our past. If it were not for the knowledge that Buber had dwelt on the experienced God in his study of Chassidism before himself discovering what he calls mutuality, one might be forgiven for suggesting that God was invented by Buber to serve as a necessary opposite person within the feeling of spiritual relationship which can yet occur when no other human being is involved. So much perhaps for theology; for, within the categories of intellectual inquiry, it is fair to say that Buber cannot or will not describe God, nor tell us anything really about the relationship of people who directly experience one another. The fundamental realities and the kind of truth they offer are only to be apprehended by insight. Theological science, philosophy, or anthropology (in the German meaning of the word), or the *via mystica*—in what framework of discussion can this message of Buber's be pigeon-holed in any summary account? The analytical philosophy of the university lecture rooms once described and would still, I think, describe today the terms of the message as a special kind of learned nonsense.

MARTIN BUBER

Learned or not, it must be sheer nonsense for some of Buber's readers. What he evokes is an uncircumscribed field of reality, beyond the categories of space and time, within which can or might be described a potential God, at the centre of potential human relationship, a God that is unknowable and inexpressible, and yet (to Buber) still recognizably the old Jehovah of the patriarchs and prophets.

Enough has been said to explain how it is that Buber feels justified in describing the kind of living that is spontaneous and true and full of insight as one of moving dialogue, dialogue with other persons and dialogue in the presence of God. Whether there is here a boundary line or proper distinction among these activities frankly I cannot pretend to say. The intellectual difficulties created by one who treats existence and knowledge in these terms, and insists on discussing man's perplexities now in the tones of the blindest philosophical realism, and now in the language of the minor prophets—these are formidable enough. All this is partly the result of Buber's style and presentation, but far more the result of his refusal to come to terms with any empirical and scientific formulation of reality; and above all it is the consequence of his withdrawing his essential doctrine beyond the reach of rational scrutiny. Of course, as one comes to know his work better, one begins to see why this must be. For the paradox which admits the co-existence of two worlds of knowledge has yet to be resolved for any of us.

Educational theory seems never to have been able to pinpoint the difficulties with which the road to an appreciation of this paradox is beset. And yet education is one of the forms of action to which Buber looks for the redemption of the civilized world from its critical state: the other is the mastery of life in community, the art of communal living, essentially what is most vital in the small community in which personal values carry appreciable weight. Now, although one may be temperamentally unfitted to describe the human predicament in the almost apocalyptic visionary terms offered us by

MARTIN BUBER

Buber, one can be convinced that his insight here is just, and moreover that education and group living both offer problems that turn out to be the same problem. How then approach education?

First, in the search for principles we must disavow any atomist prejudices. We must see in ourselves the habit, picked up from current scientific method, of analysing a piece of reality into its constituent elements and then going into reverse and declaring that the true object of our attention is an interlocking model of the bits we have just wrenched apart. From this habit we must seek release. We owe some sympathy to those of the psychologists who can see no use, when instructing young teachers, in exhibiting a network of stimulus-response mechanisms, or, what is more futile, in borrowing such mechanisms from captive rodents. To them it seems preferable to discuss the process of learning as something which involves the whole personality in action, its drives, impulses and demands for need-reduction all subsumed under one unity, instead of being presented as independent bits.

Buber would take us farther than this by denying sufficiency to the human organism even in its completeness. Even man the psychological unit is an abstraction. For him it is the mutuality of the joint experience of two or more persons that can be held to deliver the goods. And the goods include all the valuations in life, as well as the capacity to make them.

Across these tenuous bridges between individuals events occur which generate the child's first sense of his very own self, his *persona*. In his strange little book *I and Thou* Buber has written a touching and most revealing account of the dawning of consciousness in the very young child and of the first tentative provings of his personality. Then maturation advances. And the significance of all those things that the learner chooses to distinguish as having to have value attached to them springs from the same processes of joint understanding, interchange and compassion. Goodness and

MARTIN BUBER

guilt, criticism, anxiety and tranquillity are read in the hearts of others. By some process of evaluation they shape the learner's sense of direction on the way of life along which he is drawn.

These are difficult notions to swallow, so far out of line are they with the classical theories of knowledge and subject-object connection which we inherit from Descartes and Malebranche and Locke and their successors. The kind of reality that Buber asks us to consider as taking part in the real generation of understanding does not appear at all in the philosophy textbooks. He seems to be referring to the posture of mind and feeling the organism assumes when entering into a condition referred to by Buber as community. All that this posture signifies it is hard to say, but one thing at least is a distinct alertness to matters which are external to the biological and particular needs of the organism. Mutual interest, mutual concern, the common acceptance of something known to be true, these words describe the situation far better than altruism or negation of self.

This may be illustrated in a moment of real life preserved for us by a woman who endured and triumphed over the horrors of a torture-prison—Julia de Beausobre. The governor comes into her cell. 'There is only a corner of the table between us. We look at each other. And we see each other. In that moment's hush that follows *we are both present* at the eternal miracle, the lightning-quick nativity of human understanding. . . . I see him realize with wonder and relief that I am not hostile to him or to any one or anything. The barrier of cruel superficialities has fallen away, and we both know that all things in all eternity will be good and clear between us. If only—*we do not forget.*'¹

The signal that relationship is called into being is that we are at once aware of a sense of direction or deepened mean-

¹ Julia de Beausobre. *The Woman who could not die*. The first use of italics is my own. I am obliged to Professor Dorothy Emmet's *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking* (p. 212) for this passage.

MARTIN BUBER

ing. Rather than laying exacting demands upon one another, the persons involved in relationship find themselves sharing in the appreciation of a certain order of significance. Of course such appreciation *may* exact demands so heavy that they look like destiny. Even so, the personalities do not merge or pass into a supra-personal union. Indeed Buber, who long ago dropped the desire for mystical inwardness, points out that it is the very polarity of the situation which makes the dynamic tension. The situation contains the implicit understanding that persons remain persons; and this means that there is no domination or subjection of one by the other, or misuse of spiritual force.

Perhaps only the language of poetry can attempt to seize the reality of the shared moment. Let me quote from one of Buber's collections of Chassidic tales:

'There was a Zaddik who attained Hitlahabut [or ecstatic ardour] every time when the words "And God said" occurred in the reading of the scriptures. When a wise Chassid told his pupils, he added: "But I also say that if any one speaks in sincerity, and another listens in sincerity, then one word is enough to uplift and deliver the whole world." That which is ordinary becomes ever new to the man who is aflame.'¹

It will I trust be recognized that we have now been introduced without ceremony into what in the jargon of the trade we call a classroom situation. And it is right enough that the teacher, related in the medium of his work to a group of pupils and in the midst of them, should be thought of not only as a potential source of uplift, but as the epitome of all educational practice. Few subscribers to correspondence courses have been known to have their minds set aflame. Buber's message to the teacher relates in fact to the face-to-face situation, and there is no need to emphasize that it has to do with the uses of spontaneous communication, and beyond this with the rise and recognition of community values. It has to do with the interpretation of tradition—yet

MARTIN BUBER

not its forceful imposition. Looked at in another aspect, it is concerned with the knowledge of freedom and responsibility, which is what the rest of us sometimes call the development of character. All of this relates rather to the 'how' than to the 'what' of instruction: all of it relates to what happens between the teacher and the pupil. For, since authentic experience, with all the traces in memory which it leaves, is to be found in personal relationship, in the addressing of the word and the evocation of the answering word, Buber's educator is a real 'instructor'—I do not hesitate to use this maligned word; he is not a trainee in child development who has become an adept in releasing the imprisoned soul of the child and its attendant impulses; nor is he a specialist who slips the catch of Pandora's box and lets things rip!

Thus, far from believing that the child is equipped by nature with a rolled-up development plan and only desires to be left alone with a 'do-it-yourself kit' donated by Rousseau, Buber joins the social psychologists and seems even to assert that the capacity for mental development is available only in the hurly-burly of human contacts; and that the better disposed and the better informed such contacts are, the brighter the educational prospects. Indeed he seems almost to go out of his way to place the natural creativeness of the human being in an equivocal position. Try to explain the dynamic element brought by nature into the child's equipment, in the terms of William McDougall, as a quiverful of instincts, and Buber can be imagined as replying: Very well, we will agree to think like that. But remember, you cannot analyse the instinctive life and sort out the contributing voices as you might attempt to dissect the contrapuntal singing of a choir. Only when the polyphonic balance goes wrong, in other words where there is mental illness, does a single, distinct and inharmonious voice seem to assert itself above the rest. If, however, you must distinguish between instincts, look as a parent or school teacher for the least self-serving, the originating instinct. And now to quote his actual

MARTIN BUBER

words: 'What the child desires is its own share in the becoming of things.' This is 'not to be confused with the so-called instinct to busyness or activity, which for that matter does not seem to me to exist at all. The child wants to set up or destroy, handle or hit, and so on, but never "busy himself".' 'It is also to be observed how even in the child's apparently "blind" lust for destruction his instinct of origination enters in and becomes dominant.' Long ago the Edgeworths noticed that children even when destroying their dolls have a purpose in which curiosity and a kind of pioneering zest display themselves.

But *qua* originators, Buber sees man and child as solitaries. The craftsman screened off in isolation with his genius cannot touch our imagination. Even Pygmalion in the myth, whose genius found itself compromised with such a remarkable sequel to imaginative effort, is a slightly absurd figure.

So it is the task of the teacher to *meet* and enter into relationship with this released instinct discerned among the child's propensities by all the prominent educational thinkers from Plato to Montessori and Dewey, an instinct characterized by inventiveness and spontaneity—to meet it with the discipline of form. I do not mean by this that he is called upon to observe the ritual patterns and deadly repetitions of formal education, but that he must bring upon the scene the scale of values, embodied values, which are those of the culture in which tutor and pupil find themselves immersed. Both are obliged to adopt a framework and an organization of knowledge within which the child's creativeness can engage itself. Once engaged, the child secures a footing within a communal construct and begins to experience the fascination of problems revealed through the images offered to him by other engaged personalities. Part of the teacher's function is to present a skilful selection of the world within the appropriate frame. As Sir Herbert Read translates the original German, what the teacher offers is 'the selection of a feasible world'. Naturally this framework is governed by

MARTIN BUBER

tradition and mores, including conventional ethical ideas. It embodies the thought designs of a civilization within the inevitable linguistic patterns and those Procrustean beds of syntax and logic; all these must be present and the tried apparatus of academic learning too.

In this role we see the teacher, both of the sciences and of the liberal arts, as craftsman and artist, a practitioner of the oldest, noblest and riskiest trade known to man. In his role at its most creative we see him as a worker on the tissue of human imagination, a worker uninhibited in the last resort even by his own traditions; for all things which have been already said and done must in the end be seen as relative and not eternal.

But where have we been brought to? Notice here the concreteness and immediacy of Buber's thought. Reality—seized on the wing—before which all crystallized ideals and worn-out symbols must give way, is in the present, which is the moment of choice. So the rightness of decisions springs out of the insight given in present relationship. Even the teacher's valuations may have to give way. With the intuition of the present truth at one's disposal, one is under no final obligation to accept old maxims from a moral code written as it were in invisible ink on the firmament. I do not know how many citadels in the structure of moral philosophy are sold outright when such a statement is made. Would not some moralists treat this position as a startling example of the inner-light fallacy? Anyhow, most of us would agree with one very positive assertion made by Buber. It is a fatal mistake to give direct instruction in ethical comportment.

Well, there is yet another crux to be faced. The pupil is no material to be forced into a mould. Nor are we to treat him, says Buber, as a funnel or a pump. We are still on the knife-edge between nature and nurture, between inherited factors and environmental influences. Must we stay on the knife-edge? Yes. It is here that life happens. The reality of all relationship is in meeting, in encounter, in the present. This

MARTIN BUBER

primary reality embraces the educational functions of nursery, schoolroom, club, workshop and athletic ground. The parties to an educational transaction are free and independent beings brought together, often by accident, into a relationship of polarity. Tension certainly must be present. Without it precious little would happen; character development would be an almost meaningless notion.

Yet it is the kind of tension that matters. The teacher has no right to impose himself on the pupil's freedom or to proclaim his own will. He can bring the whole force of his personality into the situation—indeed he will be no convincing teacher if he fails to do so. He may display his superior skill and wisdom. He may and should love his charges, though it must be with a kind of tenderness that makes no strong personal demands. He may and should penetrate into the imaginative vision of his pupil and momentarily live his way into the pupil's role. But if he bungles, if he is a predator, if he destroys the freedom and purposiveness of the pupil's attitude to the subject matter, education ceases.

And here I think I interpret Buber rightly in stating that while the propagandist and the moralist believe, often passionately, in the virtue of their message, the true educator believes in the virtue of his pupil, sometimes within all the circumstances of failure; and that here there is a faith which the pupil must learn to share, for it is he and not the master who will sow and reap.

Thus we come to the conception of freedom. Sir Fred Clarke wrote whilst under Buber's influence the best essay on educational principles that he gave to the world. Loose talk about freedom would, he claimed, bring no one to grips with the problems of the teacher. Freedom could indeed be one of two things in education. It could be understood as a technique 'to ensure that the learning-responses of children are really and genuinely their own'. And it could be considered as an educational objective, demanding trained capacities of thought and action, the result of disciplined learning

MARTIN BUBER

and no other.¹ He seemed to be convinced that, without the implied achievement of the second, the search for freedom in the first connection had little meaning. 'Spontaneity equals freedom' is an equation the use of which does nothing to advance the argument towards a constructive conclusion; and, like Clarke, we may feel bound to agree with Buber that education through exercise of untutored impulse alone can yield nothing but 'a mere human solitariness'.

Now even Buber faces this question of freedom in educational practice with some measure of uneasiness.

'Freedom—I love its flashing face: it flashes forth from the darkness and dies away, but it has made the heart invulnerable. I am devoted to it, I am always ready to join in the fight for it. . . . I give my left hand to the rebel and my right to the heretic: forward! But I do not trust them. They know how to die, but that is not enough.'²

Freedom conceived as independence is a footbridge, not a dwelling place. To exalt freedom as an end is to treat a functional good as a substantial good. The discipline to which the pupil has to be exposed is the discipline of external values. We leave him the right to reject what is not mutually acceptable in the dialectical exchange between teacher and taught. In that rejection the teacher can not disclaim his part. In dialogue he is conscious of a charge that is laid on him. Responsibility has to be discharged.

Knowledge itself involves action; and action involves choosing. 'There is no other source of knowledge than experience', Bergson wrote again and again; and there is much of the later Bergson's phenomenological thinking in Buber's approach to knowledge. Beliefs begin in activity by insights into novel situations. They come upon us in their nakedness, without a common form. They must be clothed and made presentable in the reach-me-downs at our disposal. Having no language of their own, insights must be communicated

MARTIN BUBER

and remembered in the form of symbols. Later the symbols may have to be shed, like the husks of thought they are, as new insights declare themselves, urging us in their turn to find them symbolic expression.

Thus knowledge in books is more remote from the main highway of communication than knowledge which is conveyed in shared experience, when the teacher may with some good fortune be allowed to enter the thoughts and emotions of the pupil and partake in his insights. This degree of relationship in its fullest degree calls for a condition of confidence of a rather uncommon kind. A hint of betrayal, and all is up with that kind of communication. The true teacher has to be something of a dedicated person. Whilst welcoming involvement in the growth process, he must in some measure renounce emotional attachment. For one thing, he seldom chooses his pupils: Eros is no party to the transaction. Further, if the teacher seems to select and distinguish among his charges, in capturing some he will lose the confidence of the rest.

It can be a poignant experience for the teacher when he or she faces a new group. Potentially there is what Buber calls 'a secret resistance'. And why not? They are not asking to be loved. They ask rather, 'What do you bring?'¹

'He enters the schoolroom for the first time, he sees them crouching at the desks, indiscriminately flung together, the misshapen and the well-proportioned, animal faces, empty faces and noble faces in indiscriminate confusion, like the presence of the created universe; the glance of the educator accepts and receives them all.'

There are numerous hints in Buber's writing about classroom relationships. Though no more than hints, anyone may derive from them insights into problems with which he has been groping, especially those connected with the appreciation of the teacher's real job. Insights to be sure they must be. No direct instruction in group management is offered; no

¹ Ibid., p. 94.

MARTIN BUBER

traffic with sociometry. Only the broadest suggestions about the content of teaching are left in our way. Education for Buber has no norms. The paraphernalia of the business—objects, books, visual aids—are only incidental. As the French philosopher Merleau-Ponty has remarked, 'Le corps n'est pas une chose, il est une situation.' The relationship for which the words learning and teaching stand is, too, a situation.

'Every living situation has, like a newborn child, a new face that has never been before and will never come again. It demands of you a reaction which cannot be prepared beforehand. It demands nothing of what has been past. It demands presence, responsibility. It demands you.'¹

And the whole vocabulary of pedagogical discourse must be seen in a fresh setting. What do we look for in a learning situation? Adjustment, a word to be eyed with caution. Proper upbringing offers the child anything but a neat little lodgment in the environment; a leader, an inspired deviant, and no lodgment for him or her. Security, yes, in the sense that positive development is favoured by the consciousness of interest and love around one. Security in this sense is the fitting milieu in which a pupil acquires the posture which will force him ever to be ready to take the first step. Courage, expectancy, alertness, yes; all these for a situation in which the full experience dealt with in Buber's preaching is at hand, waiting to prompt the release of creative interest, available without recourse to incantations, ascetic practices, breathing exercises, or dangerous drugs like mescaline. But, if I understand Buber's teaching, the individual must always be ready to take the first step. And that is what the right posture means: to accept the charge which is laid on you.

And so the right word turns out to be responsibility, which is readiness to acknowledge a charge. Buber's more recent writing has been devoted to this notion of the extension of the personality by the acceptance of responsibility: it is

¹ Ibid., p. 114.

MARTIN BUBER

developed with a wonderful range of illustration and metaphor.

A part of the educator's task is already achieved when those he has with him accept a role of responsibility. The argument is difficult here (as it is apt to be with Buber when practical issues are involved); for it has to be said that responsibility is often acquired by the learner, like so much else, without noticing it. In the dialectic of social life valuations will be borrowed from all and sundry: one must lean one's responsibility on *something*, something established. Yet, as Buber points out, as we achieve elasticity in response, this leaning on something furnished by the past traditions and experiences of the social group is more and more denied to us by our spiritual maturity: responsibility becomes increasingly linked up with the unrehearsed and lonely demands made by the moment.

Responsibility for choice, put to the fullest test, must involve a sense of separateness from one's fellow-men at least. But not desolation or solitude. Existentialist Buber may perhaps be labelled, but not in the tradition of Augustine and Pascal and Kierkegaard, who were shaken at the sight of man's helplessness and loneliness. What I earnestly commend to your attention is Buber's robust gregariousness. When he sees us establish full and unreserved communication, even in knowledge of our separateness, we are at that moment citizens of the kingdom.

The point to be stressed anyway is that effective responsible teaching is a kind of transfusion. The teacher recreates from the past, but he speaks from the living moment in his own bloodstream. The learner's role is also creative. Structurized and formalized at the reception end the lessons of course must be; yet the configuration itself is a constructive effort. The educator's task on his side is neither to enunciate an everlasting truth nor indeed to assert his opinions, but, as Socrates also showed, to search, to exemplify and to illuminate the way.

MARTIN BUBER

SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN BUBER

Between Man and Man

(Beginners should start here.)

I and Thou (trans. R. Gregor Smith, 1737).

Images of Good and Evil (transl. M. Bullock, 1752).

Two Types of Faith (transl. N. P. Goldhawk, 1751).

Paths in Utopia (transl. R. P. C. Hull, 1749).

Pointing the Way (transl. M. Friedman, 1757).

For the Sake of Heaven (a novel) (2nd transl. edn. 1753).

Eclipse of God (transl. M. Friedman, 1753).

(ABOUT MARTIN BUBER)

M. Friedman, *Martin Buber: the Life of Dialogue* (1755).

A. A. Cohen, *Martin Buber* ('Studies in Modern Literature and Thought Series', 1757).

Will Herberg, *The Writings of Martin Buber* (New York, 1756) (An anthology of short pieces and extracts, with a useful introduction about Buber's religious thought.)

V

Sigmund Freud

*

By BEN MORRIS

Education begins at birth, and it may end only at death. As an enterprise it is therefore open to an immense variety of influences. Innovation and developments in educational thought and practice arise not only from direct work with children, and reflection upon such work, but from religious, political and philosophical movements, and from scientific advances and the technological and intellectual changes which such advances bring about. Every thinker who has widened human horizons and given man a new view of the universe in which he lives has influenced education, whether or not he himself had much to say about it. When the new view presented is one of man himself, his nature and development, the potential implications for education are of the profoundest kind. Sigmund Freud, the centenary of whose birth we celebrated two years ago, is in my estimation, and in the sense I have spoken of, one of the great pioneers of thought whose work is of immense significance for education.

Freud was primarily a physician and a scientist. The therapeutic instrument he created, and the body of related ideas which he developed—both described by the term psycho-analysis—are still not generally perceived in the wider setting necessary for their full understanding. To many, psycho-analysis is a somewhat obscure and even

SIGMUND FREUD

doubtful means of healing the mentally sick; to others it is a theory about human behaviour, which because of its connection with mental illness, cannot possibly be of fundamental importance either for a general view of human nature, or for the major problems of education. The connection with mental illness is likely always to be an obstacle to an understanding of psycho-analysis, for in such sickness man sees all too plainly, and writ large, the primitive and irrational side of his nature, the existence of which his civilized and rational self would fain deny. Moreover, it is true that Freud did very little direct work with children, although we now know that as a family man he knew a great deal about them, and made use of his observations. We know how the play of his eldest grandchild was the stimulus which led him to important new formulations. But he himself had very little indeed to say about education. Yet there is reason to believe that his discoveries and ideas, were they to be fully accepted, not just intellectually, but in their emotional implications, would do much to transform education and could lead to changes in man's life, perhaps even more radical than any of those brought about by discoveries in the physical sciences. Moreover, these changes would be ones making for greater personal happiness and creativity, greater social harmony, greater fortitude in face of the vicissitudes of life and of the new perils to be encountered in man's further exploration of the physical universe, greater courage in the pursuit of his unending quest for the secrets of his own nature. To do justice to Freud's work and to substantiate the claims I have made for its implications, would require not only a detailed assessment of what his own contribution actually was, but also a thorough examination of its antecedents, the contemporary climate of opinion in which he lived, and the ways in which his conceptions are now being modified, extended and merged into the broader stream of discovery and thought about human affairs, including education.

SIGMUND FREUD

Such a task is quite outside the scope of this paper; it is far beyond my personal capacity and indeed beyond the competence of any single man. Ernest Jones, in his magnificent biography of Freud, has made a brilliant contribution to this work of elucidation, criticism, and appreciation, and this contribution itself runs to three large volumes. As well as the immense range of studies to which Freud's work is relevant, there are two further difficulties in the way of adequate appreciation. First, it is notorious that many of his essential ideas, such as those concerning the dynamic role of unconscious mental processes and the facts of infantile sexuality, are difficult to grasp, not because of any inherent intellectual difficulty, nor because of the conceptual language in which he clothed them, but because of their emotional implications. It is for this reason that personal analytic experience helps so greatly in understanding them. But, that lack of such experience is no insurmountable barrier to understanding is proved by the influence these ideas have already had in medicine, education, and social anthropology, among workers and thinkers who have not themselves been analysed. Secondly, Freud's ideas underwent significant changes and, although his central conceptions were substantially maintained, he was constantly revising and modifying his hypotheses in accordance with fresh discoveries. There was the painful and profound change in his thinking brought about by the startling discovery that the stories of infantile seduction told by his early patients were not based on fact, as he had believed, but on phantasy. Even more difficult to appreciate are the changes in fundamental theory he had to make when he was forced to admit that aggressive and destructive impulses are as fundamental in human nature as sexual (libidinal) and creative ones, an admission to which he was led by a full consideration of the facts of unpleasant and terrifying dreams and of the compulsion shown by children and patients to seek to repeat unpleasant and painful experiences.

SIGMUND FREUD

The most that I can do is to select certain of Freud's key ideas which have been widely accepted and also further developed by other psycho-analysts, and attempt to show in what ways they illumine the educative process, in what ways they support or contradict existing educational thought and practice, and in what ways they suggest fresh developments. The questions I will attempt to answer therefore are: What are some of the ways in which Freud's work affects our views on education; and what are some of the ways in which it can further affect our educational practice? To handle them it is necessary to have some grasp of the nature of his achievements and of the revolution in many of our commonly accepted ideas which they imply. Central to all his work of course was his own self-analysis, epitomized in his discovery of his own Oedipus complex and of his early sibling rivalry. As is now well known, the term Oedipus complex refers to a phenomenon which an increasing number of social anthropologists agree is universal—the existence (among other and even opposing emotional patterns) of mutual sexual attraction between a child and the parent of the opposite sex and of mutual hostility and rivalry between a child and the parent of the same sex. It was so named by Freud to emphasize the link between a dramatic myth common in the ancient world and a universal human experience in infancy. Man's Oedipal ties and his unconscious primitive impulses had of course been glimpsed before. Plato was quite frank about them. In the *Republic* Socrates insists that 'in every one of us, even those who seem most respectable, there exist desires, terrible in their untamed lawlessness, which reveal themselves in dreams'. His precise meaning had just previously been elicited, 'What kind of desires do you mean?' *Socrates*: "Those which bestir themselves in dreams, when the gentler part of the soul slumbers and the control of reason is withdrawn; then the wild beast in us, full-fed with meat or drink, becomes rampant and shakes off sleep to go in quest of what will gratify its own instincts. As you know, it

SIGMUND FREUD

will cast away all shame and prudence at such moments and stick at nothing. In phantasy it will not shrink from intercourse with a mother or anyone else, man, god, or brute, or from forbidden food or any deed of blood. In a word, it will go to any length of shamelessness and folly.¹ But for the full and methodical exploration of the dark life of his own desires, man had to wait for more than another two thousand years.

Freud was not merely the first to unravel the real meaning of the riddle of the Sphinx. He used the oedipal discovery as a starting point for a systematic exploration and mapping of the complex web of infantile impulse and feeling out of which adult human character develops. As a consequence he was led to a system of concepts about human development which affect not only our theories of education, but have far-reaching implications regarding mental and also physical illness, delinquency and crime, the functioning of social and political institutions, and morals, religion and philosophy. These ideas have aroused immense controversy, and have of course been refuted over and over again to the satisfaction of those to whom they are intolerable, but with singularly little other effect. Freud has been attacked on moral grounds, for debasing man, accounting for his highest achievements in terms of sexuality, and making him part of the determinist scheme of nature—and on scientific grounds, for converting his own subjective experiences into universal truths. Of course he made mistakes. There were realms he could not penetrate; he was led astray in some of his generalizations by the culture within which he worked and by the presuppositions of the science of his time; and in some of his speculations we cannot now follow him. Yet the virulence with which he has been attacked is clearly not simply related to the truth or falsehood of his ideas as such, but to his unveiling of things which many to this day want desperately to keep concealed. I am not concerned with such attacks. They have of course to be sharply distinguished from serious, en-

SIGMUND FREUD

lightened and detailed criticism involving an examination of the conceptual basis of his theories and the evaluation of his clinical evidence, but such criticism and subsequent modification by removing what was fallacious and ill balanced, have served only to enhance Freud's achievements. On the point of subjectivity, it may be pointed out that Ernest Jones, in his biography, is largely concerned to show how Freud's achievements were in fact based on his own experience, and towards what biases this may have led. It is perhaps also relevant to add here how well the direct observation of children's behaviour, both normal and disturbed, stimulated in this country largely by the work of Anna Freud, Susan Isaacs and Melanie Klein and their pupils, has vindicated and enriched Freud's own deductions regarding infantile experience, based on the analysis of adult patients. On the theoretical side we may note that many serious students of human nature, not themselves analysts, are now grappling with the problem of correlating Freud's ideas and those of his successors with the results of anthropological and other social research, the newer observations on instinctive behaviour in animals, and the theoretical conceptions of cybernetics.

SOME OF FREUD'S KEY IDEAS

Before attempting any discussion of the relation of psycho-analytic theory to educational practice, I want to take three of Freud's leading and most general ideas, and indicate their wider implications for the understanding of human life and human behaviour, hoping that in this way I may illumine some of the more general aims of education. The three ideas in question are:

- (i) the existence of unconscious mental processes, and the dynamic nature of all mental life;
- (ii) the importance of the child's earliest relationships in the development of his personality, and

SIGMUND FREUD

- (iii) the significance of the infant's primitive impulses of love and hate, and of the conflict between them, for the attitudes he develops towards himself, towards others, and towards his work in the world, and for the beliefs and values he comes to adopt.

(i) *Unconscious processes and the dynamic nature of all mental life*

I have taken these two ideas as a single idea, because they are so closely related. In his *Hundred Years of Psychology* Flugel declared that Freud's was the major influence which turned psychologists away from an almost exclusive attention to the conscious intellect, and towards the idea, as Whitehead expresses it, that 'the basis of experience is emotional'. While there is a long educational history behind the idea that learning can only be effectively based on interest, that is ultimately on emotion and desire, it was Freud who showed what is implied in this conception. It is true also that a number of thinkers, notably Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, von Hartmann and perhaps above all Herbart, with whose ideas Freud is known to have been familiar, had enlarged on the idea of an unconscious mind. But it was Freud who formulated the conception of a continuously active and dynamic level of 'mental' functioning, not only outside consciousness in the sense that we are normally unaware of it, but totally beyond the reach of consciousness, what he called the *primary process* and the existence of which is therefore an inference from observed experience and behaviour.¹

¹ It is now generally accepted that it is a quite legitimate use of language to speak of 'unconscious mental processes', and even of an 'unconscious mind'. The sense in which these terms are used in psycho-analytic theory is made clear by Ruth L. Munroe's statement in her *Schools of Psycho-Analytic Thought* (1957) that 'Since Freud (and before) it has been possible to demonstrate quite conclusively that the unconscious acts "like a mind" in structuring behaviour in a directed manner.' The use of the term 'mental' is liable to be misleading unless its analogical character is appreciated. It may be argued that the postulated processes

SIGMUND FREUD

The significance of this notion is manifold. By his investigations Freud showed how the details of our behaviour, and of our thoughts and feelings, are influenced by unconscious motives, and he thus brought the whole of behaviour and experience within the realm of science. I might add here that this does not necessarily involve determinism as that idea is commonly understood—or should I say misunderstood?¹ There is no implication in Freud's view that we are never able to help what we do, that we are without responsibility for our conduct, and that we are therefore entirely blameless for our sins—a point well made by Richard Peters in a recent series of broadcasts.² What Freud's work does imply is that children's behaviour, our own, the deviations of the criminal and the sufferings of the mentally ill, all become in principle capable of rational explanation. For us, as teachers, this has meant primarily that children's behaviour has to be understood before it is judged and attempts made to influence it, that the explanation of much of children's behaviour, of many of their difficulties and successes in learning, has to be sought in an inner world of phantasy and of feeling. It has less often been taken to mean, as it must, that our own behaviour toward children and toward one another is influenced by unconscious motives in precisely the same way!

There is the further and no less disturbing implication that all our thought is moulded by desire, that our systems of religious, political and philosophical beliefs bear the clear im-

could just as well be regarded as neural. It can also be argued that 'the unconscious' is strictly an unnecessary concept, the word being more correctly used adjectivally and adverbally. (See A. C. MacIntyre, *The Unconscious—A Conceptual Study*, Kegan Paul, 1958.)

¹ The bog of determinism, in the form in which it haunts some types of reflective mind (and Freud himself was confused and inconsistent about the idea) may be exorcised either by a personal psycho-analysis, or by a course of modern linguistic philosophy. The latter is easier to come by, cheaper and less painful.

² 'The Contemporary Malaise', *The Listener*, 22nd June–11th July 1957.

SIGMUND FREUD

print of infantile wish fulfilment. But we must note that this does not imply that our ideas and beliefs are thereby necessarily invalid. Their validity has to be tested by other criteria. Origins are one thing; mature products, derivative yet with values of their own, are another. Freud was of course here concerned with origins and with the forces which help to mould our ideas. Nevertheless he has given us good reason for being, perhaps, a little sceptical toward many of our own beliefs and for being tolerant toward those of others. And this applies to educational theories as much as to anything else.

(ii) *The importance of early relationships*

This idea is one that has taken deep root in the public mind, albeit it is often misinterpreted. The central theme is that adult character is not only very largely moulded in infancy and early childhood, but that the early patterns of emotional relationships formed in these years tend to persist and colour all our later relationships. These early relationships are deeply sensual, indeed erotic, being concerned with the satisfaction or frustration of bodily needs, and since they are also felt to be intimately personal, we have here the key to why all personal relations are to be conceived of as fundamentally partaking of sexuality. This conception of the personal as being imbued with the sexual at every level is of fundamental importance to the understanding of psycho-analytic ideas. Our earliest relations are in this sense 'sexual' relations, and it is particularly through the work of some of Freud's followers, notably Ian Suttie, Melanie Klein and John Bowlby, that we have come to realize the very great importance of the first of all of these, the mother-child relationship in the very earliest phases of life. Deprivation of love and care can lead to deep anxiety and insecurity. This may result not only in a deep mistrust of life, in a failure of sexuality and of love itself, but also in the failure of the self

SIGMUND FREUD

and its moral function to develop on normal lines. The reverse is also true, and Freud himself said: 'A man who has been the indisputable favourite of his mother keeps for life the feeling of a conqueror, that confidence of success that often induces real success.'

The investigation of early relationships has thrown light on three of the most outstanding features of human as opposed to animal nature. These are man's capacity to forgo immediate satisfaction in favour of more remote aims, his capacity to display independent moral behaviour (that is behaviour not dependent on the immediate presence of external sanctions), with which is linked his ability to create and cherish values, and his capacity to develop a central self or ego which perceives, discriminates, reasons, judges and wills, and which matures through increasing its powers of concern for the welfare of others. Human achievements largely depend on the existence of these features. The capacity to postpone satisfaction is bound up with the extent to which the child develops the capacity to tolerate the conflicts inseparable from the not infrequent and unavoidable necessity of withholding satisfaction in infancy. We are now able to see that the development of this capacity to tolerate internal conflict is a major factor in later adult mental health, conceived not as the mere absence of conflict within the personality, but as the capacity to deal with conflict adequately at the deepest unconscious levels, to contain it and to transcend it.

It is in the dynamic effects of the infant's phantasy in relation to his parents that we find the key to the development of the moral function, of religious values, and of the emerging ego or self. But for proper understanding of these matters we have to invoke the third general idea I have chosen to discuss.

(iii) *The significance of the primitive impulses of love and hate*

The fundamental idea here is that the child experiences

SIGMUND FREUD

powerful feelings of love and hate towards both its parents, but in the first instance towards its mother. These experiences are inseparable from being nourished and cared for. To the extent that complete satisfaction cannot be achieved, aggressive feelings naturally follow on the frustration of desires. Doubtless there are cultural differences in this respect which may well account for differences in the direction and intensity of affection and hostility in different societies, and will thus modify the developmental picture. But in our modern western cultures it is from this ambivalence of feeling, this loving and hating of the same person, that there derives an inner unconscious sense of guilt. This is the internal source of our morality: guilt is after all the natural reaction to hating someone one also loves. This inner sense of guilt is stimulated both by the actual and also by the imagined behaviour of parents and later of teachers, in so far as they disapprove of or seem to disapprove of certain aspects of conduct. It is counteracted, and this is of immense significance for our type of society, by the equally natural response of reparation, the desire to undo or make good the wrong one has done—even where this wrong is entirely in the realms of phantasy—and this too is reinforced by loving and approving behaviour on the part of the parents.

The further and essential key to an understanding of the development of the self and of moral behaviour lies in the consideration that, to begin with, the child's perception of what is himself and what is not himself, i.e. is outside himself, is confused and labile. For a time he and his mother are one, and this lays the foundation for his identification with her, which is strengthened by the later desire to be like her. Later still the desire, in the case of the boy, to be like his father, leads to a similar and even more powerful identification. Governed, as he is, largely by feeling, it is the emotionally potent aspects of his parents as he sees them, with which he predominantly identifies himself. His central self or ego grows as he seeks through learning to incorporate within

SIGMUND FREUD

himself the powerfulness, resourcefulness, and cleverness of his parents; and his moral function or super-ego develops as he identifies himself with them, in their rewarding or punishing attitudes—attitudes called out in them, as he is prone to imagine, by his own loving or hostile impulses. He thus becomes possessed of a means of controlling his own behaviour, which is independent of the actual presence or absence of his parents, but which operates in the light of what his parents approve or disapprove, for he has, psychologically speaking, got his parents inside him. In this way the nucleus of the child's primitive conscience is formed, the earliest levels of the unconscious part of the super-ego, primitive because of the powerful and quite irrational impulses of love, hate and fear, of guilt and reparation which it calls into play. Its further development through the vicissitudes of the Oedipus stage, and later through the growth of a more or less conscious ego ideal, which can result in the development of what, following Sir Fred Clarke, we might call an instructed or civilized conscience, are matters we must here leave aside. It is pertinent to remark however how conventional morality throughout the ages has always been liable to give expression to, and indeed to be invaded by the workings of the primitive conscience, as is to be seen in the crippling inhibitions and the savage vindictiveness of much that has passed for righteous behaviour.

Introjection of aspects of the parents is only one side of the phantasy exchanges between external and internal world, which characterize the psychical life of the very young child. Its opposite, projection, is also constantly taking place. Through projection the infant endows the world—to begin with indeed, its parents—with qualities which really belong to his own primitive impulses, rather than to objects in external reality. In the inter-play of the projection of primitive impulses of love and hate outward on to the world and other people, and of the introjection of the loving or hostile aspects of outer reality, lies part of the explanation of man's capacity

SIGMUND FREUD

to form and cherish values. The world and its activities are good in so far as the child is able to feel and to express his own love, stimulated and encouraged in the first place by the experience of the real love of another. The world is evil and terrifying in so far as hate and fear predominate within and have been confirmed and augmented by the experience of neglect or real hostility from others. Thus are laid the basic attitudes to life, to work and to one's fellows. Experienced first in relation to his parents, these attitudes come to energize and colour every activity, and every relationship, and thus they come to characterize his very self. It is through the transference of these attitudes from their original objects to the world of things, peoples, ideas and ideals that Freud sought to explain much that is characteristic both of the growth of culture and of the process of socialization and learning in children. But besides growing through the assimilation of parental imagos and attitudes, and besides becoming the bearer of a moral function (super-ego), the child's ego is expanding through the exercise of perceptual, rational and executive functions, and is thus becoming the instrument through which he seeks to interpret both the world and himself. We must, however, leave until later further reference to the way in which the ego or central self becomes gradually able to control both primitive impulse and primitive conscience, and to become a relatively autonomous agent in the determination of conduct.

This rapid survey may help to make clear the basis of Freud's views about the universal tendency to confuse the real properties of the world with those with which we may endow it. Children and parents, children and teachers, are often seen by one another, not as they really are, but as images unconsciously distorted through a lens of projected feeling. Seeing the mote in another's eye, we fail to observe the beam in our own. How rarely, too, is the beloved quite what we sometimes feel her or him to be—how often but the hidden image of a loved and idealized parent projected on to someone who is in

SIGMUND FREUD

truth quite different? The first step toward the mature love of another person is the discovery not only of what that other is really like, but of what one is really like oneself, and this tearing aside of the veils of illusion may be deeply painful, yet infinitely rewarding once it is done.

It was also Freud's view that the gods, devils and other supernatural beings and creatures with which we have populated the universe represent projections from the unconscious levels of our minds. They depict the internal drama of our infancy and childhood, writ large and played out on the stage of the outside world. To explain these products of the imagination in this way, however, is not to exhaust their meaning. We have to remind ourselves that in a certain sense much the same sort of thing may be said of all man's works. Man's achievements in this world, and these include all his art and all his science, may be regarded as the external correlates of an internal world of thought and feeling which develops in him from infancy onwards. The relation of these creations of his to a world which may be said to be truly independent of him and them, is of course quite another question and not for discussion here. From this standpoint religious experience cannot be dismissed as merely the expression of wish fulfilment and the projection of an unconscious drama—which is the rational explanation of certain aspects of the way in which it works. In our beliefs about ultimate questions, and equally in our unbelief, we cannot escape the fact that religion and its opposite, irreligion, are fundamentally social matters. As John Macmurray has memorably put it, 'religion is about the personal aspect of our lives, about our personal relations; about friendship and the fear of friendship. In consequence, the primary religious institution is the family, in which we learn to be persons in relation and which is itself a unity in the bond of affection and the original of all human society'.¹ I think the essence of that statement

¹ 'The Celebration of Communion' in 'What is Religion About?' *The Listener* (20th December 1956).

SIGMUND FREUD

can be put in language which shows its close relation to psycho-analytic ideas, by saying that the religious life is, at any rate in part, the continual (and often the ritual) re-affirmation and acknowledgment of the unconscious bonds which unite us with the group, with the individuals who gave us life, and with those whose fellowship is the indispensable basis for the discovery of a meaning in it. The analytic view would of course stress that the bonds concerned are by no means those of love alone—a point well brought out by the extent to which religious history is a history of cruelty and bloodshed, as well as of love and succouring. Such a formulation also serves to indicate why, as again is well known, the sexual and religious aspects of the personal life are so closely intertwined.

Seen from this angle, we can appreciate why the rejection of religion itself (not merely the rejection of one of its traditional forms) is a tremendously serious matter in any society. For such rejection is tantamount to a denial of our debt to our parents, of our mutual dependence on one another, and of our obligations to our children. It is a denial of that mutuality which is the basis of our existence as persons. Yet such an apparent rejection is often a phase in development, as is borne out by adolescent experience in our society. Perhaps we need to recognize the essentially religious character—however immature in expression—of much of adolescent behaviour which is apt to strike us as being the very reverse. Macmurray goes on to say that religion is concerned with personal communion, with the possibility of a universal common life—on earth, not anywhere else—and we may say that from the analytic standpoint, the fellowship of religion is the external correlate needed to complement the facts of the internal world, where we are in psychological truth ‘members one of another’. Analytically speaking, this is the ground on which corporate acts of worship rest. To this we may, if we care, add the further conception that men can come to know God only through coming to know one

SIGMUND FREUD

another, that is, through coming to recognize the ground of their own mutuality. In religion these facts are expressed through imaginative symbolism, for in religion thought operates at the magical level. But the magic is true magic, and it is not enough to know how the symbols work—it is also necessary to appreciate them and their power for good or evil in the lives of men. Now this particular view of religion is not of course to be found in Freud. The interpretation is mine, not his, although I cannot claim originality for it. Freud's attitude to religion was based on what he had discovered about its means of operation, coupled with the rational scepticism characteristic of the scientific outlook of his day. He did not perceive perhaps that, on the personal and social sides, his own religious needs were catered for within his family and by the psycho-analytic association which he formed.

Now the three of Freud's leading ideas which I have described, the light they throw on human development and some of the implications I have personally drawn from them do not derive their importance for our present purpose from the details of the complex emotional life of children and adults with which they deal. Their importance is in the general implication that all man's life, in every aspect and detail, is capable in principle of being described ('explained') in naturalistic terms and so potentially at least is capable of being brought within his control. Mental illness and personality disturbances are no longer mysterious, although we may be far from overcoming them. True mental health may indeed seem a distant goal, and the inaccessibility of the deeply unconscious processes on which the foundations of our own personalities are based might seem to remove any hope of fundamental control. Nevertheless, it is still plain that man may greatly influence his own destiny—on certain terms, terms which, however, he may find unacceptable since they entail his renunciation of sources of great primitive satisfaction. In the long run failure to accept these terms may well

SIGMUND FREUD

spell the extinction of man by his own hand. As educators our duty would seem to be to discover in greater detail the practical implications of Freud's ideas in the everyday work of education, in schools as well as in homes. To this I shall now turn, and I should like to preface my remarks by saying that in this connection I have been greatly influenced by the contribution of a number of psycho-analysts, notably that of the late Susan Isaacs, and of Marion Milner, Ilse Hellman and Edna Oakeshott.¹

SOME PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

The most direct influence of Freud's ideas over the last thirty years or so is to be seen mainly in changes in the early upbringing of children and in work with children in infant and nursery schools, when they are at an age and stage when the more primitive levels of mental functioning are still to be observed relatively undisguised. The disguises which primitive impulses can later assume may help to explain why many educators find it difficult to understand what practical implications psycho-analytic views can have.

To many the general ideas in which I have been dealing seem remote from practical considerations, and so in a sense they are—although their remoteness does not mean that they cannot affect practice. There are others who hold that the very insistence of psycho-analysis on the importance of the early years has reduced in importance the role of the teacher and of later education. This is a most misleading interpretation of psycho-analytic views, and it makes nonsense of any

¹ Bowlby, John, 'The Roots of Human Personality', *New Era in Home and School* (Nov. 1756); Hellman, Ilse, 'Psycho-Analysis and the Teacher' in *Psycho-Analysis and Contemporary Thought* (ed. Sutherland, 1758); Isaacs, Susan, *Social Development in Young Children* (1733); Milner, Marion, 'The Sense in Nonsense', *New Era in Home and School* (Jan. 1756); Oakeshott (formerly Balint), Edna, 'The Therapeutic Value of Play in School', *New Era in Home and School* (Dec. 1752).

SIGMUND FREUD

conception of the care and guidance which is necessary throughout the whole of development, and of the dynamic effects of relationships at all stages. There are others again who say that because actual psycho-analytic experience is something which only a tiny minority of teachers can ever expect to have, psycho-analysis can therefore at best make only a marginal contribution to the work of the schools. This is a complete misconception of the role of analysis, which is fundamentally a method of research. I doubt whether any leading analyst would today advance the view that the really important influence of psycho-analysis on education and society could be a direct influence through the analysis of individuals. Therapeutic and personal experience of analysis is indeed a marginal activity and bound always to be so. The fundamental reasons why psycho-analytic thought seems difficult to implement in education are quite different from any of these, and I will proceed to suggest what some of them are. To begin with, teaching is by its nature a conservative occupation. Teachers are among the main instruments of social conservation. It is difficult for us to accept psycho-analytic views because we rightly sense that they run counter to many of our cherished preconceptions and prejudices. This readily emerges if we take just a few of the many ways in which psycho-analytic thought is relevant to educational issues.

The simplest example is the emphasis which analytic thought places on the child's inner development, his desires and phantasies. It is the analytic view that effective learning takes place only when the child's emotional energy can be directly engaged. Difficulties and failures in learning result from failure to engage him. This view is shared in common with other child-centred approaches to education; but the analytic contribution is to stress that the failures often arise because of obstacles and conflicts in the child's inner world. Traditional educational practice assumes of course that the external conditions are everything, and that the removal of

SIGMUND FREUD

external obstacles or the provision of external stimulation is all that is necessary. Hence a premium is put upon efficient instruction and upon all the devices relating to the organization of subject matter shown to be relevant by experiments in cognitive psychology. Not that these devices are unimportant, but deprived of the essential motivation they are relatively powerless, producing at best learning which is superficial. Being confined largely to factual information, it tends to be forgotten as soon as it conveniently can be. But take an analytically oriented education, and we find that it stresses those experiences which directly engage children's interest, and counsels extreme patience and a willingness to switch to something else when blockages are met. 'Readiness' and 'flexibility' are here the key concepts. Traditionally, however, it is the teacher's readiness and the inflexible demands of the syllabus which are the all important considerations. It is difficult for us to realize how necessary it is to put a child's readiness for a particular experience before our own need to teach. Again, while the aims of education are traditionally largely intellectual, the analytic view offers us a philosophy of education which lays its stress on the acquisition of the arts of living and on the development of mature personalities. It presents these as the overriding aims within which intellectual development has to find its proper expression. The traditional educational values are also largely responsible for the belief that children's curiosity is at bottom an intellectual and impersonal affair; whereas the analytic view is that it is primarily something intensely personal. Children's interests in the world are first of all in the personal objects in the world—their selves and their parents and other members of their family. Moreover, the personal begins with the bodily, sensual and emotional aspects of oneself and one's loved ones, and it is in this context that curiosity, as a particular form of interest, is first manifested. Freud thus showed that curiosity is primarily sexual, that is personal in the primitive sense, and as such it partakes of the primary emotional ambivalence of

SIGMUND FREUD

love and hate. At depth, therefore, curiosity is always liable to be highly charged with personal feeling.

Later interests in the external world and the world of ideas grow around and through persons, and these interests are thus reinforced by the energy extended and deflected from the personal realm. Our developed adult concerns, even in their most refined modes of expression, take their deeper qualities from the primitive responses to the persons who originally made up our world. This link with primitive feeling readily shows up in school activities. Attitudes to a subject can often be seen to be loaded with feelings which may have little to do with the subject as such, but much perhaps to do with the personality of the person who teaches it, or with some activity of infancy for which it has come to stand as a symbol. It is in the role that the teacher plays in education that psycho-analytic concepts are perhaps seen at their most directly relevant. The behaviour of adolescents for example shows quite clearly how much love and hate are at play in the classroom under many disguises. The great difficulty that teachers face is in trying to accept this fact; and even more in admitting that their own love and their own hate may also be involved—not just the children's. Moreover, love and hate operate so closely together that one may mask the other. This personal involvement of the teacher explains how in certain respects he is always a parent substitute, and why his greatest need is to attain some understanding of the nature of the emotional context in which learning takes place and of his own part in it.¹

The teacher's acceptance of his role in this sense also implies the acceptance of the idea that the child continues to live on within himself. In attempting to behave in a mature

¹ Freud in 1814 explicitly pointed out how schoolmasters function psychologically as substitute fathers, and that boys' feelings toward them derive from feelings toward their own fathers developed in infancy and childhood. *Some Reflections on Schoolboy Psychology*. Complete Works (Hogarth Press, 1855), Vol. XIII.

SIGMUND FREUD

fashion with children, in trying to come to terms with them in an adult way which yet meets their needs, he must first come to terms with the child in himself, that is to say with his own love and hate. The teacher therefore through his attitudes to his pupils holds the fundamental key to learning. Freud here challenged us directly when he said, 'Only someone who can feel his way into the minds of children can be capable of educating them; and we grown-up people cannot understand children because we no longer understand our own childhood.'¹ The extent to which the teacher can safely enlist his pupils' support and affection—and to do this he must be able to understand and tolerate their hatred or at least dislike—is a measure of the success he is likely to attain.

Considerations of this kind go far towards explaining the different results obtained by equally competent teachers—in the sense of instructors. How otherwise can one explain for example the artistic creativity in paint, plastic materials and writing which nearly a whole class may achieve with one teacher and fail to achieve with another, the enthusiasm and capacity for hard work evoked in one classroom and their absence in another. Here too lies the explanation of many of the problems of discipline in schools, problems both of lack of order on the one hand and of the maintenance of effort only through coercion on the other. To come to terms with children's need, both for the security which authority provides, and for the adventure of exploration to which freedom is the key, the teacher must first come to terms with his own needs for authority and freedom. To say all this is to emphasize that the fundamental problems in teaching are problems of attitude and feeling, and that the key is to be found in the underlying motives with which teachers approach their work.

There are two other respects in which the role of the teacher is of fundamental importance in children's develop-

¹ *The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest*—(H) The Educative Interest. Ibid., Vol. XIII, p. 189.

SIGMUND FREUD

ment. The first of these depends on the fact that as one of the important adults in a child's life, he inevitably functions as a model; either as one to be admired, with whose qualities the child can unconsciously identify himself, or as one to be disliked or despised and whose qualities the child can reject. The teacher is therefore one of the direct mediators of value to the child, and, taking over in this way one of the roles of the parents, he may play a significant part in the formation of children's ego ideals. He may indeed contribute significantly to the development of the moral function in its later stages. He can play this part in an indirect way also through the subjects he teaches. These he may reveal to his pupils as having been created by the achievements and discoveries of men and women worthy of admiration and emulation. Or again, by discussing ideals of conduct as these are exemplified in history and literature, he may bring his pupils to a wider sympathy and thus help them to discriminate more easily between what is valuable and what is not. Because of their tendency to identify with him, he becomes not only a model, but also a touchstone of values.

In helping his pupils to develop truth-seeking attitudes and to discriminate among values, the teacher is directly contributing to the growth of that rational part of the mind which Freud called the ego. From an educational standpoint, it is necessary to stress this part of Freud's teaching almost more than any other. In his own work he never quite succeeded in dealing adequately with the ego, and later developments have had to redress the balance.¹ Yet it is clear that Freud's preoccupation with those aspects of our nature, by virtue of which we are not free, was ultimately for the sake of discovering the conditions under which we might become free. Freud envisaged the ego, or self, as a slowly evolving agent reaching out towards freedom. This freedom he saw not merely as a freedom from external coercion but more

¹ In these developments, his daughter, Anna Freud, has played a prominent part.

SIGMUND FREUD

importantly a freedom from enslavement by the compulsions of instinct or by the equally compulsive promptings of the primitive conscience. Freedom for him implied the capacity to tolerate and utilize in the pursuit of consciously approved ends the internal pressures arising from primitive desires. He expressed this ideal by saying 'where id (primitive impulse) was, let ego be'. The child's ego is weak and immature. It is our function as teachers to help him to strengthen it, so that progressively he can become an active and free partner in his own education, that is, in his growth to personal maturity. Freud himself thought of human maturity as a state of the ego in which the capacity to love was greater than the need to be loved. This may serve to remind us of the old commandment—reiterated by Christ—to love our neighbours as ourselves. It is by this token that we may distinguish the maturity of the ego from mere egotism—one of the symptoms of an immature self. These generalities have particular and well-known applications. The capacity to cherish the well-being of their children has always been regarded as the hall-mark of good parents. It is also the hall-mark of good teachers, who find their own fulfilment in the achievements of their pupils. One would have to enter the caveat that not all so called educational achievements would qualify in this respect.

Thus Freud's views on human development and education, beginning as they do by stressing the role of the instinctive life and of unconscious impulses, seem to me to end by pointing to the possibility of men achieving a satisfactory degree of moral autonomy, through the power of love guided by reason. But there was no easy optimism about Freud's view in this respect, and we can have no easy optimism in education. The cardinal lesson which Freud's ideas suggest is the overwhelming need for teachers to deepen their insight into their own work and into their relations with children. This is no easy task and it is the real heart of the difficulty of applying psycho-analytic thought to education. Instead of

SIGMUND FREUD

offering teachers a slogan, a technique, or a method or a curriculum which will solve all their problems, it invites them instead to examine themselves and their work honestly and courageously, for by deepening their insight into their own feelings and behaviour they may more easily appreciate what children need from them and what they have to give. In my view most teachers are potentially capable, through personal reflection and through fellowship and discussion, of greatly increasing their educative powers. It follows that in the light of Freud's ideas those responsible for the "initial training and for the refreshment of teachers have a specially important task to perform in helping them to achieve a deeper understanding of themselves. . .

Taken as a whole, therefore, the constellation of ideas which develops out of Freud's work is associated with a view of education which sees it as personal from the start, and sees it as a dynamic process, charged and energized by feeling; a process which, through the interplay of the inner and outer worlds, leads to the slow growth of a controlling and gradually maturing self. Freud's view of the way in which the self and its moral function is built up implies that, while the greater part of our influence upon children's development may be exerted through means which are largely unconscious, yet we are in a position gradually and consciously to help children to grow towards autonomy, and to do this in such a way that they can participate ever more fully and consciously in their own education.

In this concluding section I may already have gone far beyond what some students of Freud would regard as the proper interpretation of his views.¹ Nevertheless, it seems to

¹ Since preparing this paper, I have found strong support for the view it expresses of the implications of Freud's work, in an analysis by MacIntyre—a modern linguistic philosopher—of Freud's concept of the unconscious. 'Freud is so often presented as undermining the rationalist conception of man as a self-sufficient, self-aware, self-controlled being, that we are apt to forget that although he may have abandoned such a

SIGMUND FREUD

me that, far from reducing man to an automaton, a passive victim of instinct, a puppet controlled by unconscious desires, or a creature of conditioned response, Freud's work enables us to put the concepts of an integrated personality and an autonomous self at the centre of educational theory. In so doing we need to develop a view of education which is directly opposed to theories of training and instruction, and which must indeed depend upon assumptions other than those on which a great deal of current practice is based. A fully developed theory which took adequate account of Freud's views on the development of the human person, would reveal training as having only a subordinate role to play in an enterprise best conceived as an adventure in mutuality.

But we must be clear as to what the advocacy of such a view entails. There is in Freud's work no basis for a belief in utopia—nor is there any basis for a new gospel or movement which by its faith and acts might redeem the world, even although some of his followers might appear to have believed there was. One of the greatest of Freud's contributions was to lay a basis for an understanding of what underlies the beliefs of religious and political movements, and for understanding why such beliefs, enriching and ennobling human life as they have often done, have also invariably added to its burden of misery, cruelty and destruction. Rather, Freud's ideas belong to that stream of humanism which, under various names and in alliance with various creeds, has striven to extend the domain of love and reason in human affairs, and to weaken the sovereignty of hate and unreason. His ideas have systematic conception as an account of what man is, he never retreated from it as an account of what man ought to be. . . . Freud's whole recognition of unconscious purposes is a discovery that men are more and not less rational than we thought they were. . . . If Freud did not believe that reasonableness is better than prejudice, the mastering of hate better than giving way to it, sympathy combined with objectivity better than blindness about the behaviour of oneself and of others, neither his theory nor his practice would have any point at all.' A. C. MacIntyre, *loc. cit.*, p. 93.

SIGMUND FREUD

matically revealed how the powers of light and the powers of darkness reside in us and in us alone, how they are part and parcel of our nature. His teaching has revealed how we may attempt to come to terms with these powers, not by the aid of any supernatural agency, but through a better understanding of ourselves in our relations with one another. Freud's message therefore is one that should serve to fortify those of us who believe that the primary aim of the educational enterprise is to preserve and extend human achievement, to add to the creative possibilities of life for all men everywhere, and to deepen their capacity for the mutual enjoyment of it.

VI

William James

By MARGARET KNIGHT

William James was born in New York on the 11th of January 1842. He was the eldest of five children, of whom the second was Henry James, the novelist. His father, Henry James senior, was a remarkable man. He was something of a crank, and also something of a genius, and he exerted a great influence on his children's development.

Old Mr. James was a man of means, who never followed any profession. His main interests in life were Swedenborgianism, of which he was an enthusiastic adherent, and the upbringing of his highly intelligent, high-spirited and argumentative family. His methods were, for his day, unconventional. He was a firm believer in children thinking for themselves, and forming their views in the give-and-take of intellectual combat, and he appears never to have told his children that father knew best; instead he trained them to argue rather as other fathers might teach them to box.

A family friend, Edward Emerson, has given an amusing account of meal-times in the James household.

“The adipose and affectionate Wilkie”, as his father called him, would say something and be instantly corrected or disputed by the little cock-sparrow, Bob, the youngest; but he would good-naturedly defend his statement, and then

WILLIAM JAMES

Henry (junior) would emerge from his silence in defence of Wilkie. Then Bob would be more impetuously insistent, and Mr. James would advance as moderator, and William, the eldest, join in. The voice of the moderator presently would be drowned by the combatants, and he soon came down vigorously into the arena, and when, in the excited argument, dinner-knives might not be absent from eagerly gesticulating hand, dear Mrs. James . . . would look at me, laughingly reassuring, saying, "Don't be disturbed, Edward; they won't stab each other. This is usual when the boys come home." ¹

Perry, James's biographer, adds:

'I have been informed by another and surviving witness of these family scenes that there was a certain method in this seeming madness. The father would propound some provocative idea, and throw it into the midst of his brood, in order that they might sharpen their teeth on it, and in their eagerness to refute him or one another, exercise themselves in the art of combative thinking.'¹

This, however, was only one side of the Jamesian domestic set-up. The other side was intense family affection. The Jameses were an unusually devoted family, and they expressed their feelings for one another with an unselfconscious demonstrativeness. Their intellectual skirmishes were conducted in an atmosphere of complete emotional security; and, though to an outsider they might seem to be hitting hard, they seldom hit to hurt.

It is impossible to resist giving an example of the characteristically Jamesian brand of good-humoured intellectual ragging. When Henry James, senior, was about to produce a book entitled *Substance and Shadow: or Morality and Religion in their Relation to Life*, William, then aged eighteen, designed a decorative woodcut for the title page. This represented a man flogging a dead horse.

¹ R. B. Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James* (1935), Vol. I, pp. 171-2.

WILLIAM JAMES

Dynamic psychologists today emphasize the value of affection and emotional security in childhood. William's later development certainly supports this view. He was an immensely attractive personality; full of warmth, humour and vitality, 'a being', as his sister described him, 'who would bring life and charm to a treadmill'. He aroused deep affection in nearly everyone who knew him, in spite of his passion for argument, which not everyone finds an endearing quality.

The influence of the family background can be seen, too, in William's literary style. He was brought up in an atmosphere in which it was taken for granted that intellectual discussion was fun, it was exciting, it was one of the most amusing ways in which one could possibly spend one's time: and this attitude pervades his writings, which have a quality of high spirits and intellectual exhilaration that make them supremely readable. This tendency disturbed certain critics, who felt that, though the *Principles of Psychology* was undoubtedly a work of genius, a standard textbook ought by rights to be somewhat duller. Sully, for example, reviewing the *Principles in Mind*, remarked in a mildly scandalized tone that though there was nothing unseemly in 'the introduction to psychology of a little imagination, or for that matter, a spice of humour' yet there might be so much of 'dazzling effect' as to blur 'the sharp boundaries of scientific thought'. Again, 'For [James's] rollicking defiance of the authorities . . . the reader of many dull psychologies may well be thankful, and yet he may wish here and there for just a *souffçon* of the old spirit which has prompted mankind at all stages of culture to pay reverence to ancestors.' Henry James's comment on this and similar criticisms was, 'they don't understand intellectual larking'.

William's early education was, to put it mildly, irregular. His father was a firm believer in the value of travel in forming children's minds, and the family were continually crossing and recrossing the Atlantic and travelling about Europe. Between the ages of thirteen and eighteen, William attended

WILLIAM JAMES

educational establishments at Paris, Boulogne, Rhode Island, Geneva and Bonn.

It was not until he was thirty that James settled down in his chosen profession. At the age of eighteen, he decided to be a painter: but he soon concluded that he had mistaken his vocation, and at nineteen he entered Harvard as a student of chemistry. Later he transferred to the department of anatomy and physiology. Then, after much hesitation, he decided to become a doctor and entered the Harvard Medical School. It was clear from the first, however, that this was not a whole-hearted choice. He was deeply interested in physiology, particularly the physiology of the nervous system, but the idea of being a practising doctor was always distasteful to him.

James's medical studies were much interrupted by ill-health. For some years he suffered from a variety of functional disorders which were almost certainly psychosomatic; and when he finally qualified, at the age of twenty-seven, it was taken for granted that he was too delicate to practise medicine, and his idea appears to have been that (as he wrote in a letter) he would 'pick up a precarious living by doing work for medical periodicals or something of that kind'.

For three years after he became an M.D., William did no regular work, but lived at home, writing occasional articles and reviews, reading voraciously and worrying about his health. This was an unhappy period of his life; but it ended in 1872 when he was offered, and accepted, the post of Instructor in Physiology at Harvard. This was a turning-point.

James had found his vocation at last. For the next four years he continued to teach anatomy and physiology with increasing success and self-confidence; and in 1876 (a crucial year in the history of psychology) he offered a new course, the first of its kind in America, on physiological psychology. In the same year he secured the use of two small rooms at

WILLIAM JAMES

Harvard for housing psychological apparatus and conducting experiments—thus founding, almost without realizing it, the first laboratory for experimental psychology in the world.

Two years later, James married—another turning point—and in the same year he signed a contract with Henry Holt, the publisher, to produce a book on psychology for a forthcoming American Science Series. In the preliminary correspondence, he remarked regretfully that he did not think he could undertake to complete the book in less than two years. In fact, it took eleven years, but it was worth waiting for. The *Principles of Psychology*, when it eventually appeared, was hailed as ‘undoubtedly the greatest work on the subject in any language’; and it changed the whole climate of psychological thought.

To quote C. A. Mace, James ‘stands at the point of transition from a psychology which was in fact a branch of philosophy with some scientific trimmings to a genuinely scientific psychology with some philosophical entanglements.’¹ Before James, psychology had been primarily an armchair activity. Broadly speaking, its method was introspection, not experiment, and its aim was description not explanation. The pre-Jamesian psychologist, writing about emotion, for example, would simply fill pages with description and classification of the emotions. James regarded this as a waste of time; he demanded insight into causes. Descriptive psychologists, he said, ‘distinguish and refine and specify *ad infinitum* without ever getting on to another logical level. Whereas the beauty of all truly scientific work is to get to ever deeper levels.’²

In an article written in 1892 and entitled ‘A Plea for Psy-

¹ In his Introduction to Margaret Knight, *William James* (Pelican Books, 1850), p. 7.

² *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, pp. 448–9. *Psychology: Briefer Course*, p. 375. The *Briefer Course* is essentially a shorter version of the *Principles*, though it contains some material not found in the parent work. When passages are quoted that occur in closely similar form in both books, both references will be given.

WILLIAM JAMES

chology as a Natural Science', James said that psychology was as yet 'hardly more than what physics was before Galileo, what chemistry was before Lavoisier'.¹ But it was on the way to becoming a science; and its aim, like that of the other natural sciences, should be towards insight into causes, and towards 'practical prediction and control'. Psychology has made some progress towards this goal since these words were written, and it is to James more than to any other single person that the fact is due.

Although he never practised medicine, James's medical training proved, in the event, invaluable. It gave him a professional flair and authority that no other American psychologist possessed; and it kept his feet on the ground. James's natural bent was speculative. He preferred the exciting hypothesis to the sober exposition of fact, and when, in later life, he turned from psychology to philosophy, this tendency sometimes led him to some rather irresponsible theorizing. But in the role of psychologist, James had a healthy respect for fact, and a thoroughly responsible and professional attitude towards his subject. As he himself wrote, in a passage that would serve admirably as a motto for the *Principles*, 'Of course my deepest interest will, as ever, lie with the most general problems. But . . . the concrete facts in which a biologist's responsibilities lie form a firm basis from which he can aspire as much as he pleases to the mastery of universal questions when the gallant mood is on him.'²

As has already been said, James's persistent aim was towards insight into causes; and for him this meant primarily relating the facts of mental life to the facts of neurophysiology. His basic working hypothesis was that all conscious processes are the effects of brain-processes. He wrote:

'The immediate condition of a state of consciousness is an activity of some sort in the cerebral hemispheres. This proposition is supported by so many pathological facts, and laid

WILLIAM JAMES

by physiologists at the base of so many of their reasonings, that to the medically educated mind it seems almost axiomatic. It would be hard, however, to give any short and peremptory proof of the unconditional dependence of mental action upon neural change. That a general and usual amount of dependence exists cannot possibly be ignored. One has only to consider how quickly consciousness may be (so far as we know) abolished by a blow on the head, by rapid loss of blood, by a full dose of alcohol, opium, ether, or nitrous oxide—or how easily it may be altered in quality by a smaller dose of any of these agents or of others—to see how at the mercy of bodily happenings our spirit is. . . . In many kinds of insanity, though by no means in all, distinct alterations of the brain-tissue have been found. Destruction of certain definite portions of the cerebral hemispheres involves losses of memory and of acquired motor faculty of quite determinate sorts. . . . Taking all such facts together, the simple and radical conception dawns upon the mind that mental action may be uniformly and absolutely a function of brain-action, varying as the latter varies, and being to the brain-action as effect to cause.

‘This conception is the working hypothesis which underlies all the “physiological psychology” of recent years, and it will be the working hypothesis of this book.’¹

As this quotation indicates, James in the *Principles* divorced psychology from philosophy, and united it more fruitfully with biology and physiology. This was perhaps his most important contribution to the development of psychology as a science. But in other ways, too, the book was a turning-point.

It revealed the importance of experimental psychology. James himself was temperamentally unsuited to laboratory work and disliked it heartily; experimental psychology, he remarked, could not have arisen in a country ‘whose natives could be bored’. Nevertheless, he was alive to the importance

¹ *Psychology: Briefer Course* (1892), pp. 5-6.

WILLIAM JAMES

of experiment, and he knew a great deal about it, which scarcely anyone else in America did. Nearly all the important work at that time was being done in Germany, by men like Wundt, Stumpf and Helmholtz, who were working on the borderline between physiology and psychology. James (thanks to his cosmopolitan outlook and his frequent visits to Europe) was well acquainted with this work and with the men who were doing it; and in the *Principles* he brought together, and presented in digestible form, a mass of information on current laboratory experiment, most of it quite unknown before that time to non-German-speaking readers. James is often accused of an anti-experimental bias, but he was, to put it at its lowest, an admirable public relations officer for experimental psychology: fully one-fifth of the *Principles* is devoted to description and discussion of experimental work, which is a far higher proportion than in any other general textbook of the time.

It is worth mentioning that, of the few experiments James brought himself to perform, at least one was of historic importance. As most students of education know, James was the first psychologist to experiment on transfer of training. The plan of the experiments—carried out first with himself as subject, and later with some of his students—was to see whether daily practice in memorizing material of one type would lead to greater speed in memorizing material of a different type. The result was a more or less unqualified negative, which has been confirmed by subsequent experiments.

James broke new ground, too, by his active interest in dynamic psychology. Pre-Jamesian psychology had been mainly concerned with cognition, but James was interested in the emotions and motives of human beings as well as in their perceptual and intellectual processes. Also, he did not, as most of his predecessors had done, study human beings in isolation, and ignore the importance of social and cultural factors.

Further, he fully realized the importance of contemporary

WILLIAM JAMES

investigations into such subjects as hypnotism, dissociation and subconscious memory. Most academic psychologists at that time recoiled from these topics, but James refused to regard any facts as untouchable.

Finally, James recognized the importance of applied psychology. He himself, like all other psychologists of his day, was concerned mainly with extending psychological knowledge rather than with applying that knowledge to practical purposes. But unlike his contemporaries, he was fully alive to the possibility of applying it. In the article already quoted, he wrote, 'We live surrounded by an enormous body of people who are most definitely interested in the control of states of mind, and incessantly craving for a sort of psychological science that will teach them how to *act*. What every educator, every jail-warden, every doctor, every clergyman, every asylum-superintendent asks of psychology is practical rules. Such men care little about the ultimate philosophic grounds of mental phenomena, but they do care immensely about improving the ideas, dispositions and conduct of the particular individuals in their charge.'¹

James's own main contributions to applied psychology were in the field of education. In the chapters in *The Principles of Psychology* on Attention, Habit, Memory, Reasoning and Will he discussed many topics that are of practical importance to teachers and students. James approached these topics from the basic hypothesis that every learning process is the result of some modification in the nervous system. There is no reasonable doubt that this hypothesis is correct, although it will be a long time before we know in detail what the modification is. James's own theory was oversimplified. Briefly, it was as follows. In learning of the physical kind (such as occurs, for example, when we learn to dance or to play golf) we repeatedly make similar movements, and so repeatedly cause nerve-impulse to flow along the same paths in the nervous system. The paths in question are thus

WILLIAM JAMES

'smoothed out' or made more 'pervious', and the action, in consequence, becomes easier and more automatic.

Intellectual learning was explained by James along similar lines, as due to the smoothing of nerve-paths in the brain. The basic learning process, he held, is association. (To take an obvious example of association, if we pat a neighbour's dog and it bites us, we shall associate this dog with biting, and treat it with caution thereafter.¹) The physiological basis of association, according to James, is that if two mental processes occur together, two groups of nerve cells in the brain are active together, and nerve current flows between them. If this happens intensely, or frequently, the path between them is smoothed out; consequently, if one group is activated alone, the nerve current will tend to spill over, to run along the 'pervious' nerve-path, and to activate the other group.

There are many reasons, into which I will not now enter, why these hypotheses about learning and association will not do. They are too neat to fit the facts. Still, they are the right kind of hypotheses; they foreshadow the work of such psychologists as Hebb² today. There is no reasonable doubt that learning of the physical kind has *something* to do with the lowering of resistance to the passage of nerve-impulse, and that association has *something* to do with the spread or irradiation of activity from one area of the cortex to another. This is all that need really be assumed in the way of physiological basis for much of James's theorizing. The value of what he says about learning, association, memory and similar topics is not destroyed by the fact that his physiological hypotheses are over-simplified.

The Principles of Psychology contains some illuminating dis-

¹ The principle involved can be expressed formally by saying that if two mental or neural processes A and B occur together or in close succession, this will result in a tendency for a process A', similar to A, to evoke a process B', similar to B.

WILLIAM JAMES

cussion of remembering and forgetting, and I will lead into this by quoting James's description of the experience of trying to remember a forgotten name.

'The state of our consciousness is peculiar. There is a gap therein; but no mere gap. It is a gap that is intensely active. A sort of wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a given direction, making us at moments tingle with the sense of our closeness, and then letting us sink back without the longed-for term. If wrong names are proposed to us, this singularly definite gap acts immediately so as to negate them. They do not fit into its mould. And the gap of one word does not feel like the gap of another, all empty of content as both might seem necessarily to be when described as gaps.'¹

This, when one reflects on it, is a curious fact. To take a concrete example, suppose that we are trying to recall a name which is, in fact (let us say) Collingham; but all we can remember is that it is a longish name, and that it begins with a K-sound. A friend makes helpful suggestions. Is it Chesterfield? No. Carruthers? No. Cunningham? No, but it is more like Cunningham—Cunningham is 'warmer'. How do we know that the forgotten name is more like Cunningham than Carruthers when we do not know what the name is?

James suggested that in such cases, the group of brain cells (or, as he called it, the brain-tract) connected with the forgotten name or fact is in a state of sub-activity—active enough to produce some effects, but not enough for full recall. When we struggle to remember, many connected brain-tracts are activated; and often the nervous excitement spills over and arouses the tract that was formerly only sub-active. To express the same fact in psychological rather than in physiological terms, when we are trying to remember a forgotten fact or name, the best plan is to think of as many

¹ *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 251. *Psychology; Briefer Course*, pp. 163-4.

WILLIAM JAMES '

related facts as possible, in the hope that they will call up the missing item by association.

James gave a vivid introspective account of the experience of searching one's mind for a forgotten thought. The passage well illustrates three of his outstanding qualities as a psychological writer—his power of introspection; his ability to fix and crystallize the most fugitive and elusive states of consciousness; and his determined attempt to relate the psychological facts to their physiological causes.

The forgotten thing is felt by us as a gap in the midst of certain other things. We possess a dim idea of where we were and what we were about when it last occurred to us. We recollect the general subject to which it pertains. But all these details refuse to shoot together into a solid whole, for the lack of the missing thing, so we keep running over them in our mind, dissatisfied, craving something more. From each detail there radiate lines of association forming so many tentative guesses. Many of these are immediately seen to be irrelevant, are therefore void of interest, and lapse immediately from consciousness. Others are associated with the other details present, and with the missing thought as well. When *these* surge up, we have a peculiar feeling that we are "warm", as the children say when they play hide and seek; and such associates as these we clutch at and keep before the attention. Thus we recollect successively that when we last were considering the matter in question we were at the dinner-table; then that our friend J.D. was there; then that the subject talked about was so and so; finally, that the thought came *à propos* of a certain anecdote, and then that it had something to do with a French quotation. Through this hovering of the attention in the neighbourhood of the desired object, the accumulation of associates becomes so great that the combined tensions of their neural processes break through the bar, and the nervous wave pours into the tract which has so long been awaiting its advent. And as the expectant, subconscious itching, so to

WILLIAM JAMES

speak, bursts into the fullness of vivid feeling, the mind finds an inexpressible relief.’¹

It may be felt that this discussion about recalling forgotten facts has not really much bearing on education in the wider sense. But it is leading up to something that has. James made a further application of his views on association and memory, and said some things of great practical importance about the necessity of organizing and ‘structuring’ material that we want to retain. It is no use (he said) trying to learn, or teach, unorganized, disconnected facts; and he explained why, in terms of brain-functioning.

‘[If E stands for a past event, and N for the nerve-centres active in its recall, then it is obvious that the more paths there are in the brain leading to N], the prompter and surer, on the whole, the memory of E will be, the more frequently one will be reminded of it, the more avenues of approach to it one will possess. In mental terms, the more other facts a fact is associated with in the mind, the better possession of it our memory retains. Each of its associates becomes a hook to which it hangs, a means to fish it up by when sunk beneath the surface. Together, they form a network of attachments by which it is woven into the entire tissue of our thought. The “secret of a good memory” is thus the secret of forming diverse and multiple associations with every fact we care to retain. But this forming of associations with a fact, what is it but *thinking about* the fact as much as possible? Briefly, then, of two men with the same outward experiences and the same amount of mere native tenacity, the one who *thinks* over his experiences most, and weaves them into systematic relations with each other, will be the one with the best memory. We see examples of this on every hand. Most men have a good memory for facts connected with their own pursuits. The college athlete who remains a dunce at his books will astonish you by his knowledge of men’s “records” in various feats and

¹ *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 585-6. *Psychology: Briefer Course*, pp. 273-4.

WILLIAM JAMES

games, and will be a walking dictionary of sporting statistics. The reason is that he is constantly going over these things in his mind, and comparing and making series of them. They form for him not so many odd facts, but a system—so they stick.

‘In a system, every fact is connected with every other by some thought-relation. The consequence is that every fact is retained by the combined suggestive power of all the other facts in the system, and forgetting is well-nigh impossible.

‘The reason why cramming is such a bad mode of study is now made clear. I mean by cramming that way of preparing for examinations by committing “points” to memory during a few hours or days of intense application immediately preceding the final ordeal, little or no work having been performed during the previous course of the term. Things learned thus in a few hours, on one occasion, for one purpose, cannot possibly have formed many associations with other things in the mind. Their brain-processes are led into by few paths, and are relatively little liable to be awakened again. Speedy oblivion is the almost inevitable fate of all that is committed to memory in this simple way. Whereas, on the contrary, the same materials taken in gradually, day after day, recurring in different contexts, considered in various relations, associated with other external incidents, and repeatedly reflected on, grow into such a system, form such connections with the rest of the mind’s fabric, lie open to so many paths of approach, that they remain permanent possessions. This is the *intellectual* reason why habits of continuous application should be enforced in educational establishments. Of course there is no moral turpitude in cramming. Did it lead to the desired end of secure learning, it were infinitely the best method of study. But it does not; and students themselves should understand the reason why.’¹

This is as near as James came in *The Principles of Psychology*

¹ *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 661–3. *Psychology: Briefer Course*, pp. 294–6.

WILLIAM JAMES

to giving specific practical advice on educational questions. But he gave some highly specific advice in *Talks to Teachers*, published nine years later.

This book deserves to be far more widely known. It is a collection of lectures delivered to teachers in various parts of America, and it is full of practical and vivid discussion of educational problems that have lost none of their importance with the lapse of sixty years. For example, James considered the crucial question of how the teacher can best arouse interest. The essence of his advice was that the teacher should always try to present new knowledge in such a way as to link it up with interests that already exist.

'This is the abstract statement; and, abstractly, nothing can be easier to understand. It is in the fulfilment of the rule that the difficulty lies; for the differences between an interesting and a tedious teacher consists in little more than the inventiveness by which the one is able to mediate these associations and connections, and in the dullness in discovering such transitions which the other shows. One teacher's mind will fairly coruscate with points of connection between the new lesson and the circumstances of the children's other experience. Anecdotes and reminiscences will abound in her talk; and the shuttle of interest will shoot backward and forward, weaving the new and the old together in a lively and entertaining way. Another teacher has no such inventive fertility, and his lesson will always be a dead and heavy thing.'¹

But James would have had little sympathy with some of the extreme tendencies now current in American education. He said uncompromisingly that even the most skilful teacher cannot hope to make every stage in learning interesting; and he made some astringent comments on 'soft pedagogics' and 'lukewarm air from which the bracing oxygen of effort is left out'. He argued, also, that the teacher need have no qualms about appealing to such impulses as rivalry and self-esteem.

¹ *Talks to Teachers* (1899), pp. 96-7.

WILLIAM JAMES

‘Among the recent modern reforms of teaching methods, a certain disparagement of emulation, as a laudable spring of action in the schoolroom, has often made itself heard. More than a century ago, Rousseau, in his *Emile*, branded rivalry between one pupil and another as too base a passion to play a part in an ideal education. . . . But to veto and taboo all possible rivalry of one youth with another, because such rivalry may degenerate into greedy and selfish excess, does seem to savour somewhat of sentimentality, or even of fanaticism. . . . There is a noble and generous kind of rivalry, as well as a spiteful and greedy kind. . . . All games owe the zest which they bring with them to the fact that they are rooted in the emulous passion, yet they are among the chief means of training in fairness and magnanimity. Can the teacher afford to throw such an ally away? Ought we seriously to hope that marks, distinctions, prizes, and other goals of effort, based on the pursuit of recognized superiority, should be for ever banished from our schools? As a psychologist, obliged to notice the deep and pervasive character of the emulous passion, I must confess my doubts.

‘The wise teacher will use this instinct as he uses others, reaping its advantages, and appealing to it in such a way as to reap a maximum of benefit with a minimum of harm; for, after all, we must confess, with a French critic of Rousseau’s doctrine, that the deepest spring of action in us is the sight of action in another. . . . No runner running all alone on a race-track will find in his own will the power of stimulation which his rivalry with other runners incites, when he feels them at his heels, about to pass. When a trotting horse is “speeded”, a running horse must go beside him to keep him to the pace.’¹

This provides a natural point of transition to James’s views on moral education—though, as can be imagined, he draws no sharp distinction between moral and intellectual training, since both, in his view, consist, in the last analysis, in producing the right sort of modification in the nervous system.

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-3.

WILLIAM JAMES

In a statement in *Talks to Teachers* that would delight a modern behaviourist, James said, 'Character is an organized set of habits of reaction.' The important thing, he held, is to get the right habits formed when you are young—or, in physiological terms, to get the right nerve-paths smoothed out while the nervous system is still in a plastic state. He expounded this view in the most famous chapter of *The Principles of Psychology*—'Habit'.

'The great thing, then, in all education, is to make our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy. . . . For this we must make automatic and habitual, as early as possible, as many useful actions as we can, and guard against the growing into ways that are likely to be disadvantageous to us, as we should guard against the plague. The more of the details of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be set free for their own proper work. There is no more miserable human being than one in whom nothing is habitual but indecision, and for whom the lighting of every cigar, the drinking of every cup, the time of rising and going to bed every day, and the beginning of every bit of work, are subjects of express volitional deliberation. Full half the time of such a man goes to the deciding, or regretting, of matters which ought to be so ingrained in him as practically not to exist for his consciousness at all. If there be such daily duties not yet ingrained in any one of my readers, let him begin this very hour to set the matter right. . . .

'The physiological study of mental conditions is thus the most powerful ally of hortatory ethics. . . . Could the young but realize how soon they will become mere walking bundles of habits, they would give more heed to their conduct while in the plastic state. We are spinning our own fates, good or evil, and never to be undone. Every smallest stroke of virtue or of vice leaves its never so little scar. The drunken Rip Van Winkle, in Jefferson's play, excuses himself for every fresh dereliction by saying, "I won't count this time!" Well! he

WILLIAM JAMES

may not count it, and a kind Heaven may not count it: but it is being counted none the less. Down among his nerve-cells and fibres the molecules are counting it, 'registering and storing it up to be used against him when the next temptation comes. Nothing we ever do is, in strict scientific literalness, wiped out. Of course, this has its good side as well as its bad one. As we become permanent drunkards by so many separate drinks, so we become saints in the moral, and authorities and experts in the practical and scientific spheres, by so many separate acts and hours of work.'¹

In considering James's contribution to education, I have emphasized his conviction that psychology is a biological science rather than a branch of philosophy; I have suggested that he contributed more than any other single individual to the development of psychology as a science; I have referred to his belief in the possibility of applied psychology; and I have quoted and discussed various stimulating things that he said about memory, habit-formation, the arousal of interest, and other topics of obvious educational importance. But I am conscious that I have given no very clear answer to the question 'what was James's educational message?' So let me conclude by suggesting that James's main contribution to educational psychology lay, not in anything specific he said on the subject—though he said some very important things—but in the general service he did by putting psychology on the map, and by putting across the idea that it is possible to apply scientific method to the study of human behaviour. James's immensely attractive personality made him the ideal person to perform this task. The idea of studying human behaviour scientifically is sometimes felt to be rather chilling: doubts are expressed about whether one can have a lively curiosity about what makes people tick, and still retain one's human loyalties and affections. James made it obvious that

¹ *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 122, 127. *Psychology: Briefer Course*, pp. 144-5, 149-50.

WILLIAM JAMES

one can. He, if anyone, exemplified Bertrand Russell's statement that the good life is the life inspired by love and guided by knowledge; and if I were to attempt the impossible task of summing up James's educational message in a sentence, I could not do better than that.

But let me end, on a suitably inspirational note, by quoting from the speech made by Josiah Royce, James's senior lecturer in the Department of Psychology, when James retired from his Harvard Chair.

'Nothing is more characteristic of Professor James's work as a teacher and a thinker than is his chivalrous fondness for fair play in the warfare and in the co-operation of ideas and of ideals. . . . Other men talk of liberty of thought: but few men have done more to secure liberty of thought for men who were in need of fair play and of a reasonable hearing than James has done. . . . Sometimes critical people have [said] that James is too fond of cranks, and that the cranks love him. Well, I am one of James's cranks. He was good to me, and I love him.

'The result of my own early contact with James was to make me for years very much his disciple. I am still in large part under his spell. If I contend with him sometimes, I suppose that it is he also who through his own free spirit has taught me this liberty. I know that for years I used to tremble at the thought that James might perhaps some day find reason to put me in my place by one of those wonderful lightning-like epigrams, wherewith he was and is always able to characterize those opponents whose worldly position is such as to make them no longer in danger of not getting a fair hearing, and whose self-assurance has relieved him of the duty to secure for them a sympathetic attention. The time has passed, the lightning in question has often descended—never indeed on me as his friend, but often on my opinions—and has long since blasted, I hope, some at least of what is most combustible about my poor teachings. Yet I am so glad of the friendly words that still sustain me, that these occasional

WILLIAM JAMES

segnende Blitze, when incidentally they are sown over the earth where my opinions chance to be growing, only make me love better the cause that James . . . has so nobly served, the cause of fertilizing the human soil where our truth has to grow.¹

¹ R. B. Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, Vol. I, pp. 779-80.

VII

William Temple

By BISHOP WAND

The first time I ever saw William Temple was when I had just arrived, a freshman, in Oxford. Looking down from my lofty window over Queen's Lane, I saw a squat figure whose round, fair head, from the height at which I stood, seemed to be impaled on a flaming red tie. 'That,' said a second-year man at my elbow, 'is Willie Temple, just back from a course in Germany and now about to take up his fellowship at Queen's.'

I mention this episode, not in order to establish my *bona fides* as one who knew Temple in the flesh, but in order to set the tone of our hero's attitude to education. About to enter the most exclusive academic society in the world, he proudly flaunted the banner of socialism. You would have thought that in that day and generation it would have required a great deal of courage to have worn that red tie, particularly for one who was about to enter the magic circle for the first time and might have wished his colleagues' first impression to be favourable.

I doubt, however, whether Temple felt the slightest need for courage. He could afford to be natural. Without being precisely *grand seigneur* either in speech or manner he was born in the purple both academically and ecclesiastically. His attainments so far had been worthy of his birth: his firsts,

WILLIAM TEMPLE

his presidency of the union, his fellowship at Queen's, his consciousness of wide reading, penetrating thought, skill in debate, as well as his personal acquaintance with men of repute in the two worlds of learning and of affairs—all alike put him well on the top row. However saintly he was, he could not have been blind to his own position. He had no need either to apologize or to bluster. He had an assured place and that assurance gave a naturally magisterial quality to his whole personality. He represented the English training of its ruling class at its best.

However, we are supposed to be dealing with Temple as an educator, and this must suffice for an introduction to the man with whom we have to do. I should like to deal with the subject under the two headings: How to Teach and What to Teach. Under the first heading we have a very good field for inspection since Temple taught so many different kinds of people and so was interested in education all along the line. It will be easiest and best to follow him chronologically in the various stages of his teaching career.

We have already begun in 1904 with his fellowship at Queen's. His red tie, to which we have drawn attention, denoted an interest in more than politics. It denoted the reformer in every branch of life. He had the lively and imaginative brain which saw how much better everything could be than it was, and drove him to set about the creation of new worlds. This was done in the best possible spirit. He was not at all one of the 'angry young men'. He did not get hot under the collar, nor did he deliberately exacerbate other people's feelings. He wanted to change things out of sheer *joie de vivre*: he was so overflowing with vitality and ideas that the old bottles could not contain the new wine. It is perhaps a somewhat melancholy reflection that the only organization he ever succeeded in remodelling was the legislative machinery of the Church of England.

However, at the moment he was much under the influence of ideas deriving from his father and from Thomas Arnold.

WILLIAM TEMPLE

They seemed to imply that if you could only get hold of all the religions and find their least common multiple you would have produced the ideal. It was a popular conception at the time until people began to reflect that it was precisely the *differentia* of each religion that made it interesting. But for the present Temple's liberal and reforming tendencies pushed him in the direction of undenominationalism. He supported Birrell's Education Bill of 1906 and was even in favour of undenominational training colleges. He would have liked to see a similar liberal and reforming spirit in the university. With six other tutors he formed the Catiline Club which met every week for an Unholy Lunch in contrast to the Holy Lunch party of the ecclesiastical traditionalists.

All this of course put him on good terms with the undergraduates. He had brought with him some of the easy manners that characterized relations between dons and undergraduates at Balliol, and these he carried into the lecture room. At any rate he thought that lectures for the schools should be popular while more serious study should be kept for the tutorial or the seminar. Perhaps this was because such an arrangement would suit his own particular style. He was supposed to lecture on the ancient philosophers, but he was said to be far more interested in his own ideas than in Plato's. How far this suited his pupils I don't know. Normal undergraduates don't want lectures to be either popular or learned: they just want to know what will get them through the next examination. And that, I am sure, would be anathema to Temple.

That comes out very clearly in his next teaching stage, at Repton, where he became headmaster in 1910. Here too it was rumoured that he came to his task with great ideas of reform. Whether he would have liked to revolutionize the public school system root and branch does not appear, but in any case it proved too strong for him, and he had to accept it for what it was. The promised revolution never materialized. He was not a good administrator and he was no better as a

WILLIAM TEMPLE

disciplinarian: in fact some unkind things were said about the moral condition of his own house. Nevertheless he was a real educationist. He was best with the older boys, whom he was able to treat on the same level as himself. He never paraded his learning and never talked down. He liked dealing with the sixth form, and no one was better calculated to understand better the difference between teaching them religion and teaching them about religion. We are told that the oldest and cleverest boys were entranced though others were apt to find themselves out of their depth. Even they could sympathize with him in his complete ignorance of mathematics, and I am sure they would enjoy his indifference to chronological precision in history. I once heard him say that he would far rather a boy knew round about when an event happened than know exactly when it happened, because in the latter case he had probably learnt the date parrot fashion whereas in the former he must know something about the other contemporary or near-contemporary events. That seems to me a good indication of his general educational method. The result is best indicated by the judgment of one who despaired of giving any more precise summing up of his efforts as a schoolmaster. 'Well at any rate he taught the whole school to think.' That is not a bad epitaph on a departing Head.

The next stage shows his method in dealing with adults. He joined the Workers' Educational Association in 1905 and was its President for the long period between 1908 and 1924. Those who are not familiar with this fine organization for adult education may be interested to know that it sprang from below and not from above. In this it offered a sharp contrast to the University Extension Lectures, which, as their name implies, emanated from the universities, and for that very reason attracted no more than the professional classes. W.E.A. on the contrary arose out of the combined efforts of the co-operative movement and Albert Mansbridge, and was intended, as its name suggested, mainly for

WILLIAM TEMPLE

artisans. This did not mean that it was not ready to call on the best brains in the universities when it could get them. As a matter of fact a quite surprising number of dons were ready to give their services to the movement. It was perhaps natural that, at least at the time when I knew it best, the favourite subjects of study were politics and economics. Later strenuous efforts were made to widen the horizon. Later still a parallel organization known as the Church Tutorial Classes was inaugurated to study theology in the same serious fashion, but that never had any widespread success.

In any case Temple would never have connived at the narrowing of horizons. He had an absorbing passion for adult education and he knew that a start must be made somewhere. Why not then begin where the men were most readily interested? But they must not get bogged down in economics. He knew all about wage-slaves, and realized how tempting it was to think that with a little skill in political economy one might help lead the way to freedom. But Temple said there was a worse slavery than economic slavery, namely that of the mind, and it was from that that a proper education might set men free. He understood well their passion for liberty and justice, but so long as they remained ignorant they could obtain neither. The further they penetrated into the power of government the more necessary it became that they should have adequate knowledge and understanding. I have heard him say in a public speech that since the working men had obtained the vote they had become our masters, and 'we must educate our masters'.

The aim of education, he said, was to enable us to understand the world we live in. This at any rate should prevent people from taking too small or partial a view. The object of such understanding was to enable us 'to raise what *is* to the level of what *might be*'. A somewhat grandiose scheme, one might think, but at least one that did not encourage narrow views. Many members of W.E.A. would no doubt have

WILLIAM TEMPLE

liked to use their studies to further personal ambitions and they no doubt would be against the introduction of too many subjects dealing with the humanities. I remember in a similar connection the story of an ambitious parent who asked that Johnny might be excused from the Scripture lesson 'because it would be of no value for his future life'. Members of W.E.A. might be on surer ground in thinking that a knowledge of poetry and general literature would not be of much use to them 'down at the works'. Though I must say I think that if I had to work at a machine or on an assembly line I should like to have my mind stored with poetry. I should hope that somehow its verbal beauty would give a new meaning to the mechanical rhythms to which my actions were attuned.

Whether Temple really had much knowledge of actual live working men I very much doubt. But I am certain he had a great love for them in the mass. Perhaps for that very reason he tended to idealize them. To him his work with the W.E.A. was not just another job; it was not even just an outlet for a laudable desire to help his fellow-men or to spread the light of learning. It was a genuine expression of his religion; he thought of it in religious terms. W.E.A. itself was a kind of sacrament in which the organization was the outward sign, and the inward grace was the pursuit of knowledge and brotherhood. The conjunction is worth noting. As these men got together over their studies they would find a certain fellowship in the pursuit of learning; they would be bound together in an ever closer brotherhood. And that sense of unity would in its turn lead them nearer to the social emancipation of which at that time they still felt the need. Was he too optimistic in this? Did he forget that the normal function of the intellect is analysis and that it therefore exposes differences more easily than it heals them? Perhaps too he was a little inclined to forget that his circle of W.E.A. enthusiasts was hardly likely to be typical of the working man. They would much more likely be the *élite*, the

WILLIAM TEMPLE

crème de la crème. The most you could hope from them would be that they might turn out an occasional leader and that the rest might be a leaven to leaven the whole lump of factory employees. If it has not turned out quite like that, at least the world would have been poorer without Temple's buoyant and undaunted enthusiasm.

I remember him once while still a young man addressing a mass meeting of men at Newcastle. He tried on them all the arts of eloquence he had brought from the Oxford Union and when it did not go down too well he tried the rapier-like wit that had never failed to rouse undergraduates to ecstasy. It glanced off the hide of the Geordies like a knitting needle off a crocodile's back. And then in despair he turned on his peroration, a lovely picture of the glorious world that would open its gates to those who followed his advice. It was a magnificent piece of sentimentalism, and as he sat down there was applause all over the building. The men responded at once to a touch of feeling as they had not done to a solid half-hour of clear, cold calculation. The lesson was not lost upon the speaker, and later when he went hunting for minds or souls he had a number of strings to his bow and a variety of arrows in his quiver.

We have seen then how he set about teaching undergraduates, schoolboys and adult working men. Let us see for a moment what was his attitude to educational administration. The opportunity occurs in relation to the Education Act of 1844. We find that his views had undergone a considerable change since the Birrell affair of 1906. He had become much more of a conservative in theological matters and that had affected his position with regard to the schools. Like most men who have to give up a large part of their time to administration he had found that mere vagueness would not do. However fine large and liberal ideas may sound on the platform they have to be translated into the specific details of everyday life and it is there that order and system are found to be completely necessary. And that makes for conservatism.

WILLIAM TEMPLE

However that may be, the fact is that whereas in 1906 Temple had appeared quite ready to accept an undenominational solution for the schools problem, by '1844 he had become a champion of the dual system. In this he moved with the times, for the old fierce hatred of church schools seems by then to have vanished. Under Mr. Butler's able diplomacy and obvious sincerity all parties were led to seek agreement. But in the case of Temple a real educational principle was at stake. He had come to feel that a severely uniform system of schools would actually be bad for the country. Variety might make difficulties at Whitehall, but it would enable more needs to be met. He wanted to see, even at the elementary stage, different types of school each with as large a measure of autonomy as possible. He therefore gave the Bill his whole-hearted backing.

He was of course fully in favour of the more specifically religious clauses in the measure. He regarded the emphasis on the period for worship as particularly important. The discussion on it gave occasion for one of his quick and unexpected insights. When a good deal of noise was being made about the consciences of the teachers who might be expected to conduct the worship or give the religious instruction, he observed that in addition to caring for the consciences of the teachers one ought to give a little attention to the consciences of the children. Needless to say the religious clauses in the Act are of the greatest importance. For the first time in the history of our country every child must have the opportunity of religious worship and instruction unless deliberately withdrawn by its parents or guardians.

He thought that the religious influence of the schools would be greatly helped by the extension of the leaving age, a feature of the Bill which he supported also, of course, on general educational grounds. But what gave him as an educationist quite peculiar pleasure was its emphasis on adult education. After he had given so much of his life to this cause, it was comforting to see it taken up so definitely by the

WILLIAM TEMPLE

government of the country. It is not very likely that he would have been happy at the slowness with which good intentions have been carried into effect, but it was a great thing that a start should have been made. Actually he was not spared to take any great part in carrying out the provisions of the Act either in its general purposes or as it affected the Church. He died the year after the Bill became law. It is fitting that we should pay tribute to one who did so much to assist the ministers of the Crown in effecting agreement among so many interested parties. Their united efforts succeeded in placing on the statute book by far the greatest educational measure we have ever known.

Having devoted so much of this lecture to Temple's views on the mechanics of teaching, we come now to consider his views on what was to be taught. I am not sure whether this is really within our terms of reference, but I hope so. People of my cloth are sometimes embarrassed by would-be benefactors who give us a lot of good advice about *how* we should preach while apparently regarding *what* we preach as of comparatively little importance. I have indeed listened to criticisms of a public speaker in which attention was entirely confined to the manner of the speech and the matter was not so much as mentioned. Certainly such a critique would never have satisfied the subject of our lecture. He had a great deal to say, and, although he was by no means blind to the need for saying it well, he put the importance of the thing said high above every other consideration.

His own teaching was so rich because he was gifted with an extraordinary largeness of mind. That may have been partly due to the fact that he had a perfect memory. He belonged to the small band of four men whom I have met at various stages of my own life, who, as one of them said, 'never forgot anything he ever read'.

You would of course naturally expect that the accumulated content of such a mind must give it a certain largeness

WILLIAM TEMPLE,

of vision. I am not suggesting that Temple was a 'polymath', a sort of walking encyclopaedia. Limitations were imposed upon his knowledge, both by his circumstances and by his tastes. We have already noticed his ignorance of mathematics. He was fond of music. At school he learnt to play the oboe, not because he thought it the best of instruments, but because he could not afford to buy a french horn, which he preferred. After this evidence of personal taste we may not be surprised to know that although he enjoyed church music he could not abide plain-song and Gregorian chants.

No, he was not a polymath. I should put down his largeness of mind rather to a certain imperial quality in his thinking. He was the very opposite of a specialist. To him learning was not a single kingdom continually retracting its boundaries year by year. He loved to feel that his feet were set in a large room. Learning was to him a great empire comprising many different kingdoms, and a man should be interested in as many of them as he could reasonably be expected to explore. He once expressed to me an architectural judgment which is very illuminating in this respect. 'As far as I am concerned,' he said, 'you could take all your Gothic cathedrals and roll them into one, and I wouldn't take the lot of them in exchange for St. Paul's'. Most people would regard that as a very surprising judgment, but they might remember that the style in which St. Paul's is built is often described as an 'imperial' style, and, remembering that, they may understand why Temple, if he was really the kind of person I am trying to describe, found it particularly sympathetic.

The branches of study in which Temple was most interested and about which he most loved discoursing were theology, philosophy, politics and economics. In this choice he belonged to the Anglican tradition established by F. D. Maurice, Westcott and Gore. It was his capacity to handle these different branches of study together and to see with clear vision their inter-relations that made him a leader of

WILLIAM TEMPLE

thought to his generation. I am not suggesting that in any one of these distinct disciplines he was the greatest man of his age. But I am suggesting that where these different lines met, at that point there was no one who could touch him. As these four subjects, in however simplified a form, make up the background of most people's thinking, it is not surprising that a very wide circle looked to him for light and leading.

Certainly they never looked in vain. It was no case of 'the hungry sheep look up and are not fed'. He had a quite clear vision himself and he was anxious to communicate it to others. He was not content to speak to an *élite* through his great books, *Mens Creatrix*; *Christus Veritas*; *Nature, Man and God*, and the *Readings in St. John's Gospel*. He wished to be understood by the man in the street. Hence a stream of small books which did a tremendous service in reaching thousands who could never have tackled the larger volumes. Hence also the anxiety to make the fullest possible use of broadcasting. 'You know,' said the authority who had the last word on the question who should be allowed on the air during the war, 'you know the Archbishop thought everything would be all right so long as I let him speak to the people often enough.'

His aim in this and every other kind of teaching was to present his hearers with an ordered and acceptable view of life. Not to leave them lost and wandering in an arid desert without map or compass, but to offer them what he himself called a 'map of the world', a guide to the meaning and purpose of existence. It was not just knowledge for its own sake, an ill-digested mass of information, but a clue to the labyrinthine maze of human affairs.

Some years ago Julien Brenda in his *La Trahison des Clercs* enunciated a charge against the universities, and indeed against all institutions engaged in teaching, which has since become classical. The teachers, he said had betrayed the very purpose for which they existed. They had become very proficient in instruction, they could teach the arts and sciences,

WILLIAM TEMPLE

they could cram for all sorts of examinations. But the one thing they could not or would not do was the very thing for which they were inaugurated, namely to inculcate an attitude to life. Men might come up, go through the whole curriculum, acquit themselves creditably in the final examinations, and then go down without having received the slightest help in acquiring an understanding of the meaning and purpose of life. We are reminded of T. S. Eliot's complaint in *The Rock*.

Where is the Life we have lost in living?

Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?

Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?

The cycles of Heaven in twenty centuries

Bring us farther from God and nearer to the Dust.

That is a complaint that could never be brought against Temple as a teacher. Whether he was even interested in learning for its own sake it would be difficult to say. There can be no doubt that its main interest for him was that it helped him to draw his 'map of the world'. It was that that he wished above all to present to his pupils young or old as a chart by which they could steer their way. It will have been noticed that all the subjects in which he was specially interested had a practical application. In fact, such is the perversity of the academic mind, he was sometimes debunked as a thinker precisely because he was thought to be too interested in the practical application to have time to get the theory right.

However that may be, he was always anxious to push his thoughts through to a conclusion. He could not be satisfied until he had arrived at some sort of synthesis which would present an overall rationale of the conclusions he had reached in each and all of his various branches of study. This synthesis he must be able to present as his own to the world. As he himself said, he wished to 'provide a coherent articulation of an experience'. His method of arriving at this articulation

WILLIAM TEMPLE

caused some uncasiness among the pundits. Although he admitted to being 'more of a philosopher than a theologian', his method was not that normal to the philosopher. He did not 'construct, stage by stage, a philosophical fabric where each conclusion becomes the basis of the next advance'. In his preface to *Nature, Man and God* he describes two strongly contrasted methods of thought and leaves us in no doubt which is his own.

'Men seem to differ very profoundly in the fashion of their thinking. If two men are presented with a novel suggestion and both exclaim, 'I must think about that', one will begin by putting together what he knows with reference to the subject, his former opinions based upon that knowledge, his general theories concerning that department of inquiry, and so forth; piece by piece he will work out his conclusion with regard to the suggestion made to him. The other will find that his mind goes blank; he will stare into the fire or walk about the room or otherwise keep conscious attention diverted from the problem. Then abruptly he will find that he has a question to ask, or a counter-suggestion to make, after which the mental blank returns. At last he is aware, once more abruptly, what is his judgment on the suggestion, and subsequently, though sometimes very rapidly, he also becomes aware of the reasons which support or necessitate it.

'My own mind is of the latter sort. All my decisive thinking goes on behind the scenes; I seldom know when it takes place—much of it certainly on walks or during sleep—and I never know the processes which it has followed. Often when teaching I have found myself expressing rooted convictions which until that moment I had no notion that I held. Yet they are genuinely rooted convictions—the response, not of my ratiocinative intellect, but of my whole being, to certain theoretical or practical propositions.'

However well this intuitive method served him as a philosopher, it did not prevent his books from presenting his arguments in a singularly lucid and cogent manner. By the time

WILLIAM TEMPLE

the whole apologetic position of Christianity to a thorough-going scrutiny made him a most acceptable missionary to the intelligentsia, as was made evident in his very successful mission to the undergraduates at Oxford.

In the sphere of technical theology he was anxious to restate the old truths in terms that would be acceptable to modern thinkers. He disliked the old 'substance' category, in the terms of which the established christology had been worked out, and wished to substitute for it that of 'value', in accordance with the Ritschlianism that was popular at the time. I do not myself believe that the two categories are as nearly interchangeable as Temple thought. I shall never forget how startled I was when I first came across the judgment, tucked away in a footnote, 'Of course if Jesus has the value of God, then he *is* God.' This identification of value with fact might lead to many absurd results and is not far from saying that a thing is just what it seems to be. But every schoolboy knows that all that glitters is not gold.

Temple made a more attractive application of his thesis in respect of sacramental theology and particularly of the Eucharist. He took what I suppose we should call a rather 'high' view of the Presence in relation to the bread and wine. He was forbidden by his Anglican formularies to hold the theory of transubstantiation and in any case, as we have seen, rejected the category of substance. For the latter reason he must avoid the solution of 'consubstantiation'. On practical grounds I think he would have found that view most satisfying but on purely philosophical grounds he pointed out that it was the most absurd of all solutions, for you could not have two substances at one and the same time serving the same set of accidents. The solution he himself proposed was that of 'transvaluation'. In the service and as used by the communicant the sacred elements ceased to have the value of bread and wine, purely physical food, and took on the value of the Body and Blood of Christ, our spiritual food. Whether he ever employed in this connection his former

WILLIAM TEMPLE

dictum and said, 'Of course if these elements have the value of Body and Blood, then they *are* Body and Blood,' I do not know.

At any rate his sense of sacramental values was powerful enough to affect his view of all life and of the whole universe. If eternal Spirit could be thus associated with the beggarly elements of bread and wine then all matter must be but a garment which revealed, even while it concealed, the person of God. To this view he wedded the theory of evolution, showing how each stage was a fresh manifestation of life, and how consequently each lower stage could only be understood in the terms of the one above it. It was therefore not origins but ends which were important, and the whole of existence was incapable of explanation apart from its true end, which was God. This did not detract from the relative importance of the material. Indeed it was this spiritual view of the universe that gave its importance to matter, and Temple was not afraid to say that of all religions Christianity was the most materialist. But that, he might have added, is true of all the sacraments. The outward and visible is important just because it is an effective sign of an inward and spiritual grace. And Temple would have contended that his view of the universe was essentially sacramental.

It was easy of course for Temple to carry this view into the sphere of politics and economics, his other major interests. Society itself was intended to be moulded after the pattern of the Kingdom of God. Its ordering was intended to reflect an acknowledgment of the divine will and its part in human affairs. The duty of Christian statesmen was to fashion all things after the pattern that had been shown them 'on the mount'. Temple wrote a Penguin on the subject which became a best-seller and has been used by thousands as a textbook. It was when he tried to translate his views into the hard facts of banking and currency that he met with the fiercest opposition. Our City magnates thought that there the Archbishop was quite out of his depth. Or perhaps it

WILLIAM TEMPLE

would be truer to say that he was too much in the depths to tread water safely amid the niceties of banking, which after all is an eminently superficial matter.

Into these regions I have no intention of trying to follow him for fear I should expose my own ignorance, which is more monumental than that of any schoolboy. I will only say that when he found the banking fraternity was solid against him he did not lose his courage but boldly asked them to meet him and show him where he was wrong. That *was* typical of him. He was quite ready to be convinced and was never afraid to retrace his steps when necessary. In this particular instance neither side succeeded in convincing the other. But it is not a bad moment at which to leave him, in very much the same attitude as that in which we found him.

As he had not been afraid to fly his colours in face of an Oxford Common Room, so he was not afraid to fly them against the embattled powers of the City of London. I am not sure which situation one would find the more daunting: one can only express sincere admiration for a leader who had sufficient moral stamina to face either.

In conclusion, I need only express the hope that I have presented a picture of a man who was a born teacher, to whom teaching was not only a passion but a part of the very vocation to which he was called. I have omitted other matters, such as his vast work for the ecumenical movement, which made his name a household word throughout Christendom. But teaching was his life because by it he thought he could put people in touch with Christ, and it is as a Christian teacher that we can see him best.

